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Abstract 
Special economic zones were introduced as an important component of China's 
open-door policy. Although the impact of the growth of special economic zones is 
not large in the context of overall development, or even in the growth of exports, 
their performance has attracted considerable attention. It is also of interest to policy 
makers in China, who are seeking to evaluate existing and possible economic 
policies for industrialization in a reformed economic system. 
This study develops a cost-benefit analysis framework within which shadow 
prices can be consistently estimated, to undertake evaluations of public investment in 
China. A shadow price of capital is calculated for China as a whole. Because of the 
large size of the geographical economy, market segmentation and restricted 
geographic labour mobility, the estimation of the shadow price of skilled and 
unskilled labour is only applicable to the Xiamen zone. These shadow prices. are 
employed in a case study, to facilitate analysis of the economy of a region in the 
Xiamen special economic zone, the Huli export processing zone. Some 
recommendations are made on improvements in resource allocation which could 
enhance welfare gains from the special economic zone. 
The study of shadow prices suggests that the nature of the centrally planned 
economy and the pursuit of self reliance at all costs distorted the Chinese economy. 
The limits placed on the operation of market mechanisms have resulted in a great 
divergence of market prices from economic prices. 
The shadow prices of capital and labour indicate that the actual prices facing 
producers are highly distorted. The market price of capital is well below its true 
opportunity cost to the economy, while that of unskilled labour is well above its 
opportunity cost. Hence, the Huli zone has been the recipient of very large capital 
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subsidies which have represented high costs to the Chinese economy. Real labour 
costs faced by zone producers and construction firms, on the otµer hand, are 
relatively high in relation to the opportunity cost of this labour. Given China's factor 
endowment, it needs to use labour intensive techniques for export. But in reality, 
there is a strong tendency to favour most recently developed technology. The Huli 
zone is therefore dominated by excessively capital and technology intensive 
techniques in the provision of infrastructural services and production. 
The case study shows that the Huli zone project is not viable economically 
unless the positive externalities, such as technology and managerial skill transfer 
have significant effects on the Chinese economy. To raise the welfare effects of the 
Huli zone, the design of the zone should be improved. Sensitivity analysis 
confirmed that the Huli zone should adopt more appropriate technology, reduce 
capital intensive inputs, markedly reduce domestic borrowing, eliminate government 
subsidies in the usage of public utilities and encourage the use of more local raw 
materials and capital goods inputs. This would lead to an appreciably higher 
economic rate of return to the Chinese economy. 
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Chapter 1 
China's Special Economic Zones and the Relevance of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
1.1 Introduction 
China initiated a program of economic reforms in 1978. The establishment of four 
special economic zones in Guandong and Fujian provinces in 1980 has been at the 
forefront of the policies effecting an opening to the outside world. To discuss the 
success or failure of China's special economic zones, it is necessary first to outline 
the economic objectives the government has set for them. Various countries' 
economic objectives can be identified by studying their announced policies. 
However, a mere listing of the objectives set by the Chinese government does not 
provide sufficient understanding of the importance of the role of the zones in the new 
development strategy. The emergence of the special economic zones, their 
objectives and roles, must also be seen in the context of past economic development 
strategy and performance. 
Economic development strategies. Since the establishment of the People's 
Republic of China in 1949, the aim of economic development has been to build a 
modem, powerful socialist state. Industrialization was both a key component of the 
objective and the means of its achievement. The industrialization strategies that 
China adopted during the last forty years were at the expense of agriculture, 
infrastructure and light industries. 
Taking the years from 1949 to 1975, the growth of heavy industry surpassed 
the growth of light industry except in the period of readjustment 1963-65 (China 
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Statistical Yearbook 1989:53). Industrialization suffered frequent shifts in policy 
and economic objectives were eclipsed by political objectives. 
Economic management system. China's central planning proved to be 
extremely cumbersome and inefficient before economic reforms began in 1978. 
State-owned enterprises received production targets and the prices of products were 
set centrally. Raw materials and fuel were also allocated centrally. Products were 
purchased by the government and profits were handed over to the government. 
Losses were also the responsibility of the government. The government provided 
investment and working capital for state-owned enterprises. 
Under this system ('eating from the iron-pot'), enterprises received everything 
from the state and returned everything to the state. They had no responsibility for 
their production, and no incentive to lower costs or to improve management Well 
managed enterprises were not rewarded, and poorly managed ones were not 
penalized. Leadership was 'blind'. Planners were poorly informed and targets 
inevitably unrealistic. 
By the end of 1978, it became evident that to modernize the Chinese economy 
changes were needel'. Growth in agriculture and light industry had to be accelerated 
to relieve serious shortages of consumer goods and industrial raw materials. In 
addition, productivity had to be increased and employment had to be created to 
ensure economic and political stability. However, the changes could not be 
accomplished and growth could not be accelerated without opening the Chinese 
economy to the outside world. It was under these circumstances that China started to 
reform its economy in 1978. 
The new strategy of economic development in 1978 consists of two elements, 
that is economic reform and opening to the outside world. Economic reform mainly 
refers to improving domestic economic efficiency by introducing decentralization 
2 
and the market mechanism. Opening to the outside world relates to the changing 
attitude of the Chinese government ~owards foreign economic rel~tions, that is, 
foreign trade, foreign aid, foreign loans and foreign direct investment. The special 
economic zones bear a close relationship with the economic reforms as well as the 
open door policy. 
1.2 The concept of export processing zones 
Export processing zones are an extension, and .~:-:velopment, of free ports which have 
a long history. The existence of free ports can be traced back to Roman times 
(Kreider 1975:43-4). They were normally located in a defined geographical area on 
the world's major trade routes. The main activities of free ports were trans-shipment 
and intermediate services of cargo breaking, storage and the re-export of goods. By 
not being subject to customs duties, they abolished impediments to the international 
movement of goods, services, capital and people (Hughes 1988:164). 
Industrial estates, originating in depressed industrial areas in the United 
Kingdom in the 1930s, also contributed to the concept of export processing zones. 
Infrastructure facilities and public utilities were provided to attract entrepreneurs to 
rev~ve depressed industrial areas. More recently, developing countries built on the 
industrial estate concept to give priority to developing public utilities and other 
infrastructural facilities in selected areas. This was done to facilitate the 
development of manufacturing industries and to overcome infrastructural bottle-
necks in the process of industrialization. The areas so designated have been called 
industrial estates or parks. 
Since the 1960s the concepts of free ports and industrial estates have been 
brought together in export processing zones which seek to combine the availability 
of inputs into manufacturing at international prices for export, with the availability of 
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internationally priced infrastructures in a suitable location with access to 
international trade routes. Administration has to be simple and effi~ient. If these 
essential conditions exist, no further regulations or incentives are necessary. 
The first export processing zone was developed in 1956 in Ireland at the 
Shannon International Airport (Hughes 1988:167). It provided an impetus for 
developing countries to follow. By 1988about100 export processing zones operated 
in Asian countries (Osborne 1986) and about 600 in other developing countrien 
(Hughes 1988). Export processing zones should not be identified with the 
establishment of modem manufacturing plants or with incentives to foreign (or local) 
entrepreneurs although this is a definition associated with the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization which defines export processing zones as the 
'establishment of modem manufacturing plants inside an industrial estate, by offering 
a suitable package of investment incentives to both foreign and domestic 
entrepreneurs' (Vittal 1977:1). 
1.3 The development of export processing zones in East Asian countries 
Since the end of the Second World War, developing countries have followed various 
dev~lopment strategies. Industrialization was generally a component of such 
strategies. In the 1950s and 1960s, the policy of promoting import substitution 
prevaile i. This policy essentially promoted industrial development by using tariff 
and other protective measures. The aim was to reduce or eliminate imports of 
manufactured goods, reserving the domestic markets for local products. 
Problems of import substitution soon emerged. Import substitution strategies 
attracted resources to protected import-competing activities, so that an inefficient, 
high cost industrial structure producing poor quality products resulted. A bias was 
created against exporters who had to pay high prices for raw materials and 
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intermediate goods and were thus unable to compete in world markets. Import 
substitution was initially undertaken, in part at least, because counbj.es wanted to 
relieve their balance of payments problems. Contrary to this expectation, the 
establishment of protected domestic production increased the demand for imported 
raw materials, components and machinery. The bias against exports of traditional 
and manufactured goods impeded the growth of foreign exchange earnings. Balance 
of payments problems became more, rather than less, serious (Krueger 1981 ). 
Hong Kong had never adopted import substituting policies, and in the late 
1950s Taiwan followed its example. In the early 1960s the Republic of Korea took 
the same path and in 1965 Singapore turned sharply toward exports. Other East 
Asian countries - notably Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia - had never gone as far 
in import substitution strategies as other developing countries, avoiding the chaotic 
pattern of import substitution incentives and restrictive trade regimes typical of most 
developing countries (Hughes 1988). In the 1970s the leading East Asian counµies 
demonstrated that export orientation gave a nation access to a large market, enabling 
it to take advantage of its factor endowment without being subject to demand 
constraints on specialization. A country that exports to a world market enjoys 
economies of scale, a high utilization of resources, consolidation of learning-by-
doing effects and competitive gains. The result is low costs and high quality of 
production. An effective export orientation thus results not only in rapid export 
growth but also stimulates overall growth (Balassa 1978). 
Developing countries are characterized by a lack of capital and low levels of 
skill and technology. Their relatively abundant labour supply, however, enables 
them to compete in international markets by exploiting this source of comparative 
advantage. Abundant labour attracts foreign investors. Several East Asian 
economies sought to take advantage of their labour abundance in international trade. 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore opted for allowing a significant role for foreign 
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investment. In contrast, in the Republic of Korea, reliance on foreign investment 
was extremely limited until relatively recently. 
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea took major policy steps to offset existing 
import substitution policies to make exporting attractive to producers. Hong Kong 
was attractive to foreign investors because of its free trade character and Singapore 
soon became so as administrative measures were taken to provide foreign investors 
with a 'one stop' entry shop through the Economic Development Board. In the 
1980s, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia pursued economic reforms desjgned to 
promote manufactured exports goods. 
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, established export processing zones in the 
1960s to enable exporters, and particularly foreign investors, to operate effectively 
outside the import substituting environment. Taiwan established Kaohsiung in 1965, 
the Republic of Korea opened Masan in 1969 and Malaysia followed with Penang in 
1971 (Warr 1983a, 1987). The principal objective of export processing zones was to 
isolate export producers from the complexities of import substitution policies, to 
provide an efficient and honest administration, to provide inputs and infrastructure at 
world prices and thus, to facilitate exports. 
A large number of other attempts to establish export processing zones 
followed. In some cases existing industrial estates were turned into export 
processing zones, bonded factories were established and attempts were made to turn 
some ports into free trade ports. But although almost 100 export processing zones 
were started in Asia (Osborne 1986), the overwhelming maj<;>~ty of attempts to 
establish export processing zones have failed. 
One of the main causes of the unsuccessful experiences of export processing 
zones was poor location such as the Philippines Bataan zone (Warr 1985a). Such 
decisions were made because the primary objective of establishing export processing 
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zones was not exports, but the development of a backward region. Inefficient 
administration, poor infrastructure and costly public utilities as we~l as excessive 
regulations were also some of the main causes of failure. 
1.4 The objectives of China's special economic zones 
China's special economic zones are expected to: attract foreign investment; increase 
exports and hence foreign exchange earnings; increase employment opportunities; 
transfer advanced technology and management skills; and provide backward linkage 
effects with other domestic sectors. 
To fulfil these objectives preferential treatment is offered to the firms 
operating in the zones. Although the details of the incentive packages vary from 
zone to zone, they can be divided into the following groups: 
• tax exemptions provided by the host country, such as exemption from import 
and export duties, exemption from or reduction in company income tax, 
exemption from personal income tax and the tax on dividends and accelerated 
depreciation on plant, machinery and buildings; 
• low land use costs, subsidized public utility prices; 
· freedom granted to foreign investors in share of ownership and in repatriating 
and remitting profits and in foreign exchange controls; 
• efficient administrative services through one-stop administrative organizations; 
and 
• financial assistance provided by the host country. 
However, the four special economic zones in China differ from export 
processing zones in other East Asian countries in several important aspects (Chu and 
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Wong 1985, Wall 1991). China remains a planned economy, so the market nature of 
the special economic zones is in contrast to the rest of its economy._ Thus special 
economic zones serve as a laboratory for private enterprise and market development 
strategy, and as a show-place for advanced technology and management methods. 
Hence, the special economic zones potentially have more significant implications for 
China than the export processing zones have for other East Asian countries. 
Table 1.1 The size of special economic zones and of export processing zones in 
East Asian countries 
Country 
Special economic zones 
China 
Export processing zones 
Taiwan 
India 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
SriLanka 
Zones 
Shenzhen 
Zhuhai 
Shantou 
Xiamen 
Gao Xiong 
Taizhong 
Kandi a 
Jakata 
Masan 
BayanLepas 
Bataan 
Katona Yake 
Land area 
Square kilometres 
327.5 
15.2 
52.6 
125.5 
0.7 
0.2 
2.8 
0.1 
1.8 
2.0 
3.5 
2.0 
Zones vary in geographic size from whole territories such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore, to the small industrial estate type of zones such as Jakata and Taizhong 
zones. The latter are usually enclave areas enclosed by fences separated from the 
rest of the economy (Wall 1991). The special economic zones in_ Ghina are city-style 
export processing zones, except for Shenzhen zone which is fenced off physically as 
well. They are separated from the rest of the economy by policies. But they are 
much larger in land area and have larger resident populations than most industrial 
estate type of zones in other East Asian countries (Table 1.1). 
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Unlike the small East Asian export processing zones which only possess a 
narrow range of manufacturing activities, the special economic zone~ in China are 
comprehensive development units. Foreign investment is not only being encouraged 
in export processing activities in the manufacturing sector, but also in the other 
economic sectors such as agriculture, construction, tourism, real estate development, 
commerce and other service activities. Hence, the special economic zones have 
broader development objectives as in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Among the initial considerations in setting up special economic zones was the 
choice of areas to test the new economic policies. It was hoped that special 
economic zones would serve as experimental grounds for the appropriateness of the 
new economic development strategies that incorporated an 'outward orientation• to 
the world. The testingMground nature of the special economic zones was later 
reiterated in early 1984, Deng Xiaoping summarized the function of the special 
economic zones as being 'to serve as the windows of technology, managell!ent, 
knowledge, and open-door policy' (Year-book of China's Special Economic Zones 
1984:102). 
It was hoped that through the creation of the special economic zones, China 
could re-establish foreign economic relationships and strengthen 'economic 
cooperation' with other countries. A further aim was to import advanced technology 
through broader and deeper foreign economic relations. These objectives were 
described in Article One of the Regulations on special economic zones in 
Guangdong Province in terms of aiming to 'develop external economic cooperation 
and technical exchanges and promote the socialist modernization programme'. 1.n 
late 1984, Premier Zhao Ziyang summarized the function of the special economic 
zones and the fourteen coastal cities as 'hubs for foreign and domestic interchange, 
like the two sides of a fan' (Shijie Jingji Daobao, 31December1984:1). 
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An important objective was the introduction of advanced technology and 
management by direct foreign investment. In 1983, Premier Zhao Ziyang went so 
far as to say 
Special economic zones are not being developed to solve the employment 
problem, nor should they aim solely for increases in output. Rather, they are 
areas designated to attract enterprises of high technological content through 
the off er of preferential treatment. They are to serve as windows of advanced 
production, technology and management methods of the world (Shenzhen 
Special Zone Herald, 14 November 1983). 
Economic factors were not the only considerations in the creation of the 
special economic zones. The creation of the Shenzhen and the Xiamen zones were 
of unique significance to national unification with Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
respectively. The market economy features of the zones were to show to the outside 
world that China intended to participate in the world economy and that private 
enterprise means of production were to be tolerated in China. The proposal for 'one 
nation, two systems' was projected as a possible path of national unification on the 
basis of foreign investment in the special economic zones, and elsewhere in China. 
The nature of the special economic zones made it inevitable that some of the 
objectives set by the Chinese government could not be achieved. In fact, the only 
real economic logic justifying the establishment of the special economic zones is to 
offset some of the domestic policies which impede foreign direct investment, hamper 
export development and prevent China from turning its comparativ_e advantage into a 
competitive advantage. The special economic zones can not create comparative 
advantage. They can only help to remove obstacles to its exploitation (Wall 1986). 
Given China's factor endowment, China's comparative advantage is in labour-
intensive manufacture. China' special economic zones should encourage the use of 
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labour-intensive techniques for tixport. The expected advanced technology transfers 
from firms entering special economic zones are not realistic and have QOt occurred to 
a significant extent. Like most export processing zones in the other Asian countries 
(Warr 1983a, 1983b, 1985a, 1987), most of the firms operating in the special 
economic zones are involved in labour intensive production. They use little 
advanced technological knowledge. Technological knowledge has a commercial 
value. Those firms which do have unique technological advantages protect their 
knowledge carefully. 
According to Wall (1988), China can utilize the full potential of the special 
economic zones and benefit from the externalities that they generate only when the 
overall economic environment is also being liberalized. If the present domestic 
policy framework is maintained, the special economic zones might be expected to 
yield only marginal gains for the Chinese economy. 
1.5 The main objectives of the study 
The four zones in Guandong and Fujian provinces were established in 1980 as an 
important component of China's open-door policy. Although the impact of the 
gro_wth of special economic zones is not large in the context of overall development, 
their performance has attracted considerable attention. 'The main objectives of this 
study are first to calculate shadow prices for capital, unskilled and skilled labour, and 
for some of the important traded and non-traded commodities, so as to facilitate 
evaluations of public investment in China; second, to develop a cost benefit 
framework within which the impact of the Huli zone in Xiamen can be examined; 
and finally to recommend improvements in the current design of the Huli zone. 
The Little-Mirrlees (1974) and Squire-Van der Tak (1975) method of socio-
economic cost-benefit analysis is applied in this study. The Huli zone appears to be 
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financially efficient. However, distortions in market prices suggest that the Huli 
zone might not be efficient in economic terms. Two hypotheses are posed. 
I • 
(i) The Huli zone is financially efficient. That is, its financial rate of return 
exceeds real interest rates. 
(ii) The Huli zone is not economically efficient. That is, the real economic 
internal rate of return is less than China's real social discount rate. 
Whether hypothesis (ii) is correct or not, the efficiency of the Huli zone could 
be raised by improving the design of the zone. The appropriate measures might 
include adopting appropriate technology, reducing capital inputs and skilled labour 
inputs, encouraging the use of local unskilled labour, raw materials and capital 
goods. The thesis will examine the degree to which these measures might raise the 
real economic rate of return from the zone. 
1.6 The arrangement of the thesis 
The thesis contains two parts. The first part, from chapter 2 to 6, mainly 
concentrates on the estimation of shadow prices for China. Chapter 2 reviews the 
framework of cost-benefit analysis. The conversion factors for traded and non-
traded goods are estimated in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 the social discount rate is 
estimated. The shadow price of capital is estimated in Chapter 5. The shadow price 
of labour is derived in Chapter 6. 
The second part of the thesis, from Chapter 7 to Chapter 10, applies cost 
benefit analyzis to the Huli zone in Xiamen. The investment environment in China is 
discussed in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 describes the conceptual framework for applying 
cost-benefit analysis to China's special economic zones. Chapter 9 describes the 
development of the Huli zone in Xiamen. This is followed in Ch:tpter 9 by a 
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financial and economic analysis of the Huli project. The policy implications are 
summarized in Chapter 10. 
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Part one 
Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis and Shadow Pricing Applied to China 
Chapter2 
Literature Review of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
2.1 Development of cost-benefit analysis 
The rapid growth of the public sector in modem societies, has meant that large sums 
of public money are collected from the population directly or indirectly by central 
governments and local authorities to be committed to public investment projects. It 
is essential to ensure that such investments have high and positive returns, when 
compared to alternative uses of such resources. In other words, scarce resources 
should be used to maximize social welfare. 
Cost-benefit analysis allows investment projects to be evaluated and ranked 
according to their likely socio-economic returns. Furthermore, the returns to projects 
can be greatly enhanced by using cost-benefit analysis to improve their design from a 
socio-economic point of view. Because the cost-benefit method relies on a project-
by-project analysis, it is described as a 'bottom-up' approach to distinguish it from a 
general equilibrium 'top-down' approach. In the latter, the economic system is 
considered as a whole and investment requirements are derived for each sector from 
a detailed model of the economy. Although this approach may appear to be 
conceptually sounder, in practice it has not proved to be practical. Therefore most 
careful assessments of the efficiency and effectiveness of public investment rely on 
cost-benefit analysis. 
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2.2 The theoretical basis of cost-benefit analysis 
The theoretical basis of cost-benefit evaluation techniques can be traced back to 
welfare economics. In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith (1776) argued that in a 
competitive environment, individual entrepreneurs would tend to maximize social 
welfare at the same time as they sought to maximize their own individual welfare. 
Later, Pareto (1896) laid down conditions under which the welfare of individuals 
would be maximized. Following Pareto, the conventional theory of welfare 
economics rests on the rule that welfare is unambiguously improved if at least one 
person is made better off, and no one is made worse off, by a particular course of 
action. 
However, the Pareto criterion has a major defect. It is so restrictive that it can 
only be applied to a very narrow range of policies. For example, it cannot be used to 
evaluate a policy which benefits some people at the expense of others. In other 
words, the Pareto criterion does not deal with the problem of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. 
To address this problem Hicks (1939) and Kaldor (1939) developed their 
compensation criterion. This provided a methodology for the evaluation of changes 
in the welfare of individuals and for the analysis of policies which benefit some 
individuals at the expense of others. This is usually referred to as the Hicks-Kaldor 
compensation criterion, but it is also known as the potential Pareto improvement 
criterion. According to this criterion, even if an economic change makes some 
people better off and others worse off, provided the gainers c'?u~d compensate the 
losers for their loss, and still be better off themselves, the change would be desirable. 
The major advantage of the compensation test is that it provides a measure of social 
welfare in money terms based on current market prices. This is comparable to the 
measure of national income, making it possible to determine which policies would 
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maximize national income if all activities were correctly evaluated, since each policy 
could be judged in terms of its impact on national income. The di~advantages of 
using the Hicks-Kaldor compensation test are, however, the same as those of using 
national income as a measure of social welfare (Irvin 1978:309). 
Scitovsky (1941) criticized the Hicks-Kaldor criterion for the undue weight 
given to the income distributional pattern, and the associated price set prevailing in 
the initial position. He suggested that a change to the new position should meet the 
Hicks-Kaldor criterion but that a movement back from the new to the old position 
should not. In other words, he added a second part to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion by 
requiring that the losers from the change should not be able to 'bribe' the gainers to 
oppose the change. The second part of the Scitovsky two-way criterion has come to 
be known as the Scitovsky reversal criterion. 
Little considered both the Hicks-Kaldor criterion and the Scitovsky two-way 
criterion inadequate. He argued that 'income distribution must... be admitted as an 
ethical variable, to which values, favourable or unfavourable, are given, and we must 
have a criterion which includes this variable' (1957:96). He therefore proposed a 
combined judgment regarding the distribution of welfare with the use of the Hicks-
Kaldor criterion and the Scitovsky reversal criterion. This would be a criterion to 
establish the actual, rather than merely the potential, superiority of policy changes. 
Mishan (1963) and Nath (1964) argued that a combination of compensation 
tests and judgments about distribution is of limited value. However, despite the 
limitations of using compensation tests to evaluate public inv~s!ment, such tests 
form the basis of cost-benefit analysis. That is, a project is considered worthwhile if 
the money value of the benefits to gainers is greater than the money value of costs to 
the losers. 
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Another line of argument that emerged as the use of cost-benefit analysis 
increased was that a competitive environment did not necessarily result in an optimal 
i • 
solution. Pigou (1932) was one of the earliest critics of the optimality of market 
solutions. He pointed out that the market solution did not take into account the 
externalities in the system. 
Further complications arise when the issue of deducing a social welfare 
function is raised. Some authors believed that the social welfare function can be 
formulated through a political voting procedure. However, Arrow (1951) showed 
that, paradoxically, majority decisions may not be consistent. Thus, a social welfare 
function generated by majority decisions does not necessarily satisfy optimal 
conditions. 
Another type of problem associated with a market solution arises from 
government intervention. Such intervention often creates distortions in the economy 
rather than correcting market failures, so that market solutions yield non-optimal 
prices and quantities. 
2.3 Project appraisal methods: background 
The idea of measuring the net advantages of a capital investment project in terms of 
a society's net utility gains originated with Dupuit He not only pointed out that 
'political economy has not yet defined in any precise manner the conditions which 
these (public) works must fulfil in order to be really useful' (Dupuit 1844:83), but 
also proceeded to develop his definition of what we now call con~u!11ers' surplus, that 
is the excess of consumers' willingness to pay for a good or service over and above 
its market price, as a measure of the net welfare gain from a project. 
The first practical widespread application of cost-benefit analysis concepts of 
the type discussed by Dupuit was to evaluate public investments in water resources 
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in the United States in the 1950s (United States Inter-Agency Committee on Water 
Resources 1958). In the 1950s and 1960s many practical applications .were reported. 
These were primarily concerned with public investment decisions in industrial 
market-oriented countries. Since then, however, cost-benefit analysis has also 
played an increasingly important role in government decisions in developing 
countries (Little and Mirrlees 1969, Harberger 1972). 
In the 1950s and early 1960s the main emphasis in strategies for economic 
development was the growth of national income. Consequently, cost-benefit 
analysis assessed investment projects in terms of their contribution to the growth of 
the economy. By the end of the 1960s, it was argued that in spite of substantial 
increases in national income, the standard of living of lower income groups had not 
necessarily improved in most developing countries. In some cases it was even 
argued that standards of living had deteriorated (Chene1y et al. 1986). Such 
arguments were later substantiated. Sustained growth has had positive inc?me 
distribution effects in developing countries whilst increased concern with the 
distribution of income has had some positive (as well as many negative) effects. 
Cost-benefit analysis methodologies began to incorporate distribution objectives, in 
addition to growth objectives, into the social welfare function. 
Cost-benefit analysis can be undertaken in two stages. The first stage is 
economic analysis. This relates to traditional project appraisal methods which are 
mainly concerned with selecting projects which maximize the growth of national 
income through the efficient allocation of scarce resources. The second stage is 
social cost-benefit analysis which incorporates a system of weights· for both the inter-
temporal and the intra-temporal distribution of income. 
In developing countries, with their greatly distorted price systems, private 
profitability often bears little or no relation to real social costs and benefits. 
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Techniques were therefore developed to estimate shadow or accounting prices, for 
the calculation of the economic and social profitability of projects. The calculation 
of private profitability and social net benefit differs not only in respect to the 
valuation of inputs and outputs, but also in the nature of costs and benefits included 
in the evaluation. 
2.4 Approaches to shadow pricing 
Shadow prices are defined by Squire and Van der Tak as 'the value of the 
contribution to the country's basic socio-economic objectives made by any marginal 
change in the availability of commodities or factors of production' (1975:26). 
Hence, shadow prices will not only depend on a country's objectives but also on the 
economic environment in which the marginal changes occur. 
To the extent that government policies ai;~ the source of market distortions, it 
is appropriate to estimate the shadow prices associated with 'first-best' optimum 
equilibrium prices if these price distorting policies are to be discontinued. Advocates 
of this shadow pricing procedure include Tinbergen (1958), and Bacha and Taylor 
(1971). 
More recently, the development of the shadow pricing approach has been 
based on second-best optimum prices. This corresponds to deriving first-order 
conditions in order to maximize welfare, treating the existence of market distortions 
as constraints. Two important contributions to this area have been the Dasgupta, 
Marglin and Sen (1972), the Little and Mirrlees (1974) and Squire. and Van der Tak 
(1975). 
These two techniques involve different methods of incorporating the f01~ign 
exchange premium in the country concerned - that is the proportion by which the 
official exchange rate understates the true value of foreign exchange in an economy. 
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They also employ a different method of incorporating the investment premium into 
the cost-benefit analysis. 
(a) The Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972) approach. The method which 
was traditionally employed in cost-benefit analysis and also used in the Dasgupta, 
Marglin, and Sen (1972) is a shadow exchange rate approach. In this approach, all 
traded goods for a project are valued in border prices and then converted from border 
prices to local currency price equivalents by multiplying the foreign exchange price 
by a shadow exchange rate, rather than the official exchange rate. Non-traded goods 
used or produced by the project are valued in domestic prices in local currency, after 
adjusting for distortions of the economy. The latter include taxes. No additional 
adjustment is necessary to make non-traded goods prices reflect their over-valuation 
in relation to traded goods. 
(b) The Little and Mirrlees (1974) and Squire and Van der Tak (1975). 
The distinctive feature of the Little and Mirrlees (1974) approach is the attempt to 
relate public production to international trade. They divide commodities !:-ito traded 
and non-traded categories and argue that the shadow price of traded commodities, 
whether they are actually traded or not, is their international (border) price, and the 
sha,dow price of non-traded commodities is their foreign exchange equivalent. 
Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen objected to this approach on the grounds that the 
use of world prices assumes that the project evaluators can influence government 
trade policies. That is, the approach assumes that they can remove quantitative 
restrictions on trade and reduce tariffs. They argued that. this was a highly 
questionable assumption for most developing countries. 
Squire and Van der Tak (197 5) refined and clarified the Little and Mirrlees 
approach and suggested the use of world prices as appropriate shadow prices, but 
they do take into consideration the criticism of the unrealistic trade policy 
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assumption. In cases where project evaluators fail to persuade governments to 
remove exclusive trade restrictions, Squire and Van der Tak maintain that the good 
or service concerned should be treated as non-traded. Similarly, commodities 
subject to rigid quantitative restrictions should be treated as non-traded goods and 
valued according to their social marginal cost or social marginal benefit, or a 
weighted average of the two. Squire and Van der Tak took the further step of taking 
income distribution explicitly into consideration in deriving shadow prices. They 
suggest a two-step procedure. First, 'efficiency prices' are derived purely on the basis 
of resource allocation considerations. Second, income distribution considerations are 
introduced, turning efficiency prices into 'social prices'. 
In the Little and Mirrlees, Squire and Van der Tak approach, the foreign 
exchange premium is incorporated into project appraisal inversely. Traded goods are 
valued in border prices expressed in foreign currency, while non-traded goods' 
values are deflated by conversion factors. These conversion factors are the ratio of 
the non-traded goods' border price equivalents to their domestic prices. In this way 
the Little and Mirrlees, Squire and Van der Tak approach converts domestic prices of 
non-traded goods into the border prices of their traded good equivalents. 
Hence, the approach for Dasgupta, Marglin, and Sen and the approach for 
Little-Mirrlees, Squire and Van der Tak have the same effect of making traded and 
non-traded goods prices comparable. There is no substantive theoretical difference 
between the two approaches. 
2.5 The numeraire employed in cost-benefit analysis 
The numeraire is the common yardstick by which all costs and benefits generated by 
a project are assessed. Any commodity or resou1ce can be used as this unit of 
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account. However, once it has been chosen, all values must consistently be 
expressed in that numcraire. 
In the Dasgupta, Marglin, and Sen (1975) approach, social benefits generated 
by projects are valued in terms of the consumption enjoyed by the average income 
recipient. If project output available for reinvestment is considered to be more 
valuable than that for consumption, project benefits available for re-investment will 
be inflated by using an investment premium to put them into consumption output 
value equivalents. !n the case that distribution of income is considered to be sub-
optimal, income distribution weirhts will be used to revalue the project outpui; 
accruing to different income groups. Finally, they are all revalued in terms of the 
consumption income received by the average income group. 
In the Little and Mirrlees, Squire and Van der Tak approach, all commodities 
are measured in terms of 'uncommitted social income, measured in terms of 
convertible foreign e Kchange' (Little and Mirrlees, 1974:145). In other words,· the 
'public income measured in foreign exchange' (Squire and Van der Tak, 1975:113) is 
the chosen numeraire. 
With the sub-optimal saving argument, the Little and Mirrlees, Squire and 
Van der Tak approach deflates project outputs committed to consumption by the 
inverse of the investment premium, to put them into investable funds value 
equivalents. If the distribution of income is considered to be sub-optimal and 
income distiibution weights are used, social benefits generated from a project are 
valued in terms of income accruing to the group on the critical income level. At this 
income level, the government is indifferent between an increase in its own income 
(measured in foreign exchange) and the same quantity of foreign exchange assigned 
to private sector consumption (Squire and Van der Tak 1975:107). 
The Little-Mirrlees, Squire and Van der Tak conversion factor approach has 
been widely accepted in the literature as well as in empirical studies. Importantly, it 
22 
is the approach which has been used by the World Bank. Moreover, it has gained 
wide acceptance by Chinese authorities, due largely to the increasing number of 
World Bank projects in China. Hence, the Little and Mirrlees, Squire and Van der 
Tak approach is applied in this study. 
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Chapter 3 
Conversion Factors of Traded and Non-traded Commodities for China 
3.1 Introduction 
In China, market prices of inputs and outputs do not accurately reflect the real social 
costs and benefits of goods and services due to the widespread use of price fixing, 
government distortions, and other sources of market failures. It is therefore 
necessary to calculate shadow prices for project inputs and outputs, so as to reflect 
their real social benefits and costs in public investments. 
To convert the market price of a non-traded or traded good into its shadow 
price value, expressed in border price equivalents, an adjustment factor must be 
derived. This corrects for any overall imperfections in the economy, such as non-
competitive pricing, tariffs, indirect taxes and subsidies, and is generally called a 
conversion factor. 
In this chapter, a set of general conversion factors and a number of specific 
non-traded goods conversion factors will be derived for China. The general 
conversion factors include: the standard conversion factor (Fs) and conversion 
factors for consumption goods (B); intermediate goods (Fi); capital goods (Fk); and 
thirteen sub-group traded commodities which will be used in obtaining conversion 
factors for non-traded goods. Non-traded goods for which conversion factors are 
estimated include construction, electricity, freight transport, passenger transport, 
commerce and miscellaneous services. 
3.2 Conversion factors for traded commodities 
Traded goods are the goods produced or used in a project that directly or indirectly 
affect the level of the country's imports and exports. Two categories of such goods 
are identified by Little and Mirrlees (1969:92): 
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• goods which are actually imported or exported (or very close substitutes are 
actually imported or exported); and 
• goods which would be exported or imported if the country had followed 
policies which resulted in an optimum industrial development. 
These authors also advocate the use of world (border) prices in the shadow 
pricing of traded commodities (Little and Mirrlees 1969). These are the prices which 
are charged or paid at the country's border, excluding all tariffs and the effects of 
non-tariff barriers. The argument for the use of border prices is that when 
opportunities for trade are present, these border prices reflect the opportunity costs 
and benefits of using or producing traded goods and services for the country 
concerned. 
Assuming an infinite elasticity of world supply (demand) for imports 
(exports), these traded commodities are valued directly at border prices. Imports are 
. 
valued at the projected cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) price and exports at the 
projected free on board (f.o.b.) price, plus C>r minus the relevant marketing and 
transport costs. 
If, on the other hand the elasticity is less than infinite, such that at the margin 
an increased demand (supply) for imports (of exports) would affect the supply 
(foreign demand) price, then the appropriate shadow prices are not measured by the 
old or the new border price but by the projected marginal import cost (Mi) or 
projected marginal export revenue <Me) respectively. Squire and Van der Tak 
(1975:89-90) expressed this algebraically: 
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where 
Pc = c.i.f. price; 
Pf= f.o.b. price; 
Es = price elasticity of foreign supply and; 
Ed = price elasticity of foreign demand. 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
There are some commodities which would be traded except for the imposition 
of the government's restrictive trade policies in the form of tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions. The appropriate shadow price for these potentially traded commodities 
depends on whether present trade poli:ies will continue or be changed. PotentiaJly 
traded commodities are valued as traded goods provided that the restrictive policies 
are expected to be abandoned. Otherwise they are treated as non-traded 
commodities. There are two methods in common use for estimating the conversion 
factor for a particular commodity. 
(a) The price comparison method. The conversion factors are derived 
directly from price comparisons between domestically produced goods and similar 
goods traded internationally (Warr 1989). 
where 
CFj =conversion factor for commodity j; 
Pj w = world price of commodity j; 
pjd = domestic price of commodity j. 
(3.3) 
However, it is often difficult to identify a commodity traded internationally which 
exactly matches the domestically produced one. It is also difficult to obtain reliable 
information on domestic prices. 
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(b) The trade-data approach. This approach simply assumes that domestic 
prices differ from world prices by the amount of tariffs, that is (Squire and Van der 
Tak 1975): 
where 
pd = domestic price; 
pw = world price. 
If this is the case then it follows that: 
CF=l/(l+lffi) 
where 
for imported commodity 
for exported commodity 
tm = weighted average tax on import 
tx = weighted average tax on export 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
Use of equations 3.5 and 3.6 for calculating the conversion factors is clearly 
appropriate only when tariffs are the main instruments of protection. When 
quantitative restrictions are the main sources of the distortion of domestic prices, this 
me~od breaks down. However, conversion factors derived from equations 3.5 and 
3.6 can be used as the low limit. 
Hence, both the price-comparison method and the trade-data approach face 
practical problems. In this study, both the direct price-comparison method and trade 
data approach are employed resulting in a range for the conversion factors for 
Chinese commodities. 
Before presenting estimation results of the conversion factors for traded 
commodities, the price structure, nominal rates of protection and the renminbi 
(RMB) exchange rate system in China are discussed briefly. 
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3.3 Price formation, the nominal rates of protection and the renminbi exchange 
rate system in China 
Price formation. From 1953 to the end of the 1970s C1ina relied predominantly on 
administered prices. The state planning mechanisms set standard prices for all major 
products and worked out how most other products should be priced in relation to 
them. 
Table 3.1 Price subsidies in China 1978-87 (in hundred million yuan) 
Total Total 
2b Year government government 1a 3c 
revenue subsidies 
1978 1121.1 93.9 55.6 23.9 14.4 
1979 1103.3 180.7 136.0 21.8 22.9 
1980 1085.2 242.1 178.6 20.4 43.1 
1981 1089.6 327.7 217.7 21.7 88.3 
1982 1124.0 318.4 240.2 21.4 56.8 
1983 1249.0 341.7 269.5 13.5 58.7 
1984 1501.9 370.1 320.9 8.2 41.0 
1985 1866.4 299.5 274.9 7.0 17.6 
1986 2260.3 257.5 234.4 9.8 13.3 
1987 2368.9 294.6 266.4 10.6 17.7 
Total 14769.7 2726.2 
Notes: 
a The amount that the government spends to make up the difference between high 
purchase price and low sales prices of basic necessities, such as rice, oil, meat, beef, 
sugar, etc. 
b The amount that the government spends to provide low prices for such inputs as 
fertilizer and pesticide for agricultural production. 
c The amount that the government spends to make up losses on the imports of five 
commodities: rice, cotton, sugar, fertilizer and pesticides. 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1989, Beijing. 
The prices of agricultural products and raw materials_ were set below 
equilibrium values. Although the government continually claimed that it would 
gradually increase the prices of agricultural products, particularly those of grains, the 
prices of agricultural products were lower than their production cost or industrial 
product prices. Although the government paid a low price for agricultural products, 
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the selling prices were at times even lower. To make up the difference between the 
high-purchase and low-sales prices of some basic necessities, the government had to 
spend a large proportion of its budget on subsidies. From 1978 to 1987 total 
government subsidies reached 272.6 billion yuan. This constituted 18.5 per cent of 
total government revenue in the same period (see Table 3.1, column 1). 
Industrial sectors not only had priority in investment, but prices of industrial 
products were raised above equilibrium prices and the prices of inputs used in the 
industry were kept low (Ma Hong and Sun Shangqin 1989). Prices were used to 
redistribute profits among economic sectors, thus making it impossible to balance 
supply and demand. 
Heavy industry was developed at the expense of agriculture and light industry. 
Heavy industry products were particularly over-priced compared with agricultural 
and light industrial products. For example the rate of return in 1979 was 61 per cent 
for watch manufacturers, 44.9 per cent for the rubber industry and 33.1 per cent for 
medicinal industries, whereas in some other sectors, such as iron ore mining, coal 
mining and the cement production, the rates of return were as low as 1.6 per cent, 2.1 
per cent and 4.4 per cent, respectively (Ma Hong and Sun Shangqin 1989:23). Prices 
of energy and mineral products were too low to cover production costs. Most mines 
operated at a loss. Overall, the manufacturing sector had a substantially higher 
return than the economy-wide average. 
The services provided by construc·don, transportation and public utilities were 
also under-priced. According to Gao Sanquan (1986), rents coll~cted from 273 cities 
in 1980 only accounted for 25 per cent of the costs of housing administration and 
maintenance. Service sectors such as hotels, hospitals, and public utilities also had 
to rely on government subsidies. Transportation costs, including railway freight and 
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shipping freights, were raised in 1984 and again in 1985 but transportation as a 
whole is still underpriced. This greatly retards development in these sectors. 
Nominal rate of protection. Tariffs protect domestic industries, especially 
those which are in the early stages of development China has been heavily 
protectionist since the 1950s with a heavy bias against agriculture and other primary 
production. The current tariff regulations came into force in 1986. The rates 
generally increase with the level of processing leading to high levels of effective 
protection. 
The government outlined the following principles governing imports. 
(i) Imports of products that can be manufactured domestically should be 
heavily discouraged. These include those products that are not urgently needed for 
economic development and the people's livelihood. Such goods are subject to the 
highest import tariff rates (from 100 per cent to 200 per cent) or are prohibited. 
(ii) Raw materials, semi-processed materials and intermediate goods that are 
not producetl domestically or are in short supply on the domestic market, but which 
are required in the process of production, must be imported. This category normally 
refers to those necessities which are considered as essential for economic 
development and the people's livelihood. These goods are subject to lower import 
duties (under 50 per cent), or even exempted from duties. 
(iii) A major reason for importing is to facilitate technological transfer. 
Advanced technology that fits in with China's national priorities must be imported. 
Such imports include advanced equipment, instruments, machinery, software and 
other equipment. Before economic reform, the policy of 'self-reliance' was thought 
to require the prohibition of imports of advanced technology. Since the late 1970s, 
the introduction of advanced technology from abroad was to be encouraged and 
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facilitated. Imports of advanced 'hard-ware' as well as 'soft-ware' are subject to very 
low tariff rates or are exempted from tariffs. 
To support domestic industries and provide cheap but necessary inputs to 
them, the government subsidizes such imports as rice, cotton, sugar, fertilizer and 
pesticide, to keep products which use these goods as inputs, competitive in the world 
market (see Table 3.1 Column 3). 
The price structure has been changed since 1978. The decentralization of 
firms has reduced the extent of products covered by planned prices. The market 
mechanism is playing an increasing role in resources allocation so that two-tier 
administered and market price system operates in domestic markets. Products 
produced under the state plan still use planned prices for inputs as well as for 
outputs. Other products use market prices for inputs as well as for outputs. The 
same products may thus have a variety of domestic prices. 
Renminbi exchange rate. A two-tiered pricing system for foreign exchange 
has also been used to modify the over-valued exchange rate. The foreign exchange 
system in China is based on a fixed official exchange rate. On 15 January 1955, 
China adopted a uniform conversion rate of 2.5 renminbi per dollar. This exchange 
rate remained constant from 1955 to the end of 1972. 
Table 3.2 Official exchange rates 1972-90 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1977 
1978 
1980 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1990 
Renminbi: US dollar 
2.24 
2.01 
1.76 
1.68 
1.80 
2.80 
3.40 
3.70 
4.70 
Sources: Fieldwork survey, 1988; Xiamen Foreign Exchange Administrative 
Bureau, 1990. 
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China adopted a pegged exchange rate system in 1973 when most industrial 
countries started to float their currencies. The Chinese exchange rate :was pegged to 
a basket of currencies of China's main trading partners. During this period, the 
primary objective of exchange rate policy was to maintain the stability of the 
exchange rate. The over-valuation of the Chinese currency against the US dollar 
(and other currencies) was retained. However, since 1973 the renminbi has been 
adjusted, with a general devaluation trend to 1990 (Table 3.2). 
Evidence for the over-valuatioL of the renminbi during the last two decades 
can be found in various forms (Zhang Zhichao 1990). Inflation is one of the major 
causes of the over-valuation. As the price level in China rises in comparison to the 
price levels in its trading partners, the real value of its currency declines. Other 
contributions to over-valuation lie in protectionist trade policies such as import 
controls and tariffs (Hughes 1991). 
Before the economic reforms, foreign exchange administrative controls 
permitted the renminbi to remain over-valued. The prices of tradeable commodities 
were set by government administrators and foreign trade was the monopoly of state-
owned companies, costs and profits of imports and exports were the responsibility of 
the .government, the renminbi exchange rate was only an accounting measure within 
the government budget (Zhang Zhichao 1990). 
In August 1979, the State Council decided to reform the exchange rate system. 
An Internal Settlement Price (ISP) for foreign exchange, of 2.80 yuan per dollar was 
applied to trade organizations and to trade .. related enterpris~s., The secondary 
exchange rate does not give a true indication of what the equilibrium exchange rate 
would be in the absence of protection. However, the secondary exchange rate is the 
best indication of the over-valuation of renminbi in China. Data in Appendix Table 
A3.8 indicates that the difference between the official exchange rate and the 
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secondary exchange rate is shrinking. In other words the renminbi exchange rate 
became less over-valued in China at the end of 1980s . 
A more straight forward method of devaluation of the renminbi exchange rate 
has been adopted since the economic reforms began. The renminbi exchange rate 
was devalued several times, to $1=2.2 renminbi in mid-1984, $1 = 3.7 renminbi in 
mid-1986, and $1 = 4.7 at the end of 1990. The devaluation of the renminbi is 
intended to promote exports and increases the real prices of imports. The devaluation 
of the renminbi supplements other trade controls to release the pressures on the 
balance of payments. As a result, the deficits of current account (US$ -11.1 billion) 
and merchandise trade balance (US$ -14.9 billion) in 1985 were significantly 
improved to a current account surplus (US$ 5 billion) and merchandise trade balance 
(US$ 7.5 billion) in 1990. 
Despite the reforms the government has not given up direct controls over 
foreign trade. A large number of products, mainly 'essential' goods and prinCipal 
inputs into industry remain underpriced by the state administration. Some of the 
major export categories, such as petroleum, remain centrally determined. 
For nearly thirty years before 1979, most imports were priced similarly to 
subsidized domestic goods. The prices of imports were thus far below international 
market prices. The government overlooked the degree of subsidy implicit in 
purchases of import goods for nearly thirty years. 
In 1979, a new pricing system was formalized to promote exports and restrict 
imports. Imports under state plans were priced according to market price plus 
applicable duties and taxes rather than at the lower domestic prices. These rules also 
apply to provincial and local government purchases. If prices of imported goods are 
too low and threaten domestic production, they are adjusted to higher levels when 
applied to domestic sales. This principle applies regardless of whether the imported 
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good falls into the category of fixed, guidance, or market pricing methods. In this 
way, import prices are kept higher than domestic goods. 
Some of the provinces such as Guangdong which are actively involved in 
foreign trade have their own import product price regulations. The Guangdong 
provincial government declared 'it is necessary strictly to control imported 
commodities ... prices of imported commodities directly for sale to the masses in the 
market must be examined and approved by the department in charge of commodity 
prices. Business units are not allowed to fix their own prices (Guangdong Provincial 
Report 1982:1). Although the market mechanism is playing an increasing role in the 
Chinese economy, it is far from pervasive. 
The foreign trade management system has also undergone a series of reforms 
since 1978. The reforms include decentralization of management to lower level. 
Foreign trade enterprises were given full authority over management ar.1 full 
responsibility for their profits and losses. Some of the large producing enterprises 
have been given permissionts to participate directly in foreign trade. The share of 
non-state owned enterprises in foreign trade has increased dramatically since the 
economic reform. An agency system which permitted foreign trade companies to act 
as ~gents for other enterprises in the export of their products has been introduced. 
The integration of industry with trade within a single enterprise created a more 
competitive environment for foreign trade enterprises and industrial units. The 
foreign trade system has thus become more flexible and more price responsive then it 
was before 1978. 
The two-tiered pricing system for foreign exchange affects many aspects of 
the economy. It is widely regarded as a major distortion (Lin 1988, Martin 1990), 
because it works against the market requirement of equal competition. This two-
tiered pricing systerr for domestic goods and the foreign exchange rate affects the 
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estimation of conversion factors for China. First, the magnitude of the conversion 
factor is reduced when planned prices rather than market prices .are chosen to 
represent domestic prices. Second, the magnitude of the conversion factor is 
increased when the official exchange rate rather than the secondary market exchange 
rate is used to convert domestic prices and international prices into common units. 
Hence, it is essential consistently to use either the planned prices in combination 
with the official exchange rate, or the market prices in combination with the 
secondary market exchange rate in estimating equation 3.3. In either case the 
distortion generated from the domestic price structure and the over-valuation of 
renminbi will off set each other to some extent. 
3.4 Estimation of the conversion factors for one hundred traded commodities 
for China: price comparison approach 
Columns 1and2 in Appendix Table A3.1 show the conversion factors of 100 traded 
commodities for China. These conversion factors are calculated from the ratio 
between domestic prices and international prices in Columns 3 and 4. Data 
collection was as follows (Tao 1988): 
prices in the main international market and the main importing and distribution 
markets; 
• export prices of the main exporters; 
• import prices of the main importers; and 
• domestic prices, based on weighted average prices of procurement at planned, 
contracted and negotiated prices. Official exchange rates are 2.8:1and3.72:1 
for 1984 and 1988, respectively. 
Domestic prices of most of the products were lower than their international 
prices. Among seven categories of products, the price levels of six groups were 
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lower than their internationl'l prices, except for chemical products in both 1984 and 
1988. The domestic prices of metallurgical products, building materi~ls and energy 
products were lower than half of their international price in 1988. 
However, comparing 1984 and 1988, the discrepancy between domestic and 
international prices in four groups of products has fallen. That is, the discrepancy 
between agricultural products' domestic and international prices declined from -25.7 
to -20.8; chemical products' dropped from +9.9 to +5.6; energy products' fell from -
75.9 to -65.5 and building materials' from -66.8 to -58.0. But the difference between 
domestic and international prices of the other three groups of products became 
greater after 1984. The discrepancy in textile and other light industrial products' 
prices rose from -21.0 to -30.6; non-ferrous metals' from -13.2 co -39.2 and 
metallurgical products' from -46.6 to -54.1. 
3.5 Estimation of the standard conversion factor (Fs) and the conversion factors 
of some of the sub-group commodities for China: trade data approach 
In practice, it is usual to obtain specific conversion factors for only a few major 
commodities or groups of commodities. The standard conversion factor, which is an 
average factor aggregated across groups of goods, is applied to the other 
commodities either because of lack of information or because their contribution to 
total costs is too small to justify calculation of individual conversion factors. 
(a) Trade data approach. The simplest way of calculacing the standard 
conversion factor is to use what is known as the trade-data approach (Squire and Van 
der Tak 1975:93-95) viz: 
M+X 
Fs=-----· (3.7) 
where 
Fs = standard conversion factor 
36 
' 
M = c.i.f. value of imports 
X = f.o.b. value of exports 
tm = weighted average tax on imports 
lx = weighted average tax on exports 
The validity of this approach depends on a number of assumptions (Ahmoo 
1983:17). These are: 
• the small country assumption, where the country in question does not have 
monopoly power in trade o.r where export demand and import supply are 
infinitely elastic; 
• that marginal changes in expenditure on non-traded goods can be neglected; 
• that income effects can be ignored or that all income elasticities of spending are 
roughly equal to one; 
• that the share of imports and exports adequately reflects the relative importance 
of traded goods in non-traded production and consumption; and 
• that quantitative restrictions on trade can be ignored when they are relatively 
small. 
When any of these assumptions do not apply, equation 3.7 may yield 
misleading results and this is indeed the case for China because of the systems of 
subsidies and trade licensing. Reliable estimates of demand and supply elasticities of 
tradeables are also not available. The approach adopted here is thus to first obtain 
the value of the standard conversion factor based on the standard model (the rate of 
foreign exchange premium is 60 per cent) and subsequently to subject it to sensitivity 
analysis. Table 3.3 summarizes the values of some of the general conversion factors 
for China estimated in this way. 
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Table 3.3 General conversion factors for China 1982-88 
Standard conversion factor 
Consumption goods 
Intermediate goods 
Capital goods 
Conversion 
factors 
0.69 
0.79 
0.70 
0.59 
Sensitivity 
.' ·range 
0.64-0.88 
0.74-0.89 
0.65-0.89 
0.53-0.84 
Appendix Tables 3.2 to 3.7 contain the data for estimation of the standard 
conversion factor and the conversion factors for consumption goods, intermediate 
goods and capital goods. The value of the standard conversion factor obtained on the 
basis of the average data over a 7 year period from 1982-88 is 0.69. Sensitivity 
analyses range from 0.64 to 0.88 based on the different estimation of foreign 
exchange premia (Appendix Table A3.4). 
(b) Shadow exchange rate u~ed as cross-check. The standard conversion 
factor bears a close relationship to the concept of the shadow exchange rate in the 
Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972) methodology. The relationship between the two 
(Squire and Van der Tak 1975:93) is: 
Fs =OER/SER 
where 
Fs = Standard conversion factor; 
OER = Official exchange rate; 
SER = Shadow exchange rate. 
(3.8) 
The secondary exchange rate may give some indication of the likely value of 
the standard conversion factor for China. This method has been used by the World 
Bank for its projects in China. A direct estimate of the sha1ow exchange rate by 
using a secondary market exchange rate is shown in Appendix Table A3.8. The 
estimated standard conversion factor using this method is 0.67. 
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Standard conversion factors calculated using the trade data approach (0.69) 
and the shadow exchange fate approach (0.67) are reasonably close. 
The conversion factors for consumption goods (8), intermediate goods (ri) 
and capital goods (Fk) are 0.79, 0.70 and 0.59, respectively. More detailed 
information is provided in Appendix Tables A3.5, A3.6 and A3.7. 
3.6 Estimation of the non-traded goods conversion factors 
A more subtle problem in cost-benefit studies involves the treatment of non-traded 
commodities. The methodology followed is that developed by Little-Mirrlees 
(1969). Non-traded inputs such as construction, electricity and transportation can be 
broken down into traded input components, non-traded input components and 
primary factor components. By using the input-output table and tracing through the 
production process, the non-traded inputs used by an industry are eventually split 
into two categories: traded inputs used directly and indirectly, and primary fa~tor 
inputs used directly and indirectly. The shadow price of the former is its border 
price. The shadow prices of primary factors (mainly labour) are treated separately in 
Chapter 6. 
An arithmetic expression for deriving conversion factors for non-traded 
commodities by using input-output tables was developed by Warr (1989). Following 
this method a set of conversion factors for non-traded goods were estimated for 
China. 
Considering the input-output matrix A of intermediate i~p_uts in the various 
sectors, we define 
where 
:t!·-A .. /X· J.j - lJ J 
A.. =total use of intermediate input i into sector j, lJ 
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(3.9) 
Xj = total output of sector j, 
Thus aij is the amount of input i required to produce one unit of output j. We divide 
commodities into traded and non-traded categories and arrange the order so that the 
matrix ~j can be partitioned in the form 
A= (3.10) 
where 
a TI = the unit requirement of tradeable inputs in the production of tradeables, 
a TN = the unit requirement of tradeables in the production of non-tradeables, 
aNT = the unit requirement of non-tradeables in the production of tradeables; 
aNN = the unit requirement of non-tradeables in the production of non-
tradeables. 
Further, if we assume constant returns to scale and competitive pricing in all 
industries, then value added corresponds to primary factor payments in all industries. 
Thus (Warr 1989), 
where 
PT= PT a TT+ PN aNT +PF aFT 
PN =PT a TN + PN aNN +PF aFN 
PT = the row vector of producer prices of tradeables; 
PN = the row vectors of producer prices of non-tradeables; 
Pp = the f-element vector of primary factor prices; 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
aFT = the unit requirements of the f primary factors required to produce 
tradeables; 
aFN = the unit requirements of the f primary factors required to produce non-
tradeables. 
The purpose of our analysis is to estimate the shadow prices for non-traded 
commodities. We wish to divide the inputs used to produce just two categories: the 
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tradeable inputs required, directly and indirectly, and the primary factors required 
directly and indirectly. Hence, we assume that all non-tradeables ~ould still be 
produced under free trade and the unit requirement matrices a TN, aNN and aFN 
would be the same under free trade as those observed in the input-output table (Warr 
1989). Therefore: 
where 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
The vector PT* a TN (I - aNNr 1 = the value of tradeable inputs required, 
directly and indirectly, to produce non-tradeables; 
The vector Pp* aFN(I - aNNrl =the corresponding value of primary factors 
required, directly and indirectly, to produce them; 
·niree non-traded goods conversion factors will be derived in this section. 
These are construction, electricity and transportation. The methodology followed in 
each case is to usr, input-output coefficients in terms of domestic prices, obtained 
from the 1981 input-output table for China, and convert these coefficients into border 
price terms by applying relevant conversion factors. The implicit assumption behind 
this methodology is that these items are produced at constant cost. 
The average conversion factors for traded goods derived in Table 3.4 will be 
applied to derive conversion factors for non-traded goods. For interest, profits and 
taxes the standard conversion factor (0.69) will be used. In the case of depreciation, 
the capital goods conversion factor (0.59) will be used. Finally, wages and salaries 
are converted into border price terms by applying conversion factors for skilled (3.7) 
and unskilled (0.83) labour derived in Chapter 6. The conversion factors for non-
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traded goods were estimated by '!!~ing a Shazam software program and are shown in 
Table 3.5. 
Table 3.4 Conversion factors for group of traded goods 1988 
Sector 
1 Crops 
2 Animal husbandry 
3 Metallurgy 
4Coal 
5 Petroleum mining 
6 Petroleum refining 
7 Chemicals 
8 Machinery 
9 Building materials 
lOWood 
11 Food processing 
12 Textiles & clothing 
13 Paper 
14 Misc. manufacture 
15. Labourc 
Unskilled 
Skilled 
Notes: 
Conversion 
facto~ 
1.09 
1.25 
1.25 
1.67 
1.09 
1.25 
0.74 
0.71 
1.43 
1.11 
1.25 
1.25 
0.77 
1.43 
0.83 
3.7 
Convers~on 
factor 
1.12 
1.98 
2.18 
3.43 
3.57 
3.22 
0.95 
0.95 
2.29 
2.52 
1.26 
1.25 
1.36 
1.00 
0.83 
3.7 
(21) 
(10) 
(23) 
(2) 
(2) 
(10) 
(26) 
(9) 
(4) 
(9) 
(12) 
(6) 
(1) 
3 Conversion factors estimated are based on the nominal protection rate calculated 
from two digit weighted averages of China Customs Statistics 1982-88. See Data 
Appendix 3.9. 
b Conversion factors estimated are based on price data obtained by Tao 1988, 
'Comparison of domestic prices and world prices,' Costs and Prices, No. 21. 
Figures in parentheses are the number of commodities used to derive the prices ratios 
in that particular commodity group. 
c Conversion factors for skilled and unskilled labours are derived in Chapter 6. 
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Table 3.5 Conversion factors for non-traded goods 1988 
Construction 
Electricity 
Transportation 
Freight 
Passenger 
Commerce 
Misc. services 
WaterC 
Notes: 
Conversion a 
factors 
1.02 
0.91 
0.81 
0.78 
1.20 
0.71 
1 
Conversionh 
· factors 
1.45 
1.44 
1.09 
1.17 
1.30 
0.75 
1.36 
3 Conversion factors for inputs of traded goods are derived from trade data method. 
b Conversion factors for inputs of tra.ded goods are derived from price comparison 
method. 
c Conversion factor for water is deiived from the different charges between other 
industrial users in Xiamen and the Huli firms (0.3 yuan/ton for other industrial users 
and 0.22 yuan/ton for the Huli firms). 
3.7 Summary of the estimation results 
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 contain estimation results for the general conversion factors, 
the conversion factors of traded goods and for non-traded goods. While using these 
data, it must be borne in mind that conversion factors derived from trade data under-
estimate their true values, especially for those commodities where quantitative 
restrictions are the main instrument of protection. On the other hand, conversion 
factors derived from price comparison might overstate their true values due to the 
depression of domestic prices. However, the overvaluation of the Chinese currency 
(the official exchange rate used to convert domestic prices into equivalent border 
prices) partly compensates for the depressed domestic prices. Hence, the conversion 
factors derived from the price comparison method may be considered as the better 
estimates. 
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Appendix Table A3.1 Prices comparison conversion factors (CF) for some of the 
important commodities in China 1984 and 1988 
Products CF CF DP/WP3 DP/WP3 
1984 1988 1984 1988 
1. Agricultural products 
1.35 1.26 -25.7 -20.8 
1.1 Grain 1.14 0.96 -12.4 +3.9 
Rice 1.40 1.19 -28.7 -15.9 
Wheat 0.82 0.84 +21.9 +19.3 
Com 1.29 0.78 -22.2 +27.5 
Soya beans 1.28 1.05 -29.1 -5.1 
1.2 Oil crops 0.90 0.61 +11.23 +63.1 
Soya bean oil 0.64 0.50 +56.8 +98.6 
Peanut oil 1.09 0.54 -8.3 +83.6 
Rapeseed oil 0.79 0.38 +27.4 +160.3 
Veg. seeds 0.97 1.72 +2.8 -41.7 
1.3 Econ. crops 1.39 1.52 -28.0 -34.2 
Cotton 1.39 1.57 -28.1 -36.2 
Jute 1.34 5.51 -25.4 -33.9 
1.4 Livestock products 
1.92 2.48 -47.9 -59.1 
Pork 2.26 3.07 -55.8 -67.4 
Beef 2.87 3.00 -65.2 -66.7 
Mutton 2.20 2.16 -54.6 -53.8 
Egg 0.97 1.30 +3.1 -23.3 
Goat fur 2.89 1.38 -65.4 -27.3 
Wool 1.21 1.07 -13.9 -6.3 
2. Textile & other light industrial products 
1.27 1.44 -21.0 -30.6 
Sugar 0.47 0.86 +112.7 +16.6 
Cotton print 1.31 2.56 n.a -60.9 
Cotton yarn 1.96 2.27 -48.9 -56.0 
Raw silk 3.79 4.12 -73.6 -75.7 
Polyester fibre (short) 
0.58 +71.0 n.a n.a .. 
Polyester fibre (long) 
0.51 0.62 +97.0 +61 
Newsprint 1.54 1.36 -35.1 -26.5 
3. Chemical products 
0.91 0.95 +9.9 +5.6 
3.1 Organic chemicals 
0.92 0.92 +8.5 +8.2 
Sulphuric acid 0.63 0.77 +59.7 +30.6 
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Caustic soda 1.31 2.07 -23.8 -51.6 
Soda ash 1.26 1.12 -20.6 -10.4 
Urea 1.43 0.96 -28.6 +4.0 
Sodium nitrate 
0.57 0.98 +75.1 +2.1 
Potassium nitrate 
1.76 2.81 -43.2 -64.4 
Potassium chloride 
1.31 1.63 -23.9 -38.7 
3.2 Biochemical products 
0.74 1.06 +34.7 -5.3 
Methyl alcohol 0.60 0.84 +78.6 +18.6 
Ethanol 0.76 1.34 +30.7 -25.1 
Benzene 1.20 1.11 -15.6 -9.7 
Methyl benzene 0.92 0.93 +11.6 +8.0 
Styrene 0.54 1.92 +80.4 -48.0 
Ethylene n.a 1.75 n.a -43.0 
Propylene n.a 1.18 n.a -15.0 
Butane n.a 1.07 n.a -4.6 
Butadiene styrene rubber 
0.96 0.87 +15.4 +15.2 
Natural rubber 0.40 n.a +148.3 n.a 
Tyre 1.26 1.93 -20.4 -48.1 
3.3 Synthetic materials 
0.91 1.37 +9.7 -26.9 
Polypropylene chloride 
0.88 1.12 +13.5 -11.0 
High pressure polypropylene 
0.90 2.00 +22.7 -50.0 
Low pressure polypropylene 
0.90 1.45 +39.6 -31.0 
Polybutane 0.72 1.67 +8.1 -40.0 
Polyethylene 0.93 1.35 +63.1 -26.0 
4. Energy products 
4.15 2.90 -75.9 -65.5 
4.1 Coal 4.30 2.83 -71.1 -64.7 
Fuel coal n.a 3.56 -76.7 -71.9 
Coking coal 3.09 2.51 -67.7 -60.2 
4.2 Oil & Petroleum Products 
4.63 2.95 -78.4 -66.1 
Crude oil 5.77 3.57 -82.7 -72.0 
High qual.petr. 1.06 1.05 -5.7 . - -4.5 
Petroleum 1.08 1.12 -7.2 -10.8 
Naphtha 1.27 1.12 -21.3 -10.9 
Aircraft keros. 1.40 1.21 ··28.6 -17.5 
Diesel 1.97 1.63 -49.2 -38.8 
Heavy fuel oil (HFO) 
7.75 2.92 -87.1 -65.8 
HFO with 1 % sulphur 
4.18 1.88 -76.l -46.9 
HFO with 2% sulphur 
6.02 3.89 -83.4 -74.3 
HFO with 3.5% sulphur 
7.58 4.18 -86.8 -76.1 
5. Building materials 
3.01 2.38 -66.8 -58.0 
Glass 2.40 2.25 -58.3 -55.6 
Cement 3.10 2.43 -67.8 -58.9 
Wood 0.30 n.a +33.2 n.a 
6. Non-ferrous metals 
1.15 1.64 -13.2 -39.2 
Aluminium 1.74 1.90 -39.1 -57.5 
Copper 0.83 1.59 +22.5 -37.3 
Lead 0.86 1.13 +21.0 -11.7 
Zinc 1.97 1.44 -45.3 -30.7 
Nickel 0.80 2.67 +30.6 -62.5 
Antymony 3.11 1.89 -67.1 -47.0 
Mercury 0.89 1.04 +11.9 -3.8 
Gold 2.14 0.91 -53.3 +9.9 
Silver 2.05 1.50 -51.1 -33.2 
7. Metallurgical products 
1.87 2.18 -46.6 -54.1 
7.1 Steel prod. 3.08 2.11 -47.5 -52.5 
Iron ore 1.66 1.82 -39.6 -45.0 
Iron 2.53 3.13 -60.5 -6s.o· 
Steel ingot 3.02 3.33 -61.9 -70.0 
Billet 1.09 2.04 -38.6 -51.0 
7 .2 Rolled steel n.a 3.41 n.a -70.7 
Steel bar 1.97 4.39 -49.2 -77.2 
Steel slab 1.57 3.62 -36.3 -72.4 
Angle 1.33 3.51 -24.7 -71.5 
Channel 1.31 3.47 -23.9 -71.2 
I-steel 1.63 3.72 -38.6 -73.1 
Strip steel 3.00 3.70 -66.7 -73.0 
Hot-rolling plate (sheet) 
-68.0 1.39 3.13 -25.2 
Cold-rolling plate (sheet) 
1.24 2.94 -17.0 -66.0 
Carbon steel plate 
1.55 3.25 -35.5 -69.2 
Tin-plating steel sheet 
2.39 3.85 -41.8 -74.0 
Zinc-plating steel sheet 
1.71 2.88 -41.7 -65.3 
7.3 High quality steel products 
1.61 3.14 -37.9 -68.2 
Carbon I-steel 3.63 7.58 -72.5 -86.8 
Bearing steel 2.17 4.93 -53.9 -79.7 
Spring steel 1.66 
Stainless steel (section) 
Stainless steel (plate) 
Notes: 
0.80 
0.48 
3.76 
1.47 
1.19 
-39.8 
+35.7 
+108.6 
-73.4 
-32.2 
-16.2 
a Ratio between domestic and world prices. Domestic prices refer to weighted 
average prices of procurement at planned, contracted and negotiated prices. World 
prices refer to the main trading prices in the world market. 
Sources: The conversion factors for 1984 and 1988 are calculated from domestic and 
world prices of those years given in Tao, 1988, 'Comparison of domestic prices and 
world prices', Costs and Prices, 1988, No. 21. 
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Table A3.2 Commodity composition of imports 1982-88 (US$ million) 
1982 1983 
Consumption goodsa 4575 3423 
Intennediate goodsb 10452 12571 
Capital goodsc 3588 4656 
No classificationsd 1256 1551 
Total imports 19872 22201 
Notes: 
~ Consumption goods = SO+S 1 +S8(no including D87)+S9 
Intennediate goods = S2+S3+S4+S5+S6 
c Capital goods = S7 +D87 
d No classifications= S9 
1984 
2982 
16069 
9141 
2832 
31023 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
2556 2732 3593 4815 
22585 23454 18946 25794 
19857 22349 15470 17491 
3380 4988 5207 7150 
48378 53523 43216 55251 
Source: General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China, China Customs Statistics 1982-1988, Economic_Infonnation 
Agency, Hong Kong. 
.t:> 
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Table A3.3 Commodity composition of exports 1982-88 (US$ million) 
Consumption goodsa 
Intermediate goodsb 
Capital goodsc 
No classificationsd 
Total exports 
Notes: Seen Table A3.2 
Source: See Table A3.2. 
1982 
5768 
12927 
1359 
2965 
23018 
1983 1984 
5916 7540 
12746 16628 
1299 17046 
3109 3156 
23070 29028 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
7453 10321 10811 13853 
17925 17812 19080 21692 
913 1432 1800 2858 
4837 9079 7745 9138 
31128 38643 39437 47540 
Table A3.4 Estimation of standard conversion factor (Fs) 1982-88 (US$ million) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Average 
Imports,(M) 19872 22201 31024 48378 53523 43216 55251 39066 
Exports,(X) 23018 23070 29028 31128 3~'143 39437 47540 33123 
TotalfM+X) 42890 45271 60052 79506 92166 82653 102791 72189 
Tariffs 7750 7770 10548 16449 16057 14693 55890 18451 
(.J1 Percentage (%)a 0.39 0.35 0.34 0.34 Q -~ 0.34 0.36 0.35 
0 
Rebate/Export Rateb 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Fs 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.69 
Sensitivity analysis of 
foreign exchange premium rate 
0% 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.88 
40% 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.71 0.-13 0.75 0.73 0.74 
60% 0.71 0.71 070 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.69 
80% 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.60 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.64 
Notes: a SITC two digit weighted average tariff rate; b author's own estimation following World Bank technique. 
Source: See Table A3.2; 'The rules of the Customs of the People's Republic of China on imports and exports', 1986, in China's Special Economic 
Zones and the Foreign Economic Legislation, Hai Tian Publishing House, Shenzhen, China. 
Table A3.5 Estimation of conversion factor for consumption goods (fi) 1982-88 (US$ million) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Average 
Import (Mc) 4575 3423 2982 2556 2732 3593 4815 3525 
Export(Xc) 5768 5916 7540 7453 10321 10811 13853 8809 
Total CMc+Xc) 10343 9339 10522 10009 13053 14404 18669 12334 
Taxes on Mc a 2653 2088 1879 1815 1858 2443 3323 i980 
(J1 Tax Rebate on Xe b 577 592 754 745 1032 1081 1385 881 I-' 
B 0.68 0.73 0.79 0.82 0.86 0.82 0.81 0.79 
Sensitivity analysis of 
foreign exchange premium rate: 
0% 0.83 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.89 
40% 0.73 0.77 0.82 0.83 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.81 
&>% 0.68 0.73 0.79 0.82 0.86 0.82 0.81 0.79 
80% 0.64 0.69 0.75 0.76 0.81 0.77 0.76 0.74 
Notes: See Table A3.4. 
Sources: See Table A3.4. 
Table A3.6 Estimation of conversion factor for intermediate goods (Fi) 1982-88 (US$ million) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Average 
Import (Mi) 10452 12571 16069 22585 23454 18946 25794 18553 
Export (Xi) 12927 12746 16628 17925 17812 19080 21692 16973 
Total (Mi+Xi) 23379 25316 32697 40510 41266 38027 47486 35526 
(,,''\ 
N TaxesonM·a 3763 4023 1 5142 7453 7740 6821 
9286 6318 
Tax Rebate on Xi b 1293 1275 1663 1793 1781 1908 2169 1697 
F· 1 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.68 
0.70 
Sensitivity analysis of 
foreign exchange premium rate: 
0% 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.89 
40% 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.75 
60% 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.68 0.70 
80% 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.65 
Notes: See Table A3.4. 
Sources: See Table A3.4. 
Table A3.7 Estimation of conversion factor for capital goods (Fk) 1982-88 (US$ million) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Average 
Import(Mk) 3588 4656 9141 19857 22349 15470 17491 13222 
Export (Xk) 1359 1299 1704 913 1432 1800 2858 1623 
Total (Mk+Xk) 4947 5955 10844 20770 23781 17270 20349 14845 
U1 
w Taxes on Mka 682 1071 2559 5759 5140 3403 4023 3234 
Tax Rebate on Xk b 136 130 170 91 143 180 286 162 
Fk 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.59 
Sensitivity analysis of 
foreign exchange premium rate: 
0% 0.90 0.86 0.82 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 
40% 0.71 0.68 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.65 
60% 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.59 
80% 0.59 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.53 
Notes: See Table A3.4. 
Sources: See Table A3.4. 
Table A3.8 Estimation of standard con'fersion factor by using the secondary 
market exchange rate 1988-90 
Secondary Official Standard 
Date market exchange conversion 
exchange rate rate factors 
(1) (2) (2)/(1) 
1988 
Oct. 7.08 3.72 0.53 
Nov. 6.87 3.72 0.54 
Dec. 6.51 3.72 0.57 
1989 
Jan 6.52 3.72 0.57 
Feb. 6.69 3.72 0.56 
Mar. 6.71 3.72 0.55 
Apr. 6.74 3.72 0.55 
May 6.89 3.72 0.54 
June 6.86 3.72 0.54 
July 6.62 3.72 0.56 
Aug. 6.37 3.72 0.58 
Sep. 6.14 3.72 0.61 
Oct. 6.08 3.72 0.61 
Nov. :5.38 3.72 0.69 
Dec. 5.54 3.72 0.67 
1990 
Jan 5.83 4.70 0.81 
Feb. 5.89 4.70 0.80' 
Mar. 5.85 4.70 0.80 
Apr. 5.92 4.70 0.79 
May 5.88 4.70 0.80 
June 5.79 4.70 0.81 
July 5.58 4.70 0.84 
Aug. 5.60 4.70 0.84 
Sep. 5.60 4.70 0.84 
Average 6.21 0.67 
Scurce: Data provided by the Shanghai Foreign Exchange Administrative Bureau. 
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Table A3.9 Conversion factors3 for groups of traded goods 1988 
Group of SITC Conversion factor 
commodity 
Crops (004) 1.09 
Animal husbandry (000) 1.25 
Metallurgy (S3) 1.25 
Coal (032) 1.67 
Petroleum drilling (033) 1.09 
Petroleum refining (034) 1.25 
Chemicals (SS) i).74 
Machinery (S7) •" 71 
Building materials 
(glass and cement) 1.43 
Wood (024) 1.11 
Food processing (can food) 1.25 
Textiles and clothing (084) 1.25 
Paper (064) 0.77 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles (089) 1.43 
Notes: 
a A number of conversion factors for traded commodities were used in obtaining 
conversion factors for non-traded commodities. Estimations of these specific 
conversion factors are presented here. In each case the conversion factor is obtained 
by using equation 3.5 or equation 3.6, depending on the nature of imports or exports 
of that particular group of commodities. The weighted average rate of taxes on 
imports and exports are obtained from two digit weighted average of SITC 
classification of commodities. 
Sources: China Customs Statistics 1982-88; Yang Zuokui (1986). 
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Chapter 4 
Shadow Price of Capital in China 
4.1 Introduction 
The capital required for public project investment may come out of current 
consumption, alternative investment, or both. In any case, one dollar of marginal 
investment will generate a stream of future consumption. The present value of this 
stream of consumption is called the shadow price of capital. 
Economic development is always limited by shortage of capital in developing 
countries. Like most developing countries, China is facing the target of breaking 
through the 'vicious circle' between capital shortage and under-development 
Chinese economic development is sustained by increasing investment, and more 
investment necessitates more savings or capital imports. The extent to which capital 
can be imported and repaid depends on the level of saving of China in the future. 
Therefore, domestic savings are the more reliable source of investment. 
For nearly thirty years before economic reform in 1979, China adopted an 
industrialization development strategy leaning towards advanced technology and 
ambitious heavy industrial investment planning. To implement development 
planning, China needs large amounts of capital investment. However, domestic 
saving can be increased only by a sacrifice in current consumption. Given limited 
savings in China, policy is biased toward investment. A dollar of investment was 
considered by the Chinese government to be more valuable thari a dollar of current 
consumption. 
The shadow price of capital thus has to reflect the premium that the 
government places on investment over consumption, in project evaluation. If 
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consumption is the numeraire, then a shadow price of capital of 1.2 means that 
income from a proj~t that is re-invested is valued 20 per cent more than income that 
results in consumption. In other words, a premium of 20 per cent is placed on the 
value of output of the project available for re-investment, as it is on the value of 
resources taken from investment elsewhere, for the project 
The primary objective of this Chapter is to estimate the shadow price of 
capital for China. The data used are based on statistics from independent accounting 
units within state industrial enterprises. 
4.2 A theoretical framework for the shadow price of capital 
Consider the case where total capital is fixed. The amount of capital required for a 
public project necessarily comes from alternative investment. Suppose that at the 
margin a unit of investment generates a projected stream of return of q per year, then 
q represents the marginal productivity of capital. Assume further that q accrue.s to 
someone at the average level of consumption, thereby permitting an increase in 
consumption measured at domestic prices of q/B, where B as defined in the Chapter 
3, is the relevant ratio of border to domestic prices of consumption commodities. 
This ratio, B, is required to transform the value of a marginal increase in 
consumption measured at domestic prices into its equivalent value relative to the 
chosen numerate, that is the public income measured in foreign exchange. 
If the average level of consumption is increasing over time and if diminishing 
marginal utility is accepted, future consumption generated by public investment must 
be discounted at a rate that reflects the expected future growth rate of consumption, 
g, and the rate of diminishing marginal utility, n. To derive n, a utility function must 
be specified: 
u -c-n c- (4.1) 
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where 
Uc= marginal utility at consumption level c; 
C = consumption level c; 
n = parameter of the utility function. 
The basic assumption underlying this utility function is that the marginal 
utility of consumption decreases when the level of consumption increases. The 
higher the value of n, the higher the rate of diminishing marginal utility and the more 
egalitarian the government's objectives (Squire and Van der Tak 1975:63). 
Furthermore, if the government considers future consumption less valuable 
than present consumption simply because it occurs in the future, the discount rate 
must include an element, r, reflecting pure time preference. The resulting discount 
rate is referred to in Squire and Van der Tak (1975:68) as the consumption rate of 
interest, i, where: 
i = ng+r 
where 
i = consumption rate of interest; 
n = value of the social elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption; 
g = the expected growth rate of real per capita consumption; 
r = pure time preference rate. 
(4.2) 
The present value of the consumption stream generated by a unit of 
investment can be denoted as: 
qKo 
+ + ... +----
8(1 + i) 8(1 + i)2 8(1 + i)T 
where 
q = marginal productivity of capital; 
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= 
T 
:E 
t=l 
(4.3) 
8(1 + i)t 
K0 = capital cost of the project; 
i = consumption rate of interest which is the social rate of discount for a 
stream of income expressed in terms of consumption equivalents; 
B =consumption conversion factor. 
If the increase in consumption comprises only one commodity, B will equal 
the ratio of the shadow to the market price for that commodity; for more than one 
commodity, B will be a weighted average of price ratios, the weights being the 
proportion of marginal expenditure devoted to each commodity (Squire and Van der 
Tak, 1975:146). Equation 4.3 is approximately equivalent to 
T 1 q 
qKo z = -K 0 
t=l B(l + i)t Bi 
(4.4) 
since 
0 1 1 
z = (4.5) 
t=l (1 + i)t i 
The present value of the aggregate consumption stream is then q/Bi times the capital 
investment. Thus, in a simple model with no reinvestment, the shadow price of 
capital measured at the chosen numeraire depends only on the marginal productivity 
of capital, the consumption rate of interest and the consumption conversion factor. 
q 
(4.6) 
Bi 
where 
sk =shadow price of capital 
However, it is unrealistic to assume that all returns from investment are 
immediately consumed. The shadow price of capital must also reflect the 
consumption generated indirectly by the reinvestment. Suppose that a fraction of the 
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returns, s, is re-invested and only (1-s) is immediately consumed. If re-investment 
~om the returns leads to an accumulated investment of At in year t, th<? overall direct 
and indirect return from this investment will be 
Assuming the fraction ( 1 - s ) of this return is consumed, the contribution to 
aggregate consumption in year t is 
( 1 - s) qAt 
Therefore, the shadow price of capital, that is, the present value of the f.mtire stream 
of consumption, is 
T ( 1- s) qAt 
Sk = L ~~~~~~-
t= 1 B( 1 + i )t 
(4.7) 
The capita) accumulated in year one is still the original investment, 
(4.8) 
In year two, the total capital investment is augmented by a fraction of the first year's 
return (sqA1). Thus in year two, 
(4.9) 
In year three, the accumulated capital includes the re-investment of a fraction of year 
two's return as well as the earlier reinvestment. The capital accumulated by year 
three is 
Hence, the capital accumulation in year t is the sum of the available capital in 
the previous year At-1 • and the reinvestment from the returns of the previous year, 
sqAt-1 · Hence, there is the general formula 
(4.11) 
Substituting equation 4.11 into equation 4. 7, we have 
( 1 - s) q ( 1 +sq )t-1 
(4.12) 
B( 1 + i )t 
or equivalently 
(1-s)q q- sq 
sk = =---- /B (4.13) 
i- sq i- sq 
since 
0 1 +sq 1 +sq 
:E ( )t = (4.14) 
t=l 1 +i i - sq 
Equation 4.13 expresses the shadow price of capital at domestic prices, as the 
product of the share of consumption in the marginal return from investment, (1-s), 
and the marginal productivity of capital, q, divided by the difference between the 
consumption rate of interest and the rate at which capital accumulates, sq. 
Four parameters are involved in the estimation of the shadow price of capital 
to the chosen numeraire in equation 4.13: the marginal productivity of capital (q), the 
marginal propensit~ to reinvest (s), the consumption rate of interest (i) and the 
conversion factor (B). The limitations of the estimation of shadow price of capital 
must be recognized. We have assumed that all the parameters that determine the 
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shadow price of capital remain constant over time. If any of these parameters 
change, equation 4.13 will not reflect 
1
accurately the true shadow price ~f capital. 
The assumption that all parameters remain constant over time generally 
implies that equation 4.13 overestimates Sk. It is reasonable to expect that the 
divergence between q and i will decrease over time, thereby reducing the value of 
current investment. Squire and Van der Tak (1975) therefore, treat the value of Sk 
derived from equation 4.13 as a maximum estimate of its true value. 
Since China has a centrally planned economy, state-owned enterprises 
dominate its economic activities. Moreover, data for estimation of the propensity to 
save and the productivity of capital for the private sector are difficult to collect. It is 
also difficult to distinguish between public and privates and q. Thus, in this study, a 
general shadow price of capital is derived from information and data collected from 
independent accounting units within state industry. 
4.3 Estimation of marginal productivity of capital in China: alternative 
approaches 
In a perfect capital market, with no go·. ~mment intervention, the market interest rate 
would reflect the social time preference rate as well as the social marginal 
productivity of capital, provided there is perfect competition in all other markets and 
there are no externalities. In China, however, not only are capital markets 
rudimentary, but capital prices are seriously distorted. Commodity and other factor 
markets are also highly distorted. The conditions required to equate the market 
interest rate to the social marginal productivity of capital are not likely to be 
satisfied. The market rate of interest is only of limited value in judging the level of 
the marginal productivity of capital. 
Estimation of the marginal productivity of capital can be based on both 
macro- and micro-economic data. For China, both sources are explored. Direct 
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estimation of the marginal productivity of capital for China is not an easy task 
because of numerous conceptual and empirical problems. The esti~ation of the 
social marginal productivity of capital is obtained by comparing estimations from 
fC' 1.ir approaches. These are: 
• the marginal capital-output ratio approach; 
• the marginal capital-output ratio modified to reflect labour's contribution; 
· an aggregate production function approach; 
• micro-kvel estimates. 
The three different macro-economic estimation procedures are undertaken 
first, followed by a further study of micro-data to establish reliable estimates of the 
marginal productivity of capital in China. 
(a; The margina~ capital-output ratio approach. In economies 
characterized by surplus labour with the marginal product of labour close to zero, the 
marginal productivity of capital (q) may be approximated by calculating the 
incremental output-capital ratio (k) which is simply the inverse of the familiu 
incremental net capital output ratio (ICOR). Formally, 
~Q 
q = (4.15) 
~K 
where 
~Q =incremental total output; 
~K = incremental total capital investment. 
Hence, the marginal productivity of capital expressed in equation 4.15 is the 
total output (measured at domestic prices) generated by a unit of domestic capital 
investment. In the literature, it is suggested that e',quation 4.15 be used a~ an upper 
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limit for the marginal productivity of capital. This is because it over-estimates the 
marginal productivity of capital for at least three reasons (Squire and. Van der Tak, 
1975:110). First, it is obtained as an incremental averuge estimate rather than a truly 
marginal estimate; second, the implicit assumption of zero marginal productivity of 
labour is not really valid; and third, no allowance is made for technical progress and 
productivity growth in explaining focrements in output. 
(b) The adjusted marginal capital-output ratio approach. One way to 
exclude labour's contribution to net incremental output is to subtract the increase in 
the value of labour's inp1Jt per unit of net investmint from the incremental net output 
capital ratio (Squire and Van derTak, 1975:111). 
Formally, 
( LiQ- t1L q = -L\x-=> 
where 
~K = incremental total capital investment; 
~Q = incremental total output; 
~L = incremental contribution of labow· to output. 
(4.16) 
In practice, it is assumed that labour's marginal contribution to output (MPI.) 
is equal to the increase in its factor payments, that is, the increase in the wage bill 
over the year. Although the adjusted marginal output-capital ratio approach provides 
a better estimate of the marginal productivity 1,-,f capital thar. the previous estimate, it 
is still crude and could be expected to over-value the marginal productivity of capital 
due to the first and third of the ihree reasons noted in the previous paragraph. 
(c) The aggregate production function approach. When reliable national 
accounts data are available, a direct estimate of the marginal productivity of capital 
can be obtained by estimating the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas (or other more 
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flexible) production functions. A Cobb-Douglas formulation (Sadiq 1978:42) is used 
here. 
Formally, 
where 
Q = total output; 
A = a constant; 
t = a time trend which reflects technical progress; 
K = total capital input; 
L = total labour input; 
a = elasticity of total output with respect to capital; 
j = elasticity of total output with respect to labour. 
(4.17) 
Constant returns to scale for the Cobb-Douglas production function implies 
the restriction a + ~ = 1. Therefore, the marginal productivity of capital gives. the 
following, 
(4.18) 
=a(Q/K) 
Given the assumptions of perfect competition and 1;onstant returns to scale, a 
is the share of profits in national income; QI K is the output-capital ratio. 
In empirical studies, translog production function form has also been used to 
estimate the output elasticities of capital and labour. Under certain restrictive 
conditions the translog production function form simplifies to the well-known Cobb-
Douglas specification (equation 4.17 above). 
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The advantage of the translog function is that it allows the output elasticities 
of capital and labour to vary over time. If the output elasticity of. capital grows 
relative to that of labour, then the increasing weight given to capital and the faster 
growing input would cause the index of factor inputs to rise more rapidly than with 
constant output elasticities. Alternatively, a growing labour output elasticity would 
cause the productivity index to rise more rapidly than with constant Cobb-Douglas 
elasticities. For the two-factor case, the translog function can be written as 
Ln Qt=~ +gt+ aklnKt + aLlnLt + (l/2)akk(lnKt)2 
+ (l/2)aLL(lnLt)2 + akLlnKtlnLt +et 
where 
Q = net industrial output; 
t = a time trend; 
K = net capital input; 
L = labour input. 
ak = elasticity of total output with respect to capital; 
aL = elasticity of ,,-,,al output with r~spect to labour; 
akL - elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. 
Hence, the marginal productivity of capital is, 
where 
Q 
+ akk-
K 
Q 
+ akl-
K 
Q = net industrial output; 
K = net capital input; 
ak :: elasticity of total output with respect to capital; 
aL = elasticity of total output with respect to labour; 
akL = elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. 
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(4.19) 
(4.20) 
The assumption of constant returns to scale requires the following restrictions 
on the parameters of the production function: 
ak + a1 = 1 (4.21) 
akk + akl = 0 (4.22) 
au+ akl = O (4.23) 
In the Cobb-Douglas production function where akk = a11 = akl = 0, the output 
elasticities are simply ak and a1. They remain constant over the entire sample period. 
(d) Data for estimation of the marginal productivity of capital for China. 
Measures of total industrial output, capital investment, fixed assets and labour 
required for independent accounting units within state industry are necessary to 
estimate equations 4.15, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.19. However, the relevant data published 
by the Chinese government contain many weakness. At least four sources of data 
weaknesses can be identified. 
(i) Total fixed assets are compiled from cumulative new investment from 
successive years with each investment valued at current prices. Unless the prices of 
capital goods remain stable, data generated in this way may not accurately reflect the 
actual growth of real fixed assets of independent accounting units within state 
industry. 
(ii) Investment data for the independent accounting units within state industry 
include a variety of service facilities, such as housing, schools, health clinics, stores, 
etc. Inclusion of investment connected with these service facilities-in industrial input 
data overstate the amount of capital used directly in the production process. 
(iii) Changes in the relative prices of the main components of total investment 
can also greatly affect the composition of industrial fixed investment. In China, 
especially during the past decade, neither the level of investment good'.s prices nor 
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the relative prices of major investment goods have remained constant over time. 
Therefore, the size and composition of the capital stock of state-own~ industry as 
shown in the China Stati:,.)cal Yearbook 1950-91 may deviate widely from the 
reality. 
(iv) The data for total labour input in state-owned industry includes non-
production labour input such as those engaged in providing public services, trading 
enterprises owned by the firm and so forth, while the national income generated from 
those non-production sectors is excluded from total industrial output. Hence, using 
official data is likely to overestimate true labour input and undervalue the total 
industrial output. 
For the above reasons, we conclude that available statistics cannot provide an 
accurate evaluation of the capital-output relationship for independent accounting 
units within state industry. Revised data of total industrial output, capital investment 
and labour required for independent accounting units within stat~ industry · are 
derived to rectify the principal shortcomings of official available data. Revised data 
are based on 1952 prices. The procedure for correcting the shortcomings in 
published data has been described by Chen, Jefferson et al., (1988). Basically these 
authors made the following adjustments: 
(i) A new time series of net industrial output data was created based on 
constant 1952 prices, by using a national income deflator; 
(ii) Annual figures for fixed capital stock \Vere decomposed into three 
categories: non-residential construction, equipment, anc! others.- Appropriate price 
indices, derived by Chen, Jefferson et al., (1988), were used to deflate each 
component of industrial investment and the deflated components "'ere combined to 
form new time series data of industrial investment v~lued at constant 1985 prices; 
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(iii) Annual figures for capital inputs were formed by including fixed capital 
stock and working capital, but excluding residential construction, w~ich represents 
the largest, though not the only category of non-industrial projects in industrial 
investment data; 
(iv) Total labour input data was compiled by excluding non-production labour 
input from the original total labour input data. Because of a lack of accurate data, 
the amount of non-production labour employed was roughly calculated from the ratio 
of production to non-production inve!Jtment. In fact this may over-estimate the level 
of non-production labour because production activities are likely to be more capital 
intensive than non-production ones. 
The adjustments described above attempt to overcome the major problems of 
Chinese industrial input data while preserving consistency between inputs and 
outputs. Appendix Table A4.1 contains the original and revised data for independent 
accounting units within state industry from 1952-88. More detailed discussions of 
revised data can be found in Chen, Wang et al., (1988) and Chen, Jefferson et al., 
(1988). 
Data for the derivation of the incremental capital-output ratio in state-owned 
industrial enterprises, is presented in Appendix Table A4.2. The average 
incremental capital-output ratio estimated by using equation 4.15 over the period 
1952-88 was .found to be 0.57. 
Data for the derivation of incremental real net labour-investment ratios are 
presented in Appendix Table A4.3. The adjusted marginal output-capital ratio for 
independent accounting units of state industry estimated by using equation 4.19 was 
0.57 - 0.20 = 0.37. 
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Table 4.1 Estimation results 
Cobb-Douglas Translog Cobb-Douglas Translog 
a.+B~l a.+8=%1 a.+B=l ,1 a.+B=l (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -71.2 
-51.1 -20.7 34.8 
(2.7)* (0.9) (1.7)*** (0.5) 
t 0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.2 
(2.7)* (0.7) (1.7)*** (0.6) 
ak 0.39 2.16 0.68 0.78 (2.5)** (1.7)** (6.3)* (5.4)* 
a1 0.32 4.4 0.32 0.22 
(3.1)* (1.4)**** (3.0)* (1.5)**** 
1/2 akk n.a -0.77 n.a 0.26 
(1.5)**** (0.9) 
1/2 a11 n.a -1.05 n.a -0.26 (1.4)**** (0.86) 
akl n.a 0.28 n.a 0.26 (1.9)*** (0.86) 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
DW 1.94 2.03 1.89 1.94 
Heteroskedasticity test 
Chi-square 0.76 1.789 0.4J 0.03 
(DF=l) (DF=l) (DF=l) (DF=l) 
Chi-square critical value 
3.84** 3.84** 3.84** 3.84** 
Ramsey test 
0.49a 0.34b 3.88a 17.96b Reset (2) 
F critical value 
4.15** 4.18** 4.15** 4.18** 
Notes: a F with DFl=l and DF2=32; b F with DFl=l and DF2=29; * Significant at 
0.5 per cent; ** Significant at 1 per cent; *** Significant at 5 per cent; and **** 
Significant at 10 per cent. 
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(e) Estimation results for production functions. Before comparing the two 
estimation results of marginal productivity of capital by usin,f! equa~ons 4.17 and 
4.19, one modification made to the original two equations should be noted. The 
ordinary least square (OLS) results show a low value of Durbin-Watson statistics for 
the Cobb-Douglas production function and the translog production function 
(DW1=0.95, DW2=0.97 respectively). This indicates that there is autocorrelation 
among residuals. By using the error correction method (ECM), the first-order 
autoregression (AR(l)) correction improved statistical results (DW 1=1.56, 
DW2=1.55 respectively) but autocorrelation among residuals still remained. 
Therefore, second-order autoregression (AR(2)) is employed in both equations 4.17 
and4.19. 
Table 4.1 shows the estimation results using time series data for the 
independent accounting units within state industry from 1952-88. 
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4.1 show the estimation of equations 4.17 ·and 
4.19 under the assumption of constant returns to scale. Thus, the sum of the output 
elasticities was constrained to equal unity. Initial estimation without this restriction 
is shown in columns (1) and (2) in the Table 4.1. 
Numbers in brackets are t values. The results show that Cobb-Douglas 
functional forms are a better estimation than the translog functional forms. All t 
statistics of the parameters are significant at 5 per cent in the Cobb-Douglas 
functional forms (Columns 1 and 3), but not in the translog functional forms 
(Columns 2 and 4). Moreover, the low F ratio of the Ramsey test lead to the 
acceptancP. of the Cobb-Douglas production functional form. The significant F value 
of the Ramsey test in the translog production function (column 4) indicates that the 
functional form specified for the Chinese economy is inadequate. 
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On statistical grounds, both Cobb-Douglas specifications are acceptable with 
or without restrictions of constant returns to scale. However, on economic grounds, 
the assumption of constant returns to scale does not sound sensible for the Chinese 
economy. Therefore, in the further studies, estimation of the marginal productivity 
of capital is based on the initial Cobb-Douglas production function form. 
The elasticity of capital derived from the Cobb-Douglas production function is 
0.39. The capital-output ratio has akeady been estimated to be 68 per cent (Table 
A2). Hence, the marginal productivity of capital estimated by using equation 4.17 is 
q = 0.39 (0.68) = 0.27 
(f) The micro level estimation approach. For micro-economic estimation, 
two sources of information are available: the interest rate structure of the economy 
and the project-specific economic rates of return. Imperfections in capital markets 
imply that interest rates are not very meaningful measures of the marginal 
productivity of cap;t::i! The pre-tax profit net of depreciation in the industrial sector 
would be a better guide of q (Squire and Van der Tak 1975:111). The profit rate in 
the private sector would also be a useful indicator but is difficult to obtain. In the 
case of China, the capital profit rates for independent accounting units within state 
industry may provide a suitable indicator. Appendix Table A4.4 shows that the 
average post-tax net capital profit rate is 17 .6 per cent and the average pre-tax net 
capital profit rate is 26.7 per cent for 1952-87. 
In using this data, the following points should be noted. First, with regard to 
the return on all invested capital, if project investment is financed by various sources, 
a weighted average of the return on each type of investment is necessary. The 
relevant interest rates may be interpreted as the return on loan finance. Secondly, 
with regard to the real return, both the pre-tax profit rate and the interest rates should 
be deflated by the rate of inflation. Thirdly, to obtain the return at border prices 
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rather than at domestic prices, the application of the appropriate conversion factors is 
required (Squire and Van derTak 1975:111). 
Table 4.2 Micro estimation of the marginal productivity of capital in China 
Sector No. 
Agriculture 11 
Highways and railways 7 
Industry 9 
Ports 5 
Power 8 
Weighted average ERR a 
Note: Economic rate of return (ERR). 
Total loans 
$US 
(million) 
973.1 
1062.6 
1018.3 
426.4 
1519.4 
Weighted 
Average 
ERRa 
25.0 
27.0 
39.0 
21.0 
12.0 
24.0 
Sources: Data for calculation of the weighted average of ERR is given in Chapter 4 
Data Appendix Two. 
Micro-level estimJ.t~s of marginal productivity of capital in this study are 
based on the estimated rate of return on projects financed by the World Bank. :r'he 
marginal productivity of capital for World Bank projects shown in Table 4.2 is 
derived from weighted average of the economic rate of return (ERR) on 40 projects 
in China. Estimates are provided by World Bank Staff Appraisal Reports. 
The average economic rate of return is 24 per cent for the 40 World Bank 
projects. This number is likely to overestimate the marginal productivity of capital 
for China for two reasons. 
First, the figure represents the expected average ERR of the 40 projects rather 
than the actual ex post ERR of the marginal project. 
Second, to receive financial assistance from the World Bank, the government 
is likely to have chosen those projects with the most profit potential. Thus, the 
projects financed by the World Bank may have higher returns than other projects 
73 
(Most of the World Bank project appraisal papers used 12 per cent as the target Tate 
of returns). 
The value of marginal productivity of capital for independent accounting units 
within state industry is shown in Table 4.3. It ranges from 24 per cent to 37 per cent 
based on various estimations. 
Table 4.3 The range of the value of marginal productivities of capital in China 
World Bank target rate of r~turn 
Economic rate of ret~ 
Cobb-Douglas function 
Profit, tax/capital ratioc 
Incremental O/K ratiod 
q values(%) 
12 
24 
27 
27 
37 
Notes: a Table 4.2; b Equation 4.17; c Appendix Table A4.4; d Appendix Tables 
A4.2 and A4.3. 
As noted above, the economic rate of return for World Bank projects, as well 
as the adjusted incremental output-capital ratio, overestimate the marginal 
productivity of capital to a certain extent. Hence, the 12 per cent World Bank target 
rate included in Table 4.3 is used as a low bound of the estimation of q. A more 
reliable range is expected to be allocated between the value derived from micro-
estimation and the World Bank target rate, that is between 24 per cent and 12 per 
cent. The mean value of 18 per cent has been chosen to calculate the shadow price 
of capital for China. 
4.4 Estimation of the consumption rate of interest (i) 
The consumption rate of interest, i, as defined in the equation 4.2 has three 
components (Squire and Van der Tak 1975:109): the expected growth rate of real per 
capita consumption, g; the value of the social elasticity of the marginal utility of 
consumption, n; and the rate of pure time preference, r. 
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(a) The expected growth rate of real per capital consumption. During the 
period 1980-87, total private consumption at constant prices grew at ~n annual rate 
of 6.1 per cent in China. Given a 1.2 per cent population growth rate (World 
Development Report 1989) an average growth rate of real per capita consumption (g) 
of 4.9 per cent is implied in this period. Assuming that projected real per capita 
consumption will not change in the near future (dlll;ng a project life of 20 to 30 
years), a value of 4.9 per cent for g is applied in this study. 
(b) The value of the social elasticity of the marginal utility of 
consumption. A number of attempts have been made to derive the value of the 
social elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption (n) objectively. Fellner 
(1967) found that a reasonable range of values for n is given by n=l.0 to n=2.5. 
Squire and Van der Tak (1975:67) suggested values of n=l.0 to n=2.0 for countries 
with mild and strong interest in income distribution objectives, respectively. 
Although economic growth has been the major objective of the Chinese 
government since 1978, social equity and an improving distribution of income have 
not been completely ignored. To eliminate the 'Three Differences' has been an 
important objective. The differences are: 
. between rural and urban areas; 
· between skilled and unskilled labour; 
· between blue and white collar workers. 
In practice it has long been recognized that there is a trade:off between growth 
and income distribution objectives which must be balanced by the government. 
Since the increased use of market mechanisms and diversified ownership from 
1978, the share of the household sector and other non state-owned sectors has 
increased rapidly. High incomes in these sectors have affected previous patterns of 
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income distributiou ~md caused social problems. The Chinese government is faced 
by the need to bal<ince economic growth with higher incomes for low i~come groups. 
Hence, in choosing subjective parameters relating to equity and growth objectives, 
the Chinese government's attitude towards income redistribution may be considered 
as being 'moderate' compared to 'radical' and 'indifferent'. Values of n lying between 
0.5 and 2.5 are chosen for sensitivity analysis. For the main part of the analysis, a 
value of n= 1.5 will be used. 
( c) Estimation of the r-~'te of pure time preference. The high priority that 
the Chinese government has placed on growth also implies a very low value for the 
rate of pure time preference (r). In other words, the Chinese government places very 
little, if any, premium on current consumption compared with future consumption. 
Because the consumption rate of interest depends on the value judgements of both n 
and r, the value of these two parameters should not be determined interdependently. 
China has a growth-conscious economy, that is, a low consumption rate of interef>c is 
required. On the other hand, China is also concerned about current income 
distribution, that is, a high elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (n) is also 
needed. 
Ta~le 4.4 The possible range of the consumption rate of interest for China 
n r=O r=l r=2 r=3 r=4 r=5 
0.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 
1.0 4.9 5.9 6.9 7.9 8.9 9.9 
1.5 7.4 8.4 9.4 10.4 11.4 12.4 
2.0 9.8 10.8 11.8 12.8 13.8 14.8 
2.5 12.3 13.3 14.3 15.3 16.3 17.3 
Note: The value of consumption rate of interest is derived from equation 4.2; g = 4.9 
per cent. 
A low value for the rate of pure time preference (r) would ensure that the 
consumption rate of interest (i) is low and hence correctly reflects the Chinese 
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government's growth objective despite the high value for n. Squire and Van dcr Tak 
(1975:109) recommend that relatively low values of zero to 5 per c,ent be used. A 
value of r=l is applied in this study. Table 4.4 shows the possible range of 
consumption rates of interest in China. A central value of 8.4 per cent for the 
consumption rate of interest is chosen at this stage. 
4.5 Estimation of the marginal propensity of reinvestment 
If the national income is fixed and there is no external borrowing, the amount of 
capital available for investment can only be increased by decreasing the amount 
available for consumption. To accelerate the process of industrialization, China 
needed to accumulate large amounts of capital. To raise living standards, on the 
other hand much of its income needed to be devoted to consumption. Correctly 
handling the relationship between reinvestment and consumption has long been 
recognized as one of the important factors in economic development. 
Looking back over China's experience, it is clear that thl: imbalance between 
reinvestment and consumption since 1958 has been one of the major causes of the 
repeated set-backs China has suffered in the process of industrialization (Dong 
Fureng 1982). Table 4.5 shows the proportion of China's national income devoted to 
reinvestment or consumption for various time periods since 1953. 
Table 4.5 The proportion of national income devoted to reinvestment or 
consum~tion 
Year National income Consumption Reinvestment (billion yuan) (%) (%) 
1953-57 412.2 75.8 24.2 
1958-62 561.6 69.2 30.8 
1963-65 357.8 77.3 22.7 
1966-70 778.5 73.7 26.3 
1971-75 1105.4 67.0 33.0 
1976-80 1502.4 66.8 33.2 
1981-85 2618.2 68.7 31.3 
1986-88 3022.9 65.'I 34.3 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing, 1989. 
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The average capital reinvestment rate in China ranged from 24.2 per cent in 
the First Five Year Plan to a peak of 34.3 per cent in the first three years of the 
Seventh Five Year Plan. However, most Chinese economists (Dong Fureng 1982) 
consider that the First Five Year i'lan was the most healthy and that a capital 
reinvestment rate of 25 per cent would be most appropriate. Since 1978, the Chinese 
government has been taking steps to improve the balance between reinvestment and 
consumption. Reinvestment is gradually being reduced to a more appropriate level, 
that is, from 36.5 per cent in 1978 to 34.1 per cent in 1988. The efficiency with 
which capital is used is being improved and the distribution of reinvestment funds is 
becoming more economically rational. 
A range from 25 per cent to 35 per cent of the reinvestment rate was 
accordingly chosen for sensitivity analysis. Table 4.6 summarises the possible range 
of the shadow price of capital (Sk) based on different estimates of the marginal 
productivity of capital in independent accounting units within state industry. 
The central group of values of Sk were chosen, that is, 2.7 for the lower 
boundary (equation 4.6) and 5.3 for the higher boundary (equation 4.13), based on 
q=18; i=8.4 and s=0.3. This means that the marginal social value of foreign 
exc_hange in the public sector is worth 2.7 to 5.3 times the marginal social value of 
private consumption at the average level of consumption in China. The mean value 
of 4 is chosen as the central value for the shadow price of capita in China. 
Table 4.6 Shadow price of capital in China 
Marginal 
produtivit)' of 
capital(%) 
12 
18 
24 
Shadow price 
of capital 
(equation 4.6) 
1.2 
2.7 
3.6 
Shadow price 
of capital 
(equation 4.13) 
1.5 
5.3 
17.7 
Notes: The value of the lower limit is de~ved from equation 4.6 and ~e value of the 
higher (upper) limit is derived from equation 4.13. B = 0.79; s = 0.30; 1 = 8.4. 
78 
4.6 Summary and conclusions 
The shadow price of capital was derived for China using equations ~.6 and 4.13 to 
establish lower and higher limits respectively. The derived values of the shadow 
price of capital using equation 4.6 range from 1.2 to 3.6 for different estimations of 
marginal productivity of capital. On the ba$i') of the discussion in section 4.3, where 
the mean value of the marginal productivity of capital was estimf\ted to be 18 per 
cent, the shadow price of capital estimates based on our chosen numeraire ranges 
from 2.7 to 5.3 depending on assumptions regarding the rate of reinvestment of 
capital. Hence, 2.7 and 5.3 represent the lower and upper bound of shadow price of 
capital. Therefore, the mean value of 4 is chosen as the shadow price of capital in 
China for case study. 
The estimation results indicate that there is a premium attached to capital 
goods over consumption goods. The implications for policy planning are equally 
clear. A shadow price of capital of 4 suggests that, rather than subsidize its ?Se, 
China should tax the use of capital at a rate of 300 per cent, that is, at three times its 
original cost. In other words, capital should be made more expensive to the user in 
China. 
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Appendix Ta~le A~.1 .. The or!ginal and revised data for independent accounting 
umts wdhm state mdustry 1952-88 (1952 constant prices) 
Ori~nal data Revised data 
Net Total Total 
Year output capital Labour capital Labour 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1952 11.44 14.68 51.0 14.68 50.5 
1953 15.30 17.80 59.4 17.68 58.6 
1954 17.68 21.17 61.0 21.17 59.2 
1955 18.76 23.61 58.0 23.83 55.9 
1956 24.53 27.02 71.7 27.28 68.6 
1957 29.97 33.03 74.8 33.32 71.1 
1958 50.24 46.96 231.6 47.55 218.0 
1959 65.30 66.45 199.3 67.99 186.4 
1960 73.34 87.45 214.4 90.40 199.7 
1961 40.95 91.65 159.7 92.28 148.5 
1962 34.90 89.26 117.8 87.39 109.5 
1963 39.51 90.21 111.9 88.35 104.0 
1964 50.19 94.83 115.9 90.55 107.8 
1965 63.87 103.73 123.8 98.32 115.3 
1966 79.58 111.94 132.4 106.23 123.4 
1967 65.27 121.38 138.2 115.50 128.9 
1968 60.58 129.16 149.2 122.58 139.2 
1969 81.95 136.26 163.0 130.23 152.2 
1970 110.12 154.51 195.9 152.29 183.1 
1971 127.59 173.94 223.3 170.17 209.0 
1972 134.09 197.46 235.0 194.65 220.3 
1973 140.36 220.01 239.7 218.41 225.1 
1974 138.52 236.31 249.7 234.91 234.4 
1975 159.83 256.90 269.1 255.49 253.2 
1976 144.19 277.44 286.6 274.44 269.8 
1977 157.88 298.52 301.3 294.80 283.8 
1978 190.82 327.30 301.4 321.12 284.1 
1979 206.25 348.76 310.9 337.13 292.9 
1980 224.20 366.37 324.6 346.42 305.0 
1981 222.12 387.30 340.7 355.44 318.3 
1982 231.95 414.59 350.3 372.48 324.6 
1983 253.81 445.25 355.2 389.17 326.4 
1984 283.46 475.51 359.2 402.31 328.6 
1985 346.92 560.41 368.5 453.89 335.2 
1986 375.54 649.60 382.3 527.97 344.0 
1987 436.21 745.70 395.8 606.58 356.2 
1988 528.10 860.30 409.3 697.90 368.4 
Notes: Columns 1,2 and 4 are in billion yuan. Columns 3 and 5 are in ten thousand 
workers. 
Sources: The original data are from State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Year 
Bonk, Beijing, 1990. The revised data for 1952-85 are from Chen, Jefferson et al., 
1988. The revised data for 1986-88 are calculated by the author. 
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Table A4.2 Data ~or the estimation of the incremental output/capHal ratio 1952-
88 (19J.l constant prices) 
l Net Incre- Total Incremental i Industrial mental capital capital llQ/t:il<. ~ Q/K 
output output(/lQ) inputs inputs(Af<:) (2)/(4) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1952 11.44 n.a 14.68 n.a n.a 0.78 
1953 15.30 3.86 17.68 3.00 1.29 0.87 
1954 17.68 2.38 21.17 3.49 0.68 0.84 
1955 18.76 1.08 23.83 2.66 0.41 0.79 
1956 24.53 5.77 27.28 3.45 1.67 0.90 
1957 29.97 5.44 33.32 6.04 0.90 0.90 
1958 50.24 20.26 47.55 14.23 1.42 1.06 
1959 65.30 15.06 67.99 20.44 0.74 0.96 
1960 73.34 8.05 90.40 22.41 0.36 0.81 
1961 40.95 -32.39 92.28 1.88 -17.23 0.44 
1962 34.90 -6.05 87.39 -4.89 1.24 0.40 
1963 39.51 4.61 88.35 0.96 4.80 0.45 
1964 50.19 10.68 90.55 2.20 4.86 0.55 
1965 63.87 13.67 98.32 7.77 1.76 0.65 
1966 79.58 15.71 106.23 7.91 1.99 0.75 
1967 65.27 -14.30 115.50 9.27 -1.54 0.57 
1968 60.58 -4.70 122.58 7.08 -0.66 0.49 
1969 81.95 21.37 130.23 7.65 2.79 0.63 
1970 110.12 28.17 152.29 22.06 1.28 0.72 
1971 127.59 17.47 170.17 17.88 0.98 0.75 
1972 134.09 6.50 194.65 24.48 0.27 . 0.69 
1973 140.36 6.28 218.41 23.76 0.26 0.64 
1974 138.52 -1.84 234.91 16.50 -0.11 0.59 
1975 159.83 21.31 255.49 20.58 1.04 0.63 
1976 144.19 -15.65 274.44 18.95 -0.83 0.53 
1977 157.88 13.69 294.80 20.36 0.67 0.54 
1978 190.82 32.94 321.12 26.32 1.25 0.59 
1979 206.25 15.43 337.13 16.01 0.96 0.61 
1980 224.20 17.96 346.42 9.29 1.93 0.65 
1981 222.12 -2.09 355.44 9.02 -0.23 0.62 
1982 231.95 9.83 372.48 17.04 0.58 0.62 
1983 253.81 21.86 389.17 16.69 1.31 0.65 
1984 283.46 29.65 402.31 13.14 2.26 0.70 
1985 346.92 63.46 453.89 51.58 1.23 0.76 
1986 375.54 28.62 527.97 74.08 0.39 0.71 
1987 436.21 60.67 606.58 78.61 0.77 0.72 
1988 528.10 91.89 697.90 91.32 1.01 0.76 
Average 0.57 0.68 
Notes: Columns l, 2, 3 and 4 are in billion yuan. Columns 5 and are in percentage. 
! Source: See Table A4.1. .~ 
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Table A4.3 Data for estimation of the incremental labour input capital ratio 
1952-88 (1952 constant prices) 
Total Total Incremental · 
Year labour Wage bill Wage bill Dl./DK 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1952 50.50 21.6 n.a n.a 
1953 58.60 27.6 6.0 2.0 
1954 59.20 28.3 0.7 0.2 
1955 55.90 29.8 1.5 0.6 
1956 68.60 36.2 6.4 1.9 
1957 71.10 41.8 5.6 0.9 
1958 218.00 79.6 37.8 2.7 
1959 186.40 86.9 7.3 0.4 
1960 199.70 92.1 5.2 0.2 
1961 148.50 66.1 -26.0 -13.8 
1962 109.50 51.8 -14.3 -2.9 
1963 104.00 51.9 0.1 0.1 
1964 107.80 56.3 4.4 2.0 
1965 115.30 60.3 4.0 0.5 
1966 123.40 63.7 3.4 0.4 
l 
1967 128.90 67.5 3.8 0.4 
1 1968 139.20 71.1 3.6 0.5 
I 1969 152.20 78.3 7.2 0.9 
" 1970 183.10 90.2 11.9 0.5 
1971 209.00 101.7 11.5 0.6 
1972 220.30 114.6 12.9 0.5 
1973 225.10 117.8 3.2 0.1 
1974 234.40 122.8 5.0 0.3 
1975 253.20 128.9 6.1 0.3 
1976 269.80 135.0 6.1 0.3 
1977 283.80 139.0 4.0 0.2 
1978 284.10 147.0 8.0 0.3 
1979 292.90 162.6 15.6 1.0 
J 1980 305.00 
181.7 19.1 2.1 
19g1 318.30 186.7 5.0 0.6 
1982 324.60 194.5 7.8 0.5 
1983 326.40 200.9 6.4 0.4 
1984 328.60 232.8 31.9 2.4 
1985 335.20 255.0 22.2 0.4 
1986 344.03 287.8 32.8 0.4 
1987 356.23 304.0 16.2 0.2 
1988 368.41 360.4 56.4 0.6 
Average 0.2 
Notes: Column 1 is in millions of workers. Columns 2 and 3 are in billion yuan. 
ColumL 4 is in percentage. Incremental capital inputs (DK) is provided in column 4 
of Table A4.2. 
Source: See Table A4.1. 
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Table A4.4 The average profit/capital ratio of state-owned industrial enterprises 
in China 1952-88 
Year 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Average 
Post-tax 
Profit/Capital 
ratio(%) 
19.2 
23.1 
22.5 
22.1 
22.0 
23.9 
34.2 
35.2 
32.6 
9.0 
8.5 
13.4 
17.5 
20.9 
24.2 
13.6 
10.0 
16.1 
20.1 
19.3 
18.0 
16.8 
13.4 
14.1 
11.4 
12.9 
15.5 
16,l 
16.0 
15.0 
14.4 
14.4 
14.9 
13.2 
10.6 
10.6 
17.6 
Pre-tax 
Profit /Capital 
ratio(%) 
25.4 
30.4 
30.4 
30.0 
32.1 
34.6 
46.5 
48.7 
43.6 
15.9 
15.1 
20.5 
25.7 
29.8 
34.5 
21.7 
17.3 
25.3 
30.6 
30.0 
27.7 
25.8 
21.7 
22.7 
19.3 
21.2 
24.2 
24.8 
24.8 
23.8 
23.4 
23.2 
24.2 
23.8 
20.7 
20.3 
26.7 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing, 1989. 
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Table A4.5 Sectoral Distribution of World Bank Loans to China 1982-88 
Sector 
Port projects 
Power projects 
Industrial projects 
Agricultural projects 
Highway & railway projects 
Education projects 
Total 
No. of 
projects 
6 
8 
15 
13 
8 
9 
59 
Source: World Bank Staff Appraisal Reports. 
Total loans 
$US 
(million) 
426.4 
1519.4 
1682.2 
1113.1 
1062.6 
854.2 
6657.9 
% 
6 
23 
25 
17 
16 
13 
100 
Table A4.6 Distribution of World Bank loans among port projects in China 
1982-88 
Project Total loans Bank 
$US 
(million) 
Dalian port 96.0 71.0 
Ningbo and Shanghai ports 76.4 
Tianjin port 130.0 .. 
Huangpu port 88.0 63.0 
Xiamen port 36.0 
Total 426.4 
Notes: a Special drawing rights. b Economic rate of return. 
Source: World Bank Staff Appraisal Reports. 
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(%) 
25.0 20 
18 
.. 21 
25.0 21 
31 
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Table A4.7 Distribution of World Bank loans among power projects in China 
1982-88 
Project 
1 Lubuge power project 
2 Second power project 
3 Shuikou power project 
4 Wujing power project 
5 National capital power 
supply project phase I 
6 Beilungang thermal project 
7 Beilingang extension project 
8 Yantan power project 
Total 
Note: a Economic rate of return 
Source: World Bank Staff Appraisal Reports. 
Total loans 
$US 
million 
145.4 
117.0 
140.0 
190.0 
485.0 
225.0 
165.0 
52.0 
1519.4 
ERR3 
(%) 
12 
14 
15 
12 
11 
9 
15 
12 
Table A4.8 Distribution of World Bank loans in industrial projects in China 
1982-88 
Project 
Total loans 
$US 
million 
Bank SDR3 
1 Shanghai aluminium milling 
2 Changcun coal mining 
3 Shanghai machine tool 
4 Shanghai sewerage 
5 Phosphate development 
6 Pharmaceuticals project 
7 Industrial credit project 
8 Second industrial credit 
9 Fourth industrial credit 
10 Gansu industrial development 
11 Kararnay petroleum 
12 Zhongyuan-wenliu petroleum 
13 Daqing oilfield reservoir 
14 Fertilizer rehabilitation 
& energy saving project 
15 Fertilizer rationalization 
Total 
.. 
126.0 
100.0 
145.0 
62.7 
127.0 
68.6 
175.0 
300.0 
20.0 
100.3 
100.8 
162.4 
97.0 
97.4 
1682.2 
.. 
45.0 
.. 
40.6 
105.0 
250.0 
Notes: a Special drawing rights. b Economic rate of return. 
Sources: World Bank Staff Appraisal Reports. 
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100.0 
.. 
28.0 
70.0 
50.0 
.. 
21 
31 
13 
26 
25 
.. 
74 
91 
31 
24 
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Table A4.9 Distribution of World Bank loans in agricultural projects in China 
1982-88 ' 
Total loans 
Project $US Banlc SDRa 
million 
1 Coastal land development 100.0 40.0 60.0 
2 Xinjiang agricultural development 70.0 
3 Rural water supply 80.0 
4 Seeds project 40.0 
5 Third rural credit project 170.0 
6 Forestry development project 47.8 
7 Pishihang-chaohu area 
development project 92.0 17.0 75.0 
8 Red soils area development 40.0 
9 Gansu provincial development 
the agricultural component 130.0 
10 Rubber development 100.0 
11 North irrigation project 103.0 
12 North china plain Agriculture 60.0 .. .. 
13 Heilongjiang land reclamation 80.3 45.0 35.3 
Total 1113.1 
Note: a Special drawing rights. b Economic rate of return. 
Source: World Bank Staff Appraisal Reports. 
ERRb 
(%) 
32 
18 
.. 
38 
24 
>50 
36 
29 
13 
17 
20 
.. 
23 
Table A4.10 Distribution of World Bank loans in highway and railway projects 
in China 1982-88 
Total loans 
ERRb 
Project $US Bank SD Ra 
million (%) 
1 Highway project 72.6 42.6 30.0 20 
2 Shaanxi provincial highway 50.0 .. .. 2sa 
3 Sichuan provincial highway 125.0 75.0 50.0 27b 
4 Railway project .. 
5 Second railway project 235.0 .. .. 25 
6 Third railway project 230.0 160.0 70.0 30 
7 Fourth railway project 200.0 36 
8 Beijing-tianjin-tanggu 
expressway project 150.0 25.0 125.0 15 
Total 1062.6 
Notes: a Special drawing rights. b Economic rate of return. 
Sources: World Bank Staff Appraisal Reports. 
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Table A4.11 Distribution of World Bank loans in education projects in China 
1982-88 
Project 
1 University development project 
2 Second university development project 
3 Rural health & medical education 
4 Second agricultural education 
5 Agricultural education & research 
6 Second agricultural research 
7 Polytechnic/television university project 
8 Teacher training project 
9 Provincial university project 
Total 
Sources: World Bank Staff Appraisal Reports. 
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Total loans 
$US 
million 
200.0 
145.0 
85.0 
68.8 
75.4 
25.0 
85.0 
50.0 
120.0 
854.2 
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Chapter 5 
Estimation of the Social Discount Rate for China 
5.1 The role of the social discount rate 
The social discount rate is defined as the rate of decline in the value of the 
numeraire. It is the rate used to calculate all discounted measures of project worth in 
cost-benefit analysis. Following Little and Mirrlees (1974) and Squire and Van der 
Tak (1975), public income measured in foreign exchange is the chosen numeraire in 
this study. In the net present value formula, 
n 
NPV = L (Br - ct) I ( 1 + Ri )t 
t=l 
where 
NPV = net present value; 
B = total benefits; 
C = total costs; 
t =time~ 
Ri = the social discount rate. 
(5.1) 
The central decision making criterion in project evaluation is the present value 
approach, which makes benefits and costs at different points of time comparable by 
using an appropriate discount rate. An economic appraisal of a project analyses its 
impact on the welfare of the whole country. 
5.2 Alternative methods for estimating the social discount rate 
Choosing among alternative time streams of social benefits and costs is one of the 
most difficult and most important problems in the evaluation of public investment 
projects. In the literature there are two alternative methods for estimating the social 
discount rate. 
88 
(a) Th~ social marginal rate of time preference. An individual is said to 
have a time preference for consumption in different periods. If. he or she is 
indifferent between the prospect of $1 extra consumption in one year and the 
prospect of $1 +t extra consumption in the following year, he or she is said to have a 
marginal time preference rate oft or t * 100 per cent per year. Hence, an individual's 
rate of time preference is the rate of return on future income for which he or she is 
willing to sacrifice current income. Similarly, the social marginal rate of time 
preference is simply the rate of return on future income for which society as a whole 
is prepared to sacrifice current income. 
Following traditional capital theory, in a perfectly competitive capital market, 
a single interest rate would equate the marginal time preference of savers with the 
marginal productivity of capital in investment, at the equilibrium level of saving and 
investment. At this interest rate, the total amount which people wished to lend 
would equal the total amount people wish to b..>rrow. 
Singer argued that government financed projects can be financed at a lower 
cost than private industry projects. The government rate of borrowing is relatively 
risk free because a government's taxing power provides security and hence the 
overall degree of security for the loan is relatively certain. He also argued that a 
government has so many projects that it can equalize losses. In view of these 
considerations, he recommended that the expected average long-term government 
bond rate be used as the basis for calculating public investment costs and that higher 
rates be used for private investments (1951:123-24). 
The United States Inter-Agency Committee on Water Resources (1958) 
recommended that: 
estimates of benefits and costs accruing at various times should be made 
comparable by adjustment to a uniform time basis through the use of projected 
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long-range interest rates. Pending the development of such rates, the average 
rate of return, that is, yield, on long-term Federal bonds ove~ a sufficiently 
long period of time to average out the influence of cyclical fluctuati~ns was 
considered by the Committee appropriate for uniform application by all 
agencies, on the condition that adequate allowance had been made for 
uncertainties and risks (1958: 24). 
Some authors, for example McKean (1958) have argued that in the absence of 
capital rationing, the market interest rate would be appropriate for evaluating public 
investment projects. 
However, more recently, most economists have recognised that market 
interest rates are not suitabie for discounting the benefits and costs of public projects, 
because of the existence of the government (and hence taxes on profits and interest 
earnings) and other financial market imperfections. One important argument 
advanced 'Jy Marglin (1963a), Feldstein (1964b), Sen (1967) and Baumol (1968) for 
not using a market interest rate was based on the insight that there is a divergence 
between collectiv~ and individual behaviour (the sub-optimal savings argument). 
Marglin (1963a) provided a mathematical proof that an individual's marginal 
rate of time preference, in the context of collective saving versus consumption 
decisions, may differ from the marginal rate of time preference in the context of 
unilateral decisions. According to this author, the implication of this result is that 
even in a frictionless competitive model, laissez-faire-determined rates of investment 
and interest lose any normative significance they might otherwise ~ave had. 
Sen (1967) studied two specific problems concerning individual and social 
actions. 
(i) The isolation paradox. This is an n-person extension of the two-person 
non-zero-sum game known as 'the prisoners dilemma'. Here each individual has a 
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strictly dominant strategy, and the pursuit of this produces an overall result that is 
Pareto-inferior. Individuals can do better than this by collusion, bu~ the collusive 
solution requires enforcement. 
(ii) The assurance problem. This problem is somewhat different from the 
isolation paradox and has a different analytical structure. It also has different policy 
implications. There is no strictly dominant strategy, and one of the equilibrium 
points in the non-cooperative game may be Pareto-optimal (Sen 1967:122). Whether 
the outcome will be Pareto-inferior depends on what each individual expects about 
the others' action. If each individual is assured that the others are doing the 'right' 
thing, then it is in one's own interest also to do the 'right' thing. No enforcement is 
necessary. 
Sen also clarified the way in which his own and Marglin's discussion of the 
non-optimality of market savings corresponds to the isolation paradox (see (i) 
above). That is, the individual will not save an optimal amount even if he or she 
knew that others were doing so (Sen 1967:122). The sub-optimal savings argument 
has an important implication when choosing a social rate of discount because if it 
holds, the market-revealed marginal rate of time preference will be too high. 
Therefore, a rate lower than the market rate of discount should be used in public 
project evaluation. 
However, this argument was challenged by Warr and Wright (1981). They 
used a simple general equilibrium model of inter-generational benevolence to 
examine its validity. They showed that the appropriate rate of discount is the market 
rate, regardless of the existence of the isolation paradox. They maintained that 
discounting public (or private) investment at a rate other than the market rate of 
discount does not represent an opportunity for achieving a welfare gain (Warr and 
Wright 1981:144). 
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Other arguments for rejecting the use of market interest rates include the point. 
that market interest rates generally underestimate the opportunity cost of capital, 
because they fail to reflect taxes paid on the profits of private sector projects 
(Baumol 1968, Harberger 1972). It has also been argued that market rates neglect 
other external benefits generated by private sector investments, particularly where 
market prices and opportunity costs of factors of production or goods diverge 
(Eckstein 1957). 
(b) The social opportunity cost of capital. The advocates of this approach to 
determining the social discount rate argue that the appropriate social discount rate is 
the rate of return earned by the marginal private sector project. Mishan (1972) 
argued that if funds are being drawn away from the private sector to undertake public 
projects, the rate of return of public projects should at least equal that of the marginal 
private sector project. Otherwise, it is easy to show that there will be welfare losses 
to the country. Even if some of these funds are actually being drawn away from 
consumption, it is argued that they could always be invested in the private sector at 
the going marginal rate of return. Hence, he believed that the opportunity cost of 
capital, defined as the expected marginal productivity of capital in the private sector 
was the appropriate social discount rate. 
Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972) show that it is only valid to use the 
marginal productivity of capital in the private sector as the social discount rate when 
private sector investment occurs at an optimal level. In other words, the government 
must believe t~-:at growth levels are ideal. However, this assumption is generally not 
valid either in developed or developing countries. 
Harberger (1972) proposed the use of a social discount rate which was a 
weighted average of the social marginal rate of time preference and the social 
opportunity cost of capital or equivalently, the market interest rate adjusted for 
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distortions in the capital market (1972:95). It was proposed that the weights should 
also be applied to different sources of capital drawn by a project. 
(c) Reconciliation of the social marginal rate of time preference approach 
with the social opportunity cost of capital approach. In a perfectly competitive 
economy, there would be no conflict between the two approaches. The social 
marginal rate (Jf time preference would equal the marginal productivity of capital and 
the unique market interest rate which would be the social discount rate. In these 
ideal conditions, resources would be optimally distributed between investment and 
consumption and the country's growth rate would also be at an optimal level. 
However, in the absence of these ideal conditions, the social marginal rate of 
time preference is not equal to the marginal productivity of capital in the private 
sector. Hence, restricting the analysis to the selection of a single 'optimal' social rate 
of discount by choosing between the marginal rate of time preference and marginal 
rate of productivity is not appropriate. Neither the social marginal time preference 
rate, nor the marginal productivity of capital in the private sector would be the 
appropriate social discount rate if they were not equal, that is, if growth were not 
optimal (Morawetz 1972). 
Marglin (1963a), Feldstein (1964b) and Baumol (1968) overcame this 
dilemma by recognizing that at least two policy targets must be considered in 
selecting the optimal social rate of discount. The first is an efficient allocation of 
resources between consumption and investment. The second is an optimal allocation 
of resources over time. Accordingly, they suggested that two instruments are 
necessary to achieve these objectives in evaluating projects. These authors 
recommended the use of a marginal rate of time preference to ensure the optimal 
allocation of resources over time, and the use of a shadow price of capital to ensure 
the optimal allocation of resources between consumption and investment. 
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Introducing these two instruments enables a comparison of investment and 
consumption streams to be achieved over time, and hence an optimal allocation of 
resources. This is achieved by firstly converting all costs and benefits to equivalent 
decreases and increases in consumption by multiplying all changes in investment 
which occur by the shadow price of capital (which is greater than one if there is an 
investment premium). These consumption streams are then discounted at ihe 
appropriate social time preference rate for comparison of consumption streams over 
time. Use of two instruments to attain two targets has been widely accepted in the 
literature as the correct approach. It is not possible to use a single instrument (either 
the social marginal rate of time preference or the social opportunity cost of capital) 
to attain two targets; optimal allocation of resources between consumption and 
investment, and optimal allocation of resources over time. 
This approach for deriving a social discount rate is employed by Dasgupta, 
Marglin and Sen (1972), Little and Mirrlees (1974), and Squire and Van der J'ak 
(1975). The changes in investment and consumption caused by the project are 
converted into a common numeraire by using a shadow price of investment. In the 
case of Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen, this numeraire is the consumption stream, while 
in the case of Little and Mirrlees, Squire and Van der Tak, the numeraire is the 
investment stream. 
5.3 Theoretical framework of the estimation of the social discount rate (Ri) 
The social discount rate allows all costs and benefits generated by a project to be 
expressed in present value terms, and allows a comparison with alternative projects. 
If a low value for the social discount rate is employed, too many projects will 
pass the positive net present value criterion and demand for public investment funds 
will exceed supply. If the social discount rate is too high, too few projects will pass 
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the test of positive net present value which, will result in a surplus supply of public 
investment funds (Squire and Van der Tak 1975:76). 
Ideally, the value of the social discount rate should be set at the level where 
demand for public investment funds just matches the available supply. In other 
words, the social discount rate is the internal social rate of return on the marginal 
project in the public sector. 
It follows (Squire and Van der Tak 1975) that if at the margin a country is 
lending in the international financial Iliarket, the real rate of return on foreign lending 
must be the lower limit for the social discount rate. On the other hand, if at the 
margin a country is borrowing from abroad, the social discount rate should be at least 
equal to the marginal cost of such borrowing. 
Squire and Van der Tak's (1975:114) provided a broad guide to the estimation 
of the true value of the social discount rate (Ri). That is: 
(5.2) 
where 
q = is the marginal return to public investment measured in free foreign 
exchange 
· h = where h adjusts for the distributional impact of public investment on the 
private sector 
If public investment leads to an increase in private sector consumption, h 
would be equal to the difference between the social cost of that consumption and its 
corresponding social benefit. Only if the entire return (q) accrue.s ~o the government, 
that is all of it is saved, or the social costs and benefits resuhing in increased 
consumption are exactly offset, will the social discount rate be equal to the marginal 
productivity of capital, that is, the traditional discount rate (Squire and Van der Tak 
1975:76). 
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More realistically, only part of the returns from the public investment will be 
re-invested (saved). Supposing that the marginal propensity of saving out of the 
return is s, it follows that ( 1 - s ) q units of foreign exchange accrue to private sector 
consumption. Also, assuming that this increased consumption accrues to those at the 
average level of consumption, then: 
h = ( 1 - s ) q ( 1 - 1 / vB ) 
Hence, 
Rj = sq + (1 - s)q Iv B 
where, 
s = marginal propensity to save; 
q = marginal productivity of capital; 
v = the value of public investment; 
B = consumption conversion factor. 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
Equation 5.4 shows that the social discount rate is the weighted sum of the 
marginal productivity of capital, and the marginal productivity of capital deflated so 
that it is expressed in terms of the numeraire (investment flows), where the weights 
are rate of re-investment, s and the rate of consumption generation ( 1 - s ), 
respectively. 1 / vB is the deflater used and may be interpreted as follows. The value 
of a unit of consumption measured at domestic prices accruing to someone at the 
average level of consumption is worth 1 I vB units of public investment measured in 
foreign exchange. 
Given equation 5.4, the social discount rate is greater or smaller than the 
marginal productivity of capital, depending on whether 1 I vB is greater or smaller 
than unity. If the increment in consumption accrues to those below the average level 
of consumption, the term 1 I vB should be replaced by d I vB, where d > 1. This will 
96 
increase the probability that the social discount rate is greater than the marginal 
productivity of capital. 
Squire and Van der Talc (1975) suggested that the marginal productivity of 
capital q be regarded as an upper bound and equation 5.4 as a lower bound for the 
social discount rate Ri. The following section estimates the social discount rate for 
China on equation 5.4. 
5.4 Estimation of the social discount rate (Ri) for China 
Four parameters are involved in calculating the social discount rate. The 
marginal productivity of capital (q) was estimated in Chapter 4 with a central value 
of 18 per cent. The consumption conversion factor (B) was estimated in Chapter 3 
with a central value of 0. 79. The shadow price of capital was estimated with a 
central value of 4 and the marginal propensity to save (s) was estimated as 30 per 
cent in Chapter 4. Drawing on the above parameter estimates, we can now estimate 
the social discount rate for China. Table 5.1 presents the results calculated from the 
equation 5.4. 
Table 5.1 The possible range of the social discount rate (Ri) for China 
Social Discount Rate 
q(%) s = 0.25 s =0.30 s =0.35 
12 5.9 6.3 
6.7 
18 8.8 9.4 
10.0 
24 11.7 12.5 
13.3 
Notes: i = 8.4 (Chapter 5); B = 0.79 (Chapter 3); v = 4 (Chapter 4). 
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The central value of the social discount rate is estimated to be 9 .4 per cent for 
China in this study, taking into account the other variables already es.timated in the 
previous Chapters. They are as follows: 
• marginal propensity to save (Chapter 4), s = 0.30 
• marginal productivity of capital (Chapter 4), q = 0.18 
• shadow price of capital (Chapter 4), v = 4 
• consumption rate of interest (Chapter 4), i = 8.4 
• consumption conversion factor (Chapter 3), B = 0.79 
The sensitivity analysis shows that the social discount rate does not change 
very much when the rate of re-investment changes. The social discount rate only 
changes from 8.8 per cent to 10 per cent when the rate of reinvestment changes from 
25 per cent to 35 per cent. 
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Chapter 6 
Estimation of the Shadow Price of Labour for China· 
6.1 Introduction 
Consideration of labour market distortions is very important for project evaluation in 
developing countries. The shadow price of labour (Sr) refers to the economic 
consequences of transferring labour to a new project and its estimation must take into 
account the following three social cost factors: 
• the output foregone elsewhere in the economy as a result of employing a 
worker on a given project; 
• the cost of increased consumption as the result of a worker being employed on 
a project; 
• the disutility of increased effort called for in the new job. 
The shadow price of labour can be derived by considering the case of an 
unskilled worker who is drawn from a perfect labour market into a project and paid a 
wage which is above the value of the output foregone elsewhere by moving him to 
the project. If it is assumed that the worker consumes the entire increase in his 
income then the shadow wage rate formula can be derived as follows (Squire and 
Van der Tak 1975:83): 
where 
SL= ma.+ ( w - m )( B - d Iv)+ ( w - m) <!Jed Iv 
SL = shadow price of labour; 
m = output foregone elsewhere in the economy ; 
a = conversion factor for output foregone; 
w = market wage in the project; 
B = conversion factor for consumption goods; 
d = distribution weight; 
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(6.1) 
v = conversion factor for capital; 
f = ratio of the social to the private evaluation of forgone leisure or disutility of 
effort; 
e =ratio of t~e private value of forgone leisure to the market value of 
consumption. 
A different set of shadow wage rates may be required for the different types of 
labour. This chapter focuses on two major groups of labour, skilled and unskilled. 
Unskilled labour is commonly believed to be in surplus supply in China, while 
skilled labour is believed to be relatively scarce. It would be impossible to estimate 
a shadow price of either skilled or unskilled labour which would be valid for the 
whole of China because of the large size of the geographical economy, market 
segmentation and restricted geographic labour mobility. The estimation of the 
shadow price of skilled and unskilled labour in this Chapter is only applicable for the 
Xiamen special economic zone project. 
6.2 Determination of the output foregone (m): literature review 
In most conventional analyses, the output foregone elsewhere in the economy (m) as 
a result of employing labour on a project has been identified with the marginal 
product of the relevant labour in its previous employment. In the case where projects 
hire unskilled labourers from the traditional agricultural sector, the marginal product 
of these labourers in the agricultural sector has been considered as the appropriate 
opportunity cost of labour. 
Kahn (1951) and Lewis (1954) argued that with large pools of surplus labour, 
the marginal product of the labour withdrawn from the agricultural sector would be 
negligible, zero, or even negative. The implication of this argument in project 
evaluation is that if the marginal product of labour in agriculture is zero, labour 
should be considered 'costless' to the industrial sector. 
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Sen (1966) was among the first to react against this traditional view. He 
claimed that workers employed in public projects should not be regard¢ as 'costless' 
in surplus labour economies, even though that worker's marginal product might be 
zero. He made a distinction between labour and the labourer and argued that it is not 
that too much labour is being spent in the production process, but that too many 
labourers are spending it. Disguised unemployment normally takes the form of less 
working hours per head per year or lower intensity of work. He demonstrated that 
zero marginal productivity of labour was not a necessary condition for the existence 
of surplus labour. The necessary and sufficient conditions are given by a constant 
disutility of effort which implies a constant marginal rate of substitution between 
income and leisure over the relevant range of hours worked per person in the 
agricultural sector. In view of this, the change in output in the agricultural sector 
when a worker is drawn away could be zero even though the marginal product of 
labour in the agricultural sector is positive. 
The concept of a voluntary supply price, introduced by Harberger, also has 
important implications. According to Harberger the 'supply price and therefore the 
social opportunity cost is not zero even for involuntarily unemployed labour' 
(1972:168) because labour has a reservation price below which it is not willing to 
work. 
It is well known that throughout history, economic development has usually 
been associated with the gradual but continuous transfer of labour from the 
agricultural sector to the expanding urban industrial sector. To investigate this 
phenomenon, Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro (1970) and Harberger (1972) 
developed rural-urban migration models and have contributed to the analysis of the 
shadow price of labour in two ways: 
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• by relaxing the unrealistic assumption, implicitly held in traditional labour 
transfer models that any migrant entering the urban sector is e~ployed at the 
prevailing formal urban sector real wage rate; and 
• by taking into consideration the higher wage rate in the formal urban sector 
which was previously thought to be irrelevant. 
In the Todaro (1969) 'two stage labour migration model', the unskilled rural 
worker migrating to an urban area was initially expected to find a job in the 'urban 
traditional' or informal sector. In the second stage, this worker was assumed to attain 
a more permanent modem sector job. In this model, the decision to migrate from 
rural to urban areas was related to two principal variables: 
·the urban-rural real income differential ( w - m) and 
·the probability of obtaining an urban job (p). 
The distinguishing feature of the Harris and Todaro (1970) model is· that 
migration proceeds in response to urban-rural differences in expected earnings with 
the urban employment rate acting as an equilibrating force on such migration. Harris 
and Todaro (1970) assumed that the agricultural marginal product of labour is 
alV{ays positive and inversely related to the size of the rural labour force. Since 
creating one job in the urban area usually attracts more than one more migrant from 
rural areas, if n people migrate, and the effect on agricultural output as a result of one 
person's migration is y, then 
(6.2) 
m=ny 
where 
m = marginal output foregone; 
n = number of people migrate; 
y = the effect on agricultural output as a result of one person migration. 
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Moreover, when one more worker is hired by the urban industrial sector, the 
expected wage, pw, rises as p rises. This induces rural-urban migi:ation of 1 / p 
workers (that is n = 1 / p ). Hence: 
m=ny=y/p (6.3) 
where 
p = probability of obtaining an urban job. 
Sen (1966) has pointed out that in general it cannot be assumed that the 
change of output in the agricultural sector will equal the marginal product of labour. 
It is further assumed that migrant workers receive their marginal product, a (where a 
is the income the worker received in agriculture, which on a family fann would equal 
the average product of the fann if we assume equal income and work sharing on 
family farms). Therefore, at the margin, migrant workers will equate their incomes 
in agriculture, a, to the expected wage in the urban sector, pw that is, a= pw. Hence, 
the output foregone derived from the Harris and Todaro type of migration model is: 
m=(l/p)a=w (6.4) 
Harberger (1972) introduced the concept of a voluntary supply price of labour 
and argued that it provides a more technically rigorous an~ subtle basis for 
approaching the measurement of social opportunity cost than does the concept of 
foregone product. The two stage migration idea also holds for this model. The 
formal urban sector has been divided into an unprotected sector (informal) and a 
protected sector (formal). Harberger argued that if migrants do not succeed in 
obtaining protected sector jobs at the higher wage of w, they can nevertheless find 
some employment in the unprotected sector and derive an income. Harberger further 
argued that unprotected sector wages are the best available approximation to the 
supply price oflabour. 
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However, Harris and Todaro, as well as Harberger failed to take into 
consideration the costs of migration or the relatively higher costs ~f urban living 
which the migrant would have to incur by migrating. Lal (1973b) was able to 
incorporate these important features into a more general migration model. To derive 
the shadow price of labour for this more general migration model, Lal assumed that 
in addition to the agricultural income foregone, a, the migrant has to incur migration 
costs of d, which include both the real and 'psychic' costs of migrating. Following 
Harberger (1972), Lal (1973b) differentiated wages into the higher institutional wage 
w1 (formal sector) and the unorganized urban labour market wage w2. He also 
assumed that by living in the town the migrant incurs a relatively higher cost of 
living than the cost of maintaining the same standard of livinr in a rural area, u. If 
the probability of obtaining a formal sector job is p, then at the margin the migrant 
will equate the total costs of migration, which are given by, (a+ d + u) = C with the 
expected benefits, [ pw1 + ( 1 - p) w2 ]. This yields the equilibrium value: 
(6.5) 
where 
C = total costs of migration; 
w 1 = market wage in urban formal sector; 
w2 =market wage in unorganized urban sector. 
As before, with the creation of an extra industrial sector job, n = 1 I p, 
migrants will move from agriculture, and as the output foregone per migrant in 
agriculture is y, we have the total output foregone: 
(6.6) 
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6.3 Social cost of changing consumption and savings: literature review 
Two policy parameters are involved in deriving the shadow price of labour: the 
premium . on saving compared to consumption; and the social va~uation of the 
disutility of effort (t). The question of whether s should be positive or not depends 
on whether investment at the margin is regarded as more valuable than consumption. 
In estimating the shadow price of labour it is common to incorporate a 
'premium on saving' as well as a set of income distributional weights. The reasons 
for valuing s > 1 have been frequently discussed in the literature (Marglin 1963b, 
Lind 1964, Baumol 1968, Sen 1966 and 1972, Little and Mirrlees 1969, Harberger 
1972, Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen 1972, and Squire and Van der Tak 1975). These 
authors believed that in most developing countries, a unit of saving is socially more 
valuable than a unit of consumption and a unit of income in the hands of the poor is 
more valuable than that in the hands of the rich. 
The above premise has been widely discussed. Some authors (Marglin 1963b, 
Sen 1961, 1966) have argued that there is a tendency for individual saving decisions 
to lead to aggregate savings levels below socially desirable aggregate savings. Other 
authors (Singer 1951, Harberger 1975) argued that the presence of a company 
income tax system makes the private after tax rate of return lower than the social rate 
of return to investment. Others (Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen 1972, Little and 
Mirrlees 1969, 1974, Squire and Van der Tak 1975) stated that with the presence of 
surplus labour, the social opportunity cost of labour may be much lower than the 
market wage which is a cost for the individual investor. Consequently, the market 
return on investment of a project will under-estimate its true economic rate of return. 
These authors also believed that most developing countries are not able to use fiscal 
instruments to reach the optimal saving position. Hence, they believed that the 
higher wage rate in the formal urban sector than in the rural sector resulted in a 
transfer of income from saving to consumption (&ssuming that project workers' 
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consumptior1 leve1 is higher than labour in the agricultural sector), thus generating a 
cost to society. It was argued that this shQuld be taken into account .in valuing the 
cost of labour, as well as the direct cost of output foregone in traditional agriculture. 
While the traditional formulae for the shadow price of labour concentrated on 
the different social valuations of saving and consumption; Lal (1974) was able to 
take account of the different social utilities of income accruing to people in different 
income groups within the same generation and among different regions. He 
presented a way of integrating the three relevant aspects of income distribution, 
inter-temporal, inter-regional and intra-regional, and derived distribution weights for 
different income and regional groups. 
6.4 Valuation of disutility of effcrt 
A new job normally requires an increase in effort from the worker, either because the 
worker has to work more hours, because the work is more arduous or merely because 
new skills have to be learned. Hence, with a change in project income, there is also a 
change in the aggregate disutility of effort. At the margin, utility maximizing 
workers wili equate the disutility of increased effort with the utility from increased 
incomes. In other words, the extra disutility of effort must equal the change in 
workers' consumption. This individual utility maximizing framework indicates that 
society should value private disutilities of effort as social costs. 
However, a number of arguments suggest that a social va.luation should not be 
equal to the private valuation of the disutility of effort (up to a certain 'nornlal' range 
of hours worked per worker) in developing countries (Lal 1973b). In the next 
section, the formulae of the shadow price of labour derived for China, the social cost 
of the private disutility of effort, <!>, is put at zero because of the data difficulties. 
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6.5 Th.e main components of the estimation of the shadow price of labour in 
Chm a 
Consider a project in which one more worker is drawn into the project from another 
occupation. The social cost of employing him or her can be divided into three parts. 
The first part is the output foregone elsewhere in the economy as a result of 
employment in the project. Let m be the marginal product in market prices of the 
labour drawn by the project. If the labour market from which the labo~: is drawn is 
competitive, the prevailing market wage rate can be a good indicator for the value of 
m. 
As mentioned above, migration theory suggests that an urban project will have 
an excess-migration effect. That is, the creation of a job in the urban industrial 
sector will induce more than one worker to migrate. Therefore, the forgone output 
will be greater than one worker's marginal product. Let L be the total urban labour 
force and E the total urban employment; L / E workers will migrate to restore an 
equilibrium ratio of unemployed to urban labour force, given the rural-urban wage 
differential. Hence, the direct output foregone for the Chinese economy is: 
D=cxm(L/E) 
where 
D = direct output foregone; 
a =conversion factor for foregone marginal product; 
m == foregone marginal product at domestic prices; 
L = total urban labour force; 
E = total urban employment. 
(6.7) 
The output foregone, measured in market prices, should be converted into its 
border price equivalent by applying a conversion factor, a. If the relevant output 
foregone consists of agricultural products, a is the weighted average conversion 
factor for that particular group of agricultural products. 
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The second element of the shadow wage rate is the net social cost of increased 
consumption. Einployment on the project frequently involves changes.in income. In 
most cases, the project provides higher wages e::)pecially when labour is drawn from 
the rural sector. Depending on whether the worker consumes all the income or saves 
part, the changes in consumption and saving could either be a net cost or a benefit to 
the Chinese economy. 
Let w be the project wage rate which is believed to be higher than the 
marginal product of labour in his or her previous employment. Suppose the worker's 
marginal propensity to save (Sw) is lower than the marginal propensity to save at the 
average level (Sa)· Hence, to hire a worker in the project, there is a loss in saving to 
the Chinese economy measured at border prices: 
Lsav = ( Sa - Sw )( w - m ) B (6.8) 
where 
Lsav = loss in saving to the Chinese economy; 
Sa = average marginal propensity to save; 
Sw = worker's marginal propensity to save; 
B = conversion factor for consumption goods. 
To convert the loss in saving measured in market prices to its border price 
equivalent, a consumption conversion factor, B, is applied. Because different 
consumption goods are involved in a worker's consumption basket, a weighted 
system is needed to derive the value of B. Therefore, the value of B will depend on 
the relative importance of consumption goods in the total consumption basket at the 
margin. 
However, this loss in savings is consumed by the worker so that there is a 
corresponding benefit in increased consumption. To obtain the net social loss in 
savings, the corresponding social benefit in increased consumption after taking into 
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consideration income distribution effects, should be further adjusted by the shadow 
price of saving (v) to cope with sub-optimum saving arguments. That is: 
Bsav = ( Sa - Sw )( w - m ) d Iv 
where 
Bsav =social benefit in lost savings; 
d = distribution weight; 
v = conversion factor for saving. 
(6.9) 
Hence, the net social cost in savings is equal to equation 6.8 minus equation 
6.9. That is: 
Csav = ( Sa - Sw )( w - m )( B - d Iv ) (6.10) 
where 
Csav = net social cost in savings. 
As we assumed that workers consume the rest of their income, ( 1 - Sw )(- w -
m ) B which would have been consumed by the economy in the absence of the 
project, is now consumed by the worker. With respect to this consumption there is a 
net social benefit in line with equity considerations. That is: 
Bcon = ( 1 - Sw )( w - m )( d - 1 ) Iv (6.11) 
where 
Bcon = net social benefit in increased consumption. 
The net social cost of increased consumption at border prices is the difference 
between equations 6.10 and 6.11. That is: 
Neon = ( Sa - Sw )( w - m )( B - d Iv ) 
- ( 1 - Sw )( w - m )( d - 1 ) Iv (6.12) 
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where 
N con = net social cost of increased consumption at border prices. 
The social benefit resulting from increased income will be higher if the project 
worker's marginal propensity of saving is higher than the average level. The social 
benefit resulting from increased consumption will be higher if the project worker's 
consumption level is below the average consumption level. The complete fonnula 
for the shadow price of labour at border prices is thus given by equation 6.13. 
where, 
L 
= am(-) + (Sa- Sw )( w - m )( B - div) 
E 
- ( 1 - Sw )( w - m )( d - 1 ) Iv 
SL = shadow price of unskilled labour; 
a = conversion factor for agricultural output; 
m = foregone marginal product of labour; 
L = total urban labour force; 
E = total urban employment; 
Sa= average propensity to save; 
Sw= worker's marginal propensity to save; 
w = market wage rate; 
B = conversion factor for consumption goods; 
d = income distribution weight; 
v = conversion factor for saving. 
(6.13) 
The first component in the right hand of equation 6.13 is the direct social cost 
which is the output foregone elsewhere in the economy as a re.suit of employing a 
worker in the project. The indirect social costs include the second component that is 
the net social loss due to a reduction in savings and the third component which is the 
net social benefit generated from increases in r.onsumption. 
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6.6 Empirical estimation of the shadow price of unskilled labour in the Xiamen 
zone 
(a) The direct opportunity cost of unskilled labour in the Xiamen zone. The 
most important element in the estimation of the shadow price of labour for the 
Xiamen zone is m, the marginal product of labour. It is commonly believed that the 
Chinese agricultural sector is characterized by a large amount of disguised surplus 
labour. The marginal product of labour in the agricultural sector, though not 
necessarily zero, is significantly below the wage rate in the urban industrial sector. 
In this study, it is assumed that at the margin, any further increase in the 
employment of unskilled labour in the Xiamen zone will be drawn from the 
agricultural sector. The output foregone in agriculture is taken to be the marginal 
product of unskilled labour. Because of data difficulties, the real average income in 
agriculture will be used as a proxy for the marginal product of unskilled labour. This 
is also the method used by World Bank Project Appraisal Report N0.7365-CHA to 
derive shadow prices for unskilled labour in China. However, the marginal products 
are probably lower than the real average income in agriculture, so they could be 
taken as an upper limit of the marginal productivity of unskilled labour in the 
Xiamen rural areas. 
Table 6.1 The real average rural household income in Xiamen 1986-88 (yuan per 
year) 
Items 1986 1987 1988 
1 Total income per head 757 851 1001 
2 Total expenditures 712 748 915 0.06 0.12 0.08 3 Rate of saving 
Notes: Real average rural household income and expenditure. per pe~son in the 
agricultural sector is based on a survey ?f 140 rur~ ~ouseholds rn the Xrnmen rural 
area. This survey is carried out by the X1amen Statistical Bureau every year. 
Source: Xiamen Statistical Bureau, the Xiamen Statistical Yearbook 1986-88. 
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The direct opportunity cost of output foregone in the Xiamen zone is 
calculated as follows: first, the marginal output foregone of unskilled .labour for the 
Xiamen zone, m, is estimated, by taldng the average income from agriculture and 
adjusting it for the inflation rate (Table 6.1); second, the output foregone in market 
prices is converted into border prices by indentifying the relative importance of 
agricultural products in the total agricultural output and applying different 
conversion factors for the different products in total agricultural outputs (Table 6.2); 
third, the excess migration effect on the total urban labour force and total urban 
employment is estimated (Table 6.3). 
The real average income is further adjusted by shadow pricing the output of 
rural labour. This is achieved by deriving the weights from the composition of total 
agricultural output during 1986-88 (Table 6.2) arid multiplying by the individual 
conversion factors for particular products. For example, the average product of rural 
labour is adjusted to 53 per cent by the conversion factor of plantation products, 25 
per cent of the conversion factor of livestock etc. in 1986. The conversion factor is 
computed from the difference between world prices and the domestic prices for that 
particular group of products in Chapter 3. 
Table 6.2 Composition of total agricultural outputs 1986-88 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1988 
CF a 
Plantation Livestock 
0.53 0.25 
0.49 0.26 
0.49 0.24 
1.12 1.98 
Fishery 
0.19 
0.23 
0.2~ 
1.26 
Notes: 
a 1988 prices, see Chapter 3, T~ble 3.3 and Table A3.1; 
Forestry 
0.01 
.0.01 
0.01 
2.52 
b conversion factor for total agncultural products. . . . 
Source: The Xiamen Statistical Bureau 1989, Fen Jin De Xzamen. 
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Others 
0.02 
0.02 
0.0~ 
1.26 
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In Table 6.3 the way that excess migration effects the total labour force and 
urban employment for the Xiamen zone has been calculated. Given the excess 
migration effects of 1.18, 1.15 and 1.13 for 1986, 1987 and 1988 respectively, the 
direct opportunity cost of unskilled labour in border prices for 1986 to 1988 is shown 
in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.3 The total urban labour force and urban employment in the Xiamen, 
1986-88 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Notes: 
Total labour 
force a 
(1) 
362,957 
370,342 
376,682 
Studentb 
numbers 
(2) 
65,666 
66,898 
66,684 
Urban 
employment 
(3) 
251,227 
264,542 
274,218 
L/E 
(4)= 
(1-2)/(3) 
1.18 
1.15 
1.13 
a Population of working age .15-64. . . 
b Including middle school, high school, college and umvers1ty students. 
Table 6.4 The direct opportunity cost of output foregone by the unskilled labour 
in the Xiamen, 1986-88 (yuan per year) 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Parameters 
am(L/N) 
am(L/N) 
am(L/N) 
Direct opportunity 
cost (border price) 
1,231 
1,374 
- 1,572 
Notes: Direct opportunity costs during 1986-88 are calculated from Tables 6.2 and 
6.3. 
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(b) The net social cost of the increased consumption in the Xiamen zone. 
Table 6.5 shows the data for u.rban cash wages. Comparing Table 6.1.and Table 6.5, 
it is evident that the average earnings of rural workers is substantially lower than that 
of urban industrial workers in the Xiamen zone. When comparing rural and urban 
earnings, differences in the cost of living must be taken into account. In the 
following estimation of the shadow price of labour, the data refers to the yearly real 
average wage per worker (1) for collectively owned enterprises; (2) for state-owned 
enterprises; and (3) for foreign joint ventures. 
Table 6.5 Real average income of industrial workers in the Xiamen zone 1986-
1988 (yuan per year) 
Class 1986 1987 1988 
1 Collectively owned enterprises 1,192 1,379 1,524 
2 State owned enterprises 1,519 1,596 1,862 
3 Foreign joint ventures 1,916 1,942 2,488 
Source: Xiamen Statistical Bureau, The Xiamen Statistical Yearbook 1986-88. 
To calculate the indirect cost of labour resulting from transferring a worker to 
the urban industrial sector, the pure income distribution parameter din equation 6.15 
needs to be estimated. The value of d is designed to allow for the different values 
assigned to additional consumption at different existing levels of consumption. If the 
Chinese government does not wish to use project selection to improve income 
distribution, the value of d should be set equal to unity. However, this is not likely to 
be the case in China. The value of d is assumed to be greater or less than unity 
depending on whether project generated income accrues to those enjoying a level of 
consumption below or above the average of consumption. 
114 
\ 
I ' 
Squire and Van der Tak (1975:63) suggested the use of a social welfare 
function to derive the value of d. The utility function specified in Squire and Van 
derTak. is: 
Uc=c-n 
where 
U = the marginal utility function; 
c = the level of consumption; 
n = the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. 
Hence, the income distribution weight is: 
where 
Uc * d=-=(C /C)n 
u* c 
d = income distribution weight; 
c* = average level of consumption; 
C = consumption level corresponding to any individual or group; 
n =elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (income). 
(6.14) 
(6.15) 
Given data on the distribution of consumption (income) among employers, a 
set of consumption distribution weights can be estimated by assuming different 
values for n. 
Table 6.6 Values of the general distribution weight (d) for the Xiamen zone 
Group c* IC n=0.5 n = 1.0 n = 1.5 
Unskilled 1.29 1.14 1.29 1.57 
Skilled 0.70 0.84 0.70 0.59 
Weighted average 1.1 1.2 1.3 
Notes: Values of C* /Care based on 1988 fieldwork survey in Xiamen. 
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To obtain the true value of income distribution weights, all income classes 
have to be examined. However, it is difficult to trace the effects of the project on 
consumption in this way. In Table 6.6, a general distribution weight d is derived 
based on the weighted average of two groups of employees, that is skilled and 
unskilled labour in the Xiamen zone. 
According to the fieldwork survey of 23 fums operating in the Huli export 
processing zone in 1987, of 78 per cent of workers (of which 11 per cent were 
technicians, 10 per cent administrative staff and 1 per cent foreign employees), 60 
per cent had no previous employment experience. The Xiamtn zone thus increased 
employment opportunities. The general distribution weight is estimated to be 1.3 for 
the Xiamen zone project. For discussion of the value of n see Chapter 4. 
Table 6.7 shows the indirect opportunity cost in border prices for unskilled 
labour in the Xiamen zone from 1986 to 1988 based on equation 6.12. The negative 
value of the indirect opportunity cost means that a net social benefit was generated 
from increased consumption when one more worker is employed in the state-owned 
enterpdscs and the foreign joint ventures. 
Table 6.7 The indirect opportunity cost of unskilled labour in the Xiamen zone, 
1986-88 (yuan per year) 
Collectively-owned enterprises 
State-owned enterprises 
Foreign joint ventures 
l986 
1.7 
-16.9 
-66.9 
1987 
-0.2 
-13.0 
-283 
1988 
2.1 
-17.0 
-89.4 
Notes: . . dir . f k'll d 
a Parameters involved in calculanon of the m ect opportunity cost .o uns 1 e 
labour are in equation 6.12. Where B = 0.79; d = 1.3; and v = 4; sav~ng rates are 
11 %, 15% and 25% in the ~ollective enterprises, state-owned enterpnses and the 
foreign joint ventures respectively. Sources: Fieldwork survey 1988, Xiamen and the Statistical Bureau, Xiamen 
Statistical Yearbook 1986-88. 
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Summarizing the components in equation 6.13, the shadow price of unskilled 
labour for the Xiamen zone is shown in Table 6.8. To facilitate project appraisal in 
the case study in the second part of the thesis, conversion factors for unskilled labour 
in the Xiamen zone were derived in Table 6.9. They range from a low of 0.63 for 
foreign joint ventures, 0.83 for state-owned enterprises to a high of 1.02 in the 
collectively owned industrial enterprises. The figure 0.83 for state-owned industrial 
enterprises is the average of the total. 
Table 6.8 Shadow price for unskilled labour in the Xiamen zone, 1986-88 (yuan 
per year) 
Collectively-owned enterprises 
State-owned enterprises 
Foreign joint ventures 
Note: in border prices. 
1986 
1,233 
1,214 
1,164 
1987 
1,374 
1,361 
1,346 
1988 
1,570 
1,555 
1,483 
Table 6.9 Conversion factors for unskilled labour in the Xiamen zone 1986-88 
Sectors 1986 1987 1988 Average 
(1) Collectively owned 1.03 1.00 1.03 1.02 
(2) State-owned 0.80 0.85 0.84 0.83 
(3) Foreign joint ventures 0.61 0.69 0.60 0.63 
Average 0.81 0.85 0.82 0.83 
Notes: Conversion factors are calculated from the ratio of the shadow price and the 
wage rate for unskilled workers. 
6.7 World bank model applied in the Xiamen zone 
To estimate shadow wages for unskilled labour in China, the World Bank derived a 
general formula (World Bank Project Appraisal Report 1988, N0.7365-CHA) for the 
shadow wage, combining the Little and Mirrlees (1974), Squire and Van der Tak 
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(1975) methods. That is: SL= marginal product of labour+ marginal disutility of 
work + urban overheads + net social cost of increased consumption. , The 
components in the above formula are all evaluated at accounting prices. 
The World Bank document argued that marginal disutility was hard to 
estimate, and would probably be given little weight by the Chinese government. 
Hence it was not taken into account in the calculation. It was also argued that the 
social cost of increased consumption is relevant only if it is believed that public 
investment income has a higher value than private consumption. It claimed that 
given present savings ratios, this may not be the case for China. Hence, the marginal 
product of rural labour, by taking the average income in the agricultural sector 
evaluated at accounting prices (by using rice and wheat production weights and the 
corresponding conversion factors) and adjusted for urban overheads (20 per cent of 
the urban wage rate) was used by the World Bank as the shadow wage of unskilled 
labour. The conversion factor of unskilled labour was calculated as 0.57 for China as 
a whole. Using the World Bank model, the conversion factor for unskilled labour for 
the Xiamen zone is showed in Table 6.10. 
Table 6.10 Conversion factors for unskilled labour in the Xiamen zone, 
calculated by applying the World Bank model 1986-88 
Sectors 
(1) Collectively owned 
(2) State-owned 
(3) Foreign joint ventures 
Average 
1986 
1.47 
1.20 
0.99 
1.22 
1987 
1.42 
1.26 
1.07 
1.25 
1988 
1.47 
1.24 
0.98 
1.23 
Average 
1.45 
1.23 
1.01 
1.23 
By applying the World Bank model, the conversion factors for unskilled 
labour for the Xiamen zone range from 1.01, to 1.23 and 1.45 for foreign joint 
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venture industries, state-owned industries and collectively-owned industrial 
enterprises, respectively. These results are much higher than the estimation results 
using the equation 6.13. 
The average shadow price of unskilled labour derived from equation 6.13 
which took into account the indirect opportunity cost of labour, the sub-optimum 
saving argument and income distribution effects as well as the effects of excess 
migration may be a better estimation than the shadow price derived from the World 
Bank model. In particular it seems unlikely that all unskilled workers are under-paid 
in industrial enterprises in the Xiamen zone. 
6.8 Estimation of shadow price of skilled labour for the Xiamen zone 
In contrast to the large pool of unskilled labour, skilled labour is relatively scarce. 
Since working experience and periods worked are important factors in distinguishing 
skilled and unskilled labour, the wage scale rather than educational background was 
chosen as the criterion of skill. 
(a) Labour and wage rates in the Xiamen zone. According to the 
Department of Labour in Xiamen, the average price of a worker to the foreign 
investors and joint venture is about 150 yuan per month, of which 50 per cent is paid 
to the workers in the form of a basic monthly wage, 20 per cent is to be used as an 
incentive in the form of additional wage payments, 25 per cent is turned over to the 
zone Administration Bureau (which administers a 'welfare fund') and the remaining 5 
per cent is allocated to medical and recreational funds in the factories. 
In practice, wages, bonuses and fringe benefits paid in the zone vary 
considerably. As can be seen from Figure 6.1, the basic wage rate (excluding 
bonuses) varies from a low of 80 yuan to 360 yuan a month depending on the level 
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of skill and the types of enterprise. Wages in foreign enterprises and joint ventures 
tend to be 20 to 40 per cent higher than in state-owned enterprises. 
(b) Empirical estimation of the shadow price of skmcd labour for the 
Xiarnen zone. Like the shadow price of unskilled labour, the social opportunity cost 
of skilled labour is the output foregone elsewhere in the economy as the result of the 
worker being emplvyed on a project. As skilled labour, however, is in short supply, 
it is very unlikely that skilled workers would be unemployed if the zone did not 
exist. The marginal productivity of agriculture is not relevant for the output 
foregone elsewhere in the economy, when skilled workers are employed in a new 
project. 
When a skilled worker is employed in the zone, he or she may have been 
drawn from ·~ A"eas: 
• state-owned enterprises; 
• collectively owned enterprises; or 
• foreign joint ventures operating in the zone. 
Hence, the worker's direct opportunity cost is the output foregone in their 
previous occupation. The principles for estimation of indirect social cost in 
increased consumption and the social benefit in increased saving are the same as 
those discussed in relation to unskilled labour. :Vi.ence, the shadow price of skilled 
lab0ur is: 
sskL =am+ (Sa - Sj )( Wj - wi )( B - d Iv) 
_ c 1 • sj >< wj - wi )( d - 1 ) / v 
where 
a = conversion factor for industrial output; 
m = mru'ginal product of worker's previous occupation; 
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(6.16) 
Sa = average propensity to save in the society; 
Sj =worker's marginal propensity to save; 
Wj = project wage rate; 
wi = worker's previous wage rate; 
B = conversion factor for consumption goods. 
d = income distribution weight; 
v = conversion factor for saving. 
In this section, the shadow price of skilled labour for the Xiamen zone is 
derived from the weighted average marginal productivities of labour employed in the 
three different types of industrial firms. 
Figure 6.1 shows the basic wage rate which was earned in the Huli export 
processing zone in 1988. In the grade 1 to grade 7 skilled labour categories, wage 
rates ranged from 180 yuan per month to 360 yuan per month for skilled workers. In 
estimating shadow prices for skilled workers, a mean value of 270 yuan per month 
was used as the mean market wage rate for skilled workers in the foreign joint 
ventures. 
The process of estimation of the shadow price of skilled labour for the Xiamen 
zone are as follows: 
Table 6.11 The marginal productivity of labour in Xiamen zone enterprisesa by 
industrial ownership 1985-88(1980 constant prices, yuan per year) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Collectively 
owned 
industry 
13,300 
12,100 
12,000 
14,000 
State- Foreign 
owned joint 
industry ventures 
20,200 27,200 
19,100 29,900 
19,400 35,300 
16,000 36,(}f)() 
Note: a market prices; elasticity of labour :<... q.32 is .the ~la~ticity of labour. in total 
industrial output for the independent accounting umts w1thm state-owned industry 
which was estimated in Chapter 4. . . . 
Sources: Xiamen Statistical Bureau. the Xiamen Statistical Yearbook 1985-88. 
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(i) The marginal productivity of skilled workers is calculated for firms 
within the three different industries in Table 6.11. 
Table 6.12 The ~irect opportunity cost of output foregone by skilled workers in 
the X1amen zone, 1985-88 (1980 constant prices, yuan per year) 
Collectively State-owned Foreign 
owned enterprises joint 
enterprises ventures 
1985 9,655 14,665 19,747 
1986 8,736 13,790 21,588 
1987 8,640 13,968 25,416 
1988 10,192 11,648 26,208 
Notes: Conversion factors for industrial output are calculated from the weighted 
average of light industrial and heavy industrial output; B = 0.79; Fk = 0.59. 
(ii) The output foregone by skilled workers expressed in market prices is 
converted into border prices in Table 6.12, by using a weighted average conversion 
factor for consumption goods and capital goods. The weights are derived from the 
relative importance of output of light industry and heavy industry in the Xiamen 
zone. 
Table 6.13 The wage rates of skilled workers in the Xiamen zone, 1985-88 (yuar. 
per year) 
Collectively State-owned Foreign 
owned enterprises joint 
enterprises ventures 
1985 1,687 1,984 
2,834 
1986 1,875 2,205 
3,149 
1987 2,083 2,450 
3,499 
1988 2,314 2,722 
3,888 
Sources: Fieldwork survey 1988, Xiamen, the Xiamen Labour Service Company, 
1988. 
(iii) Wage scales for skilled worker are identified from figure 6.1. The mean 
value of 270 yuan per year further adjusted by 20 per cent of bonus and subsidies 
123 
I 
I 
I', 
(3888 yuan per year) is used as the average market wage rate for skilled workers in 
the foreign joint ventures in the Xiamen zone. Table 6.13 shows the sJ.dlled worker's 
wage rate in the three different industrial ownership. 
(iv) The indirect opportunity costs of skilled worker are calculated in Table 
6.14. The negative value of indirect social costs in Table 6.14 means that there is a 
net social benefit in increased consumption and savings when a skilled worker is 
drawn away from other industrial enterprises into the foreign joint ventures. The 
rates of consumption and savings for the skilled workers involved in calculations of 
indirect opportunity costs are based on the data obtained during fieldworks survey in 
Xiamen in 1988. 
Table 6.14 The indirect social cost of skilled workers in the Xiamen zone, 1985-
88 (yuan per year) 
Collectively State-owned Foreign 
owned enterprises joint 
enterprises ventures 
1985 -112 -83 n.a 
1986 -124 -92 n.a 
1987 -138 -102 n.a 
1988 -154 -114 n.a 
Notes: Rate of saving is 11 per cent, 15 per cent an~ 25 ,P~r cent for collectiv~ly 
owned enterprises, state-own.ed ~n~erprises and. foreign JOlflt ventures respectively. 
Consumption rate in the foreign Jomt ventures is 75 per cent. 
Table 6.15 The shadow price of skilled workers in the Xiamen zone, 1985-88 
(border price, yuan per year) 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Collectively 
owned 
enterprises 
9,543 
8,612 
8,502 
10,038 
State-owned 
enterprises 
14,582 
13,698 
13,866 
11,534 
Notes: Calculated from Table 6.12 and Table 6.14. 
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Foreign 
joint 
ventures 
19,747 
21,588 
25,416 
26,208 
(v) The shadow price for skilled workers in the Xiamen zone is calculated 
from the sum of direct and indirect opportunity costs of the skilled ~orker in Table 
6.15. 
(vi) Conversion factors for skilled workers in the Xiamen zone in Table 
6.16 are derived from the ratio between the shadow price of skilled workers and their 
wage rates. From the 1987 fieldwork survey, 78 per cent of the skilled labour in Huli 
export processing zone was drawn from state-owned enterprises; 9 per cent was 
drawn from collectively owned enterprises; 2 per cent was drawn from other foreign 
joint ventures in the special economic zone; 1 per cent were foreign employees and 
10 per cent were from other sources which included university graduates. Taking a 
weighted average of this distribution, the general conversion factor for skilled labour 
in the Xiamen zone was estimated to be 3.7. 
Table 6.16 Conversion factors for skilled labour in the Xiamen zone 1985-88 
(1980 constant prices) 
Collectively State 
Year owned· owned 
industry industry 
1985 3.4 5.2 
1986 2.7 4.4 
1987 2.4 4.0 
1988 2.6 3.0 
Average 2.8 4.2 
Weights 0.09 0.78 
Conversion factor 
for skilled worker 3.7 
Notes: Wage rate of skilled labour is 3,888 yuan per year. 
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Foreign 
joint 
ventures 
7.0 
6.9 
7.3 
6.7 
7.0 
0.03 
6.9 Summary and conclusions 
The shadow price of unskilled and skilled workers derived in equations 6.13 and 
6.16 has several advantages compared with the traditional formula and World Bank 
practice. First, it includes the excess migration effect in the unskilled labour 
equation which is a common phenomenon in developing countries. 
Second, the sub-optimum saving argument and the income distribution effects 
are both incorporated in equations 6.13 and 6.16. The equations reflect growth and 
equity objectives of the government. 
Third, equations 6.13 and 6.16 distinguish between the change of private 
saving and consumption, so that the effect of government valuations of consumption 
versus investment have been taken into account. 
The project specification conversion factors are preferred to nation wide 
conversion factors due to labour market segmentations in China. The conversion 
factors for unskilled labour and skilled workers for the Xiamen zone are estimated to 
be 0.83 and 3.7 respectively. These results show that unskilled labour is over-priced 
while skilled workers are under-priced in the Xiamen zone. 
The policy implication of this study are clear. Given China's factor 
endowment, it needs to encourage the use of labour intensive techniques. However, 
over-pricing of unskilled labour tends to favour the use of capital intensive 
technology and leads to high costs to the Chinese economy. In establishments in the 
special economic zones, over-pricing of unskilled labour disco~r~ges the inflow of 
foreign investment and retards the exploitation of China's comparative advantages. 
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Part two 
Evaluation of the Xiamen Zone 
Chapter7 
The Investment and Operational Environment in the Xiamen Zone 
7 .1 Introduction 
The most important objective for establishing special economic zones in China was 
to stimulate private direct foreign investment. The desire of the Chinese government 
to attract foreign investment is however, one issue, the willingness of the foreign 
investors to come is another. The objective of this chapter is to examine the 
investment environment and operational conditions in the Xiamen zone. 
Location, infrastructure and other public facilities of the Xiamen zone. 
Xiamen zone is located in the south-eastern part of Fujian province. It consists of 
Xiamen Island, Gulangyu Island and the coastal part of the north bank of 
Jiulongjiang River, with a total area of 131 square kilometres and a population of 
330,000 (Map 7.1). 
Xiamen is a sub-tropical, maritime area ·with a mild and pleasant climate. The 
average temperature is 20.8°C, with extremes from 38.4°C to 2°c. The 
temperature, however, does not vary greatly between summer and winter. The 
average precipitation is 1100 mm per year. 
Xiamen has a relatively well developed domestic transportation system, 
including the Yingtang-Xiamen railway and the Zhangzhou-Xiamen and Fuzhou-
Xiamen highways, which are linked into the provincial and nationwide transportation 
networks and thus connect Xiamen to the rest of China. Xiamen also has a strategic 
position on sea routes. Xiamen's hinterland borders Zhangzhou and Quanzou. 
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Sketch Map of Xiamen S0<>c;c; Economic Zone 

Xiamen faces Taiwan across the Strait and is thus on the main domestic 
coastal route as well on princi al· · al · · 
.' P mtematton channels m the westeqi Pacific (Map 
7.2). 
Xiamen has a good harbour. It has 234 kilometres of coast line which 
includes 13 kilometres available for the construction of a deep water harbour. 
Twenty four kilometres of navigable channels run through the port. A 10 kilometre 
channel running from north to south, is 1,287 - 3,218 metres in breadth and 16 
metres in depth, permitting 10,000 ton ships to move in and out of the port. The 14 
kilometres outside channel rnns from north-west to south-east. It is 1,609 to 4,827 
metres wide and 19 metres deep, large enough for 50,000 ton ships. 
To attract foreign investors, the Xiamen government improved the 
infrastructure and other public facilities. Construction of the Xiamen International 
Airport was started in 1982 and was completed within 22 months. Direct flights go 
to Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore and more than ten domestic destinations. 
Dongdu harbour has been greatly extended. In the first phase it was deepened 
and four large berths (one for 50,000 tonnage ships, two for 15,000 tonnage ships 
and another for 10,000 tonnage ships) were constructed bringing the total capacity of 
the·port to 3 million tonnes a year. A second phase was started in 1990 and when 
this is complete the total capacity will be 4 million tonnes a year. The container 
berth can handle 30,000 standard containers a year and storage area of 30,000 square 
metres and warehouses of 110,000 square metres have also been constructed. The 
h?:rbour is linked to the railway and highway systems. 
An electronically controlled telephone system imported from Japan has been 
installed. It provides direct links with Hong Kong, Japan, the United States, 
Australia and most West European countries. 
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High voltage power lines of 11,000 volts bring power into Xiamen island. An 
emergency power station with a capacity of 97 ,000 kilowatts h~s been built. 
Increasing power capacity has enabled the supply of water on Xiamen Island to be 
increased, although problems are still encountered. 
The development of three new districts is in progress. Yuan Dang New 
District lies next to the Yan Dang Harbour sea-wall. The south is adjacent to the old 
downtown area, the north is next to Foxtail Hill and Xianyue Hill and the east leads 
to the railway terminal. A residential area is planned for this district. Infrastructure 
for the Yuan Dang industrial district has been completed. Dongcheng district 
adjacent to the old downtown has been developed into a residential area for 
expatriate investors, Chinese staff and workers. 
Jiang Tou industrial district is situated on the east of Xiamen Island. It 
includes Lianban, Small Dongshan, Qianpu and the area nearby. An area of 30 
square kilometres is to be developed for 'high tech' industries including scientific 
instruments, chemical plants and other technology intensive industries. Luxury 
villas and residences are being built and are to be extended. 
The State Council has approved another two industrial districts to be 
developed for Taiwan investors. They are the Xinlin textile industrial district and 
Haicang heavy chemical industry district. 
7 .2 Political environment and the legal system of the Chinese special economic 
zones 
Since the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, public ownership has 
been a very important feature of China's economic system and private ownership has 
been disallowed. In addition, foreign capital has been regarded as ··exploitative' and 
prior to 1978 foreign debt was avoided. 
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Chinese attitudes to foreign investment changed with the introduction of the 
open-door policy in 1978 Des "t th · · · · 
· pt e e pos1ttve approach to foreign u~vestment and 
foreign debt by the Chinese government, doubts have remained in the minds of 
potential foreign investors about the continuity of such open-door policies. Because 
of this difficulty in reconciling the t.::(;ntinuing macroeconomic and microeconomic 
policy environment with the stated desire of the government to encourage foreign 
investment, the open-door policy has had only limited success so far. 
From an investor's point of view, a stable political and business environment, 
especially stable policy stances towards foreign investment, and the continuity of 
such policies, are important. Since 1978 China has ma.de substantial efforts to create 
a favourable legislative environment to give such assurance to foreign investors. The 
Constitution, adopted in late 1982, for the first time in the history of the People's 
Republic of China, protects foreign direct investment. Article 18 provides that: 
The People's Republic of China permits foreign enterprises, other foreign 
economic organizations and individual foreigners to invest in China and to 
enter into various forms of economic co-operation with Chinese enterprises 
and other economic organizations in accordance with the law of the People's 
Republic of China. 
All foreign enterprises and other foreign economic organizations in China, as 
well as joint ventures with Chinese and forej gn investment located in China 
shall abide by the law of the People's Repubii..; of China. Their lawful rights 
and interests are protected by the law of the People's Republic of China. 
Source: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporation 1988:56. 
This provision was inserted to alleviate the concern of foreign investors 
anxious that, without explicit constitutional protection for foreign ownership, 
investment in China would be too risky. As Article 18 makes clear, however, 
protection for foreign investment depends on the legislation enacted by the People's 
Republic of China. In the Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign 
Investment Enterprise 1986 (Foreign Languages Press 1986b) Article 5, the Chinese 
government guarantees that it will not nationalize a foreign enterprise unless such a 
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measure ie u~!::;:-.ary in the national interest. In such cases, the government will pay 
compensation under th .... rules of the Jaw. 
Since 1979, the National People's Congress, China's highest legislative level 
of government, has promulgated more than one hundred laws and regulations 
concerning foreign investment. These include The Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Chinese~Foreign Joint Ventures in Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures 1979 
(Foreign Languages Press 1986a, 1:1-7); Tha Economic Contract Law of the People's 
R11?public of China 1981 (Foreign Languages Press 1986a, 2:1-27); Rules for the 
bnplementation of the Income Tax law of the People's Republic of China 
Conce.'ning Foreign Enterprises 1982 (China, Foreign Languages Press 1986a, 2:83-
97). 
Although China's investment-related legislation and regulatory framework has 
begun to take shape, it is still far from complete. Implementation and supervision of 
the new laws and regulations has proved difficult, particularly for foreign enterprises. 
In 1985, Zhao Zi) ang put forward a policy giving access to the domestic 
market to foreign invr.::itors with 'advanced technology', but until now, there have 
been no regulations to implement this policy. Definitions of 'advanced technologies' 
appearing in government documents are very broad. They include such phrases as: 
(1) technologies which are totally new to China; 
(2) advanced technologies already present in a limited way; 
(3) technologies which use domestic materials; and 
(4) technologies which promote import substitution. 
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The priority areas for foreign investment are not clear, nor is it clear to what 
extent China is willing to open its domestic market in return for ~e transfer of 
advanced technology. 
7 .3 The administrative system of the Xia men zone 
Most East Asian countries have an administration board for foreign investment. For 
example, the Economic Development Board in Singapore was established in 1961, as 
a 'one stop ~hop' to handle the administtation of all foreign investment. 111e Board 
handlf"~ investment applications and provides assistance for foreign firms in dealing 
with local authorities and assists with industrial training schemes. The Malaysian 
Industrial Development Authority, the Boards of Investment of Thailand and the 
Philippines, and the Investment Coordinating Board in Indonesia have similar 
functions. 
China, in contrast, has failed to recognize the importance of efficient 
adminh\tration for foreign investors. In the Xiamen zone no one organization 
t~ffocthely coordmates all foreign investment activities. Foreign investors have to 
deal with many government departments, to start and to continue production in the 
zone. The local government does not possess full administrative rights over foreign 
investment. Some investors have to go to both provincial and central government for 
decisions. It is often not clear with which department an investor should negotiate. 
Divided and unclear respons;bility inevitably creates bureaucratic delays and adds to 
investors' difficulties. 
Some effort has been put into the improvement of Xiamen's administrative 
management. The Central Government has increased the power of the Xiamen 
Municipal government in recent years. Since mid-1988, Xiamen has been granted 
special status as a 'Single Line' administration. This means that in major respects it 
has the same administrative rights as Provincial governments, including financial and 
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trade management under the direct supervision of the State Council. However, this 
has not overcome all problems for foreig1a investors. 
There is horizontal as well as vertical administration of the Huli export 
processing zone creating particular problems. The fully foreign owned enterprises 
are under the administration of the Foreign Investment Administrative Bureau, while 
joint ventures and cooperative enterprises are subject to the administration of various 
industrial bureau. Hence, there is no single administrative organization which can 
meet the needs of enterprises within the Huli Industrial District. 
The administrative system of Xiamen is still significantly less effective than 
the administrations of several other East Asian economies. Application procedures 
for foreign investment, import and export licences, and tax rebates are all very time 
consuming. The large number of government departments involved in foreign 
investment and the lack of a 'one stop shop' mean that bureaucratic inefficiency is 
inevitable and the potential for corruption is great. 
7.4 Incentive systems and preferential treatment for foreign investment 
practiced in other East Asian countries 
Most East Asian countries have designed packages of incentives in the belief that 
they would attract potential foreign investors. The packages generally include the 
following elements. 
• The provision of industrial buildings, designed to minimize investment costs. 
This has the effect of reducing the total capital required for investment, 
minimizing the operational cost of the asset to the user, and reducing the :~:.~k, 
since the investor can rent rather than build a factory. Many investors, 
however, do not like such factory buildings, finding them unsuitable. 
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• To reduce operating costs and increase profitability, raw materials and 
components have been allowed duty free entry providing dir~t 'offsets' to 
domestic protection. 
• Other export incentives such as tax 'holidays', accelerated depreciation on 
plant, machinery and building, and the carry forward of losses into tax 
holidays are common. Subsidized credit and export financing schemes are 
made available. Subsidized utilities' prices are further incentives. 
A great deal of analytical work has been done on the impact of incentive 
packa:5es on foreign investment in developing countries since the 1960s. The United 
Nations (1968:21) concluded on the basis of several studies that most incentives are 
not effective in attracting foreign investors. This finding is supported by the study of 
foreign investment in Singapore in Hughes and You Poh Seng (1969). 
Tax holidays are not applicable to some major investing countries, notably the 
United States. US firms (and those from other countries such as Australia) do not 
derive wiy benefit from tax reduction and tax holidays once profits are repatriated. 
The US Treasury does not practice tax 'sparing'. When profits are repatriated. <>ny 
difference between tax rates paid in the host country and US taxes has to be paid t0 
the·US Treasury. Except for profits reinvested in the host country, there :s thus a 
transfer of revenues from the host country to the home country, that is thr United 
States (Hughes 1988). 
In Philippines, export processing zones, do not have tax holidays. This may 
be because they rely more heavily than other Asian countries on foreign investment 
from the United States (Warr 1985a, 1986). Most other 'home' countries do practice 
tax 'sparing', so that their firms do benefit from tax rt.'duction and tax ho~ .. 1ays, 
however, 'the sum of incentives has been excessive in many countries in relation 
both to the need and the possibility of attracting additional direct foreign investment', 
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it is highly desirable 'at least to stop neighbouring countries from competing with 
each other' in offering investment incentives (Hughes, 1972:337). 
7.5 xl~centive systems and preferential treatment for foreign investment in the 
1amen zone 
As a late comer in attempting to attract foreign investment in Asia, China turned to 
special economic zones as a means to this end. Regulations promulgated by the 
State Council of the People's Republic of China for the encouragement of foreign 
investment are the most important authorization for such measures. They include 
measures to reduce production costs by subsidies to infrastructure tax exemptions, 
financial assistance and flexible labour administration. The regulations include 
guarantees of autonomy in planning production for foreign firms and improvement in 
the efficiency of handling foreign investment and operations (Chinese Financial 
Economic Press 1989). 
This national package was adapted for local use by provincial and municipal 
authorities. The Xiamen Municipal Government, not satisfied with the national 
regulations, formulated detailed implementation guide-lines called the Eight 
Measures to Improve the Foreign Investment Environment of the Xiamen Special 
Economic Zone (the Laws and Regulations Bureau of Xiamen 1987:57-58). Within 
this guide-line, the Xiamen municipal government created three companies to 
provide services for foreign investors. They were the Xiamen Foreign Investment 
Service Company (XFISC), the Xiamen Project and Technology Consultation 
Company (XPTCC) and the Xiamen Material Supply Company (XMSC). But these 
are not the only organizations with which foreign investors have to deal. 
To improve administrative efficiency, the Xiamen municipal government set a 
working timetable for municipal departments dealing with foreign investors to 
guarantee speedy processing. The Economic and Trade Committee has to reply 
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within 30 days to an application for foreign investment. The Industry and 
Commerce Bureau has to reply within 7 days to an application for re~stration. The 
Taxation Office has to reply within 15 days to an application for tax exemptions. 
The slogan of one stop administration was adopted as a working system by the 
Customs Office. This means that foreign investors still have to deal with many 
government departments. 
Machinery and equipment, spare parts, raw and semi-processed materials, 
means of transportation and other capital goods required for production are exempt 
from customs duties when imported by enterprises in the special economic zone. 
However, a monthly plan of import clearances is required ahead of time by the local 
customs office. During the author's survey of Huli export processing zone firms, 
many of the firm managers in the Xiamen zone stated that dealing with customs was 
one of their most time consuming activities. 
To solve the shortage of operating capital and other short-term difficulties 
associated with foreign exchange, export enterprisesl and technologically advanced 
enterprises2 have priority in obtaining loan~. Unfortunately the definitions of such 
enterprises are loose and the administration of these regulations tends to be arbitrary. 
Loans are subject to the approval of the Bank of China, other specialized banks and 
the Xiamen International Trust and Investment Company (XITIC). Under the 
supervision of the Xiamen Foreign Exchange Administrative Bureau (XFEAB), 
enterprises dealing with foreign investment can trade in foreign exchange. 
To implement the circular of the State Council concernin~ ~rmly curbing the 
indiscriminate levy of charges on enterprises, the municipal government removed 
1 Production ente rises whose prodnc1;5 are ma~ly for expert, which haye foreign exch~ge revenues - the 
l " · rph ge expenditures incurred m production and operation and the foreign exchange needed for armua lore1gn exc an . . 
the remittances abroad of the profits earned by foreign investors. 
2 · · ssessin advanced technology supplied by foreign investors which are engaged in 
Produc:t1on enterpodnsestspo d upg~ading and replacing products in order to increase foreign exchange generated 
developing new pr uc • an . . 
by exports or for import substitution. 
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charges on six items, including a gas development fee and import and export 
application fees. The same standards apply to foreign firms as to state enterprises 
with regard to infrastructure and utility charges. 
Preferential treatment is provided for foreign investment in the Huli zone. It 
includes low land use fees (5 yuan per square metre per month) and low rentals for 
standard factory buildings. Land use fees are computed on the basis of the type of 
business and the terms of use. Educational, cultural, scientific and technological, 
medical and health or public welfare institutions in the special economic zone 
receive preferential treatment. Projects involving exceptionally advanced technology 
and non-profit projects may be exempt from payment of the land use fee. Special 
economic zone enterprises are allowed a 50% reduction of the fee during an 
approved project construction period. The right of using land may be transferred 
upon approval. 
Some flexibility is allowed in setting labour contracts. Theoretically, foreign 
investors can themselves determine the recruitment, employment, dismissal or 
discharging of staff. However, in practice, firms have found difficulties in doing 
this. 
Subject to approval, foreign enterprises can sell up to 40 per cent of their 
output to the domestic market at a price determined by the foreign firms except 
where such commodities are under 'unit price' controls. However this approval may 
be difficult to obtain or to v2ry. The greatest obstacle is the inability to repatriate 
profits earned in the domestic market. This problem is inevitable. while the domestic 
market is protected and foreign exchange is under-control. 
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Table 7.1 Rates on land use in the Xiamen zone 1988 
Usage 
Industry, transport 
and storage 
Commerce, hotel 
and restaurant 
Apartments and offices 
Open air parking lot 
and recreation 
Tourist facilities 
Source: Fieldwork survey 1988, Xiamen. 
per square metre (yuan/month) 
0.6-1.2 
7-14.0 
2-6.0 
0.2-1.0 
6-14.0 
In the author's Huli firm survey, many firm managers stated that investment 
incentives especially tax reductions and tax 'holidays' have little effect on their 
investment decisions. The accelerated depreciation provisions may be more useful 
policy tools than tax holidays, particularly when they are tied to shift work, for they 
may increase capital utilization and lower incremental capital labour ratios. 
However, an effective administration and better infrastructure facilities are more 
likely to be effective in attracting further foreign investment in China. 
7.6 The labour market in the Xiamen zone 
The Xiamen government has tried to break away from the rigidities of the national 
labour and wage systems and to move towards the establishment of a labour market. 
Tue· government is attempting to break the 'iron pot' system of employment, increase 
labour mobility, and improve labour productivity. Three measures, in particular, 
have been introduced to increase labour mobility and improve labour productivity. 
A labour contract system governs the employment of staff and workers. 
According to the Laws and Regulations Bureau of Xiamen (1987 1:7-10), labour 
contracts have to be drawn up between foreign investors and their employees. 
Contracts should include the following issues: terms of employment, dismissal and 
resignation, production and work tasks; labour service charges and provisions for 
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awards and punishments; work schedules, holidays and paid leave of absence; labour 
insurance and welfare benefits; labour protection; and labour disciplin~. 
Channels for recruitment of workers are diversified. The Xiamen Labour 
Service Company was formed to meet the labour requirement of foreign investors 
who can hire workers through the Xiamen Labour Service Company (XLSC). 
Alternatively they can advertise for labour. The Xiamen Personnel Department is 
also involved in recruitment of administrative managers, engineers and other 
specialists. 
Under the contract system, workers are employed for a limited period, 
normally 2-4 years. The foreign investors reserve the right to refuse the renewal of a 
contract if it's labour needs fall due to market fluctuations. In cases of redundancies, 
unfitness for allotted tasks or violation of discipline, a contract worker can be 
dismissed before the contract has expired. Attempts have been made to link workers' 
performance to their pay by giving greater powers to foreign investors to determine 
the level of wages and bonuses. 
Despite these measures, a competitive labour market has not been established. 
Firms find it difficult to 'hire and fire'. They also find it difficult to retain skilled 
workers and to provide further skills training. This is especially a problem for those 
workers who come from rural areas and cannot officially migrate to the Xiamen 
zone. 
The administration of the labour force. Different administrative and 
regulatory systems apply to the local labour force and labour from rural areas. The 
local labour force is under the protection of the local government and has priority in 
employment. Procedures for entry into and exit from the labour market is also 
simpler for local labour. 
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The legal inflow of unskilled labour is under the control of the local 
government. Each year, local government sets a quota for the inflow of labcur so as 
to control the increase of population in Xiamen. Of the large number of workers 
who come into Xiamen each year, only a small number can obtain approval from the 
Xiamen Security Bureau to settle in Xiamen. Some of the unsuccessful applicants 
for this approval return to the countryside, whit~ others remain 'unofficial' residents. 
Only those who obtain a place in the quota and become residents of Xiamen can 
enter the permanent bbour market and compete with local labour. Those who can 
not obtain a quota place can only obtain temporary residential approval and become 
temporary workers in Xfamen. 
In general, temporary workers have quite different rights to permanent 
workers and contractual workers. They work under poorer conditions, and receive a 
lower wage. They are not covered under the social security schemes. 
There is little motivation for employers to provide training for temporary 
workers or for such workers to improve their skills. The demand for labour is 
determined in the labour market but the supply of labour continues to be determined 
by the local government. Overall, the dampening effect on permanent labour costs is 
small. 
7.7 Proposals for improving the investment environment in the Xiamen zone 
The advantages of a suitable geographic location, an incentive package, cheap labour 
costs and a vast domestic market have been thought to provide attractive conditions 
for foreign investment. However, at present the investment environment in the 
Xiamen zone is not satisfactory for foreign investors. To develop a more efficient 
and internationally competitive investment environment, several steps need to be 
taken. 
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(a) Administration. The Xiamen zone needs an effective 'streamlined' 
administrative system for foreign investors. An authorized organizatio_p as well as an 
entrepreneurially oriented group of administrators should be able to handle and 
coordinate all the economic activities in the zone. The time consuming individual 
negotiation of domestic market entry should be replaced by a set of simple general 
rules, which apply for all foreign investors. 
(b) Customs. A reform of customs without the submission of annual plans 
arrangements for imports and exports is needed to improve the operational 
environment. Bonded warehouses could be established in factories to ensure that 
duty free imported goods are available without being released to the domestic 
market. 
(c) Labour cost and labour productivity. More flexible labour 
administration policies enabling nation-wide mobility of labour would undoubtedly 
bring down labour costs in the Xiamen zone. In addition, lifting restrictions ori the 
permanency of residents would increase the stability and, in the long run, skill levels 
of the work force. 
(d) Public utilities and infrastructure. Improved management skills are of 
particular importance in public utilities and infrastructures. A movement towards 
more market oriented operation of public utilities will require new skills in 
production design, production engineering and quality control. This would enable 
the existing facilities to be better utilized. 
Moreover, creation of a favourable working and living environment including 
transportation, entertainment, shopping, education and hospitals within the special 
economic zone, is also important for improve labour productivity. 
(e) The Chinese government needs more systematic attitudes towards foreign 
investment and the investment environment. It needs to have a commitment to 
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facilitating foreign investment, not only at the higher levels of government, but also 
at the operational levels of bureaucracy. Hence it is not sufficient iµerely to pass 
relevant laws, regulations and incentive packages, but also to supervise carefully 
their implementation. Most foreign investment is flexible internationally in terms of 
location. Unless China's unfavourable investment environment is improved, foreign 
investment will seek other locations. 
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Chapters 
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Economic Performance of the Uuli Zone 
8.1 Introduction 
The creation of special economic zones has the effect in a small part of the Chinese 
economy, of lowering the level of protection and provision of special subsidies to 
foreign and domestic investors. Standard neo-classical theory suggests that a 
lowering of protection throughout the economy should lead to increased levels of 
trade and specialization, which in turn will result in higher social welfare. However, 
establishment of a special economic zone also may reduce welfare through a 
diversion of trade and misallocation of investment. Moreover, any net benefits from 
reduced protection must be balanced against the economic cost of the subsidies 
provided. In addition, there are welfare effects of an indeterminate nature due to the 
redistribution of tax revenue. Hence, only empirical case studies can provide 
accurate estimates of the net social benefits and costs of establishing a special 
economic zone. 
The main objective of this chapter is to construct a cost-benefit framework 
and to use it to examine the economic performance of the Huli zone. The cost-
beriefit framework employed to estimate the net benefits from foreign firms in the 
Hull zone mainly follows the method developed by Warr (1990) in the study of 
export processing zones in other East and South-east Asian countries. The 
estimation of the net benefits from local firms in the zone employs standard cost 
benefit analysis methods for project assessment. 
The Xiamen zone initially consisted of the 2.5 square kilometres Huli 
industrial estate constructed in 1981. In 1985 the State Council passed a decree to 
extend the Xiamen zone to the whole Island (see map 7 .1 in chapter 7) This 
extended zone included much existing infrastructure and many enterprises 
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established in Xiamen prior to 1985. On the other hand, prior to 1981 Huli was an 
undeveloped area. The newly developed transponation system, factory buildings, 
residential housing and other public facilities in Huli were all constructed for the 
purposes of the export processing zone. To make a cost-benefit analysis feasible, 
taking account of the availability of data, the following study concentrates on the 
economic performance only of the original Huli zone. 
The Huli zone is designed to provide both a physical and a policy enclave, 
which permits neutral or export-promotion policies to be pursued within the zone 
without reforming China's trade regime. In order to achieve these goals, the 
government invested heavily in infrastructure and other public utilities. In return for 
this investment, the Chinese economy benefits from firms operating in the zone. 
There are three different kinds of firms operating in the zone; wholly foreign owned; 
joint venture and co-operative enterprises. Results of a fieldwork survey in Xiamen 
in 1988, showed that of the total investrr.~,1t in the Huli zone, 28 per cent is d~e to 
foreign firms and foreign partners in the joint ventures and co-operative enterprises, 
and 26 per cent of the total employment is in foreign firms and foreign partners in 
the joint ventures and co-operative enterprises. 
The net benefits of the zone to the Chinese economy can be determined by an 
amalgamation of the cost-benefit analysis of foreign firms and domestic firms in the 
Huli zone (Huli model). 
Figure 8.1 shows what activities are relevant when assessing the net benefits 
of the zone, among the various transactions of foreign firms an~ foreign partners in 
the joint ventures and cooperative enterprises and domestic firms and domestic 
partners in cooperative enterprises. 
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Figure 8.1 The relevance of coot be n . . firms in the Huli zon~ ne a analy,s1S of economic transactions of 
Transaction 
with: 
Rest of 
the world 
Local economy 
\coreign finns: 
\ ~reign investment 
model 
* 
** 
Notes: * irrelevant; **relevant. 
Figure 8.2 Bcn~fits and costs of the Huli zone 
Benefits 
A Payments of firms for: A 
1 Unskilled workers 1 
2 Skilled workers 2 
3 Raw materials 3 
4 Capital goods 4 
5 Electricity 5 
6 Water 6 
7 . Port charges 7 
8 Interests and 8 
principal repayments 9 9 Rents 
10 Building Purchased 10 
11 Taxes 
B Positive externalities B 
1 Technology transfer 
1 
2 Managerial skills transfer 
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Domestic finns: 
domestic investment 
model 
** 
** 
Costs 
Opportunity cost of: 
Unskilled wc1rkers 
Skilled workers 
Raw matedals 
Caphal ~oods 
Electridty 
Watr,1 
P~rt constm~tion 
Domestic borrowing 
Construction cost 
Admini~tration cost 
Negative externalities 
Pollution 
8.2 The net bem~fits from foreign investment: 'the foreign investment model' 
Following Corden (19741 1985) and Warr (1990), the net bene~ts of foreign 
investment in the Huli zone can be assessed by using the enclave model, called the 
foreign investment model in Figure 8.1. All the economic activities of foreign firms 
in the Huli zone can be classified into two categories: firstly, the economic activities 
that occur between foreign firms (including foreign partners in joint ventures and 
cooperative enterprises) and the rest of the world; and secondly, the economic 
activities that occur between the foreign firms and China's local economy. Only the 
second type of economic activities are relevant for the evaluation. of the welfare 
impact on the Chinese economy that results from the development of th~ zone. 
8.3 Component of costs and benefits of the foreign investment model 
Figure 8.2 summarizes the potential benefits and costs components for foreign 
investment in the Huli zone. Official Chinese data is only available for the Huli zone 
for the years 1980-83. To provide slltisfactory data for this analysis, fieldwork 
studies were undertaken. The data relating to the Huli zone were collected in 
Xiamen in 1988. Two questionnaire surveys were conducted: one for workers and 
one for firms. The firm survey covered all 19 foreign industrial firms operating in 
the standard and non-standard factory buildings. The workers' survey covered 2000 
workers in the zone (about 30 per cent of total workers). 
(i) Employment and shadow wage rate. The income generated by 
e
1
nployment in the project is considered by the Chinese government to constitute a 
large share of the benefits of setting up the Huli zone. In other words, the wages 
received by the workers, especially by the unskilled workers, are considered to 
exceed the social opportunity cost of their e!Jlployment in the zone. This opportunity 
cost includes the foregone output from that proportion of this work force that would 
otherwise have been employed elsewhere in China. Moreover, workers in the zone 
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are known to be paid · tl . cons1sten Y higher wages than similar workers employed 
outside the zone so the diffi ' erence may represent a source of net gain ~o the Chinese 
economy. 
Table 8.1 shows that total employment in Huli zone grew rapidly during the 
first four operating years. In 1987, the tot31 employment in the zone reached 5,919 
people, which was about six times the level in the first year of operation in 1984. 
Table 8.1 ~~~~i~ment and total wages in the Huli zone, by firm ownership, 
Class 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Total workers 941 2225 4476 5919 
Managers 90 223 448 590 
Technicians 104 245 492 651 
Workers 739 1735 3491 4618 
Expatriates 8 22 45 60 
Total wagesa 1.35 4.16 8.37 11.84 
Staff members 0.20 0.63 1.26 1.18 
Technicians 0.24 0.71 1.42 2.01 
Workers 0.89 2.75 5.53 
7.82 
Foreigners 0.03 0.08 0.17 
0.24 
Unskilled wagesa 0.89 2.75 5.53 
7.82 
Foreign finns 0.23 0.72 1.44 
2.03 
Domestic finns 0.66 2.03 4.09 
5.79 
Skilled wagesa 0.47 1.42 
2.85 3.43 
i:<oreign firms 0.12 0.37 
0.74 0.89 
Domestic finns 0.35 1.05 
2.11 2.54 
Average monthly 
119.8 155.9 155.9 166.7 wage (yuan) 
Note: a Total wag1..;s are in million yuan. 
Source: Fieldwork Survey 1988, Xiamen; Xiamen Labour Service Company 1988. 
However, only that part of employment which was created by foreign firms 
and the foreign paru1ers in joint ventures and cooperative enterprises generated 
benefits to the Chinese economy. That wages paid in local finns, which is in excess 
of the opportunity cost of the labour is simply a transfer payment from Chinese 
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entrepreneurs to workers Th . . 
· e net gam to the Chmese economy from employment in 
the Huli zone is calculated from the total wage bill for unskilled and ~killed workers 
in foreign firms minus th tt" ed "al . · e es mat soc1 opportumty cost of employing these 
workers, that is: 
where 
B~ = net employment benefit from foreign investment; 
Lpu = number of unskilled workers in foreign firms; 
Wu = wage of unskilled worker; 
Wu* = shadow price for unskilled worker; 
Lps = number of skilled workers in foreign firms; 
W s = wage of skilled worker; 
W s * = shadow price for skilled worker. 
(8.1) 
There are two potential sources of benefit to the Chinese economy from 
foreign firms converting foreign exchange to pay their wage bills, local materials.and 
capital goods inputs, etc. Firstly, there is the difference between the actual exchange 
rate paid by foreign firms and the shadow exchange rate and secondly, there is the 
difference between market prices and the true economic value in domestic prices. 
However, the Little ~md Mirrlees (1972), Squire and Van der Tak (1975) conversion 
factor approach combines these two effects together when shadow pricing labour and 
domestically produced raw materials, etc. Hence the net benefits to the Chinese 
economy from foreign firms converting foreign exchange to pay their wage bills, is 
as described above. 
(ii) Taxes and profits. In terms of an economic efficiency analysis taxes paid 
by foreign firms represent a source of benefit to the Chinese economy. Table 8.2 
shows that the taxes collected from the Huli zone were low during the first six years 
of operation. The bulk of these taxes would not have been received if the Huli zone 
did not exist, with the exception of the taxes paid by those foreign firms which would 
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have come to China even if the zone did not exist. However, it is very difficult to 
judge the numbers of such firms among the total foreign firms in Hu~i. Taxes paid 
by local entrepreneurs are merely transfer payments from the Chinese entrepreneurs 
in the zone to the Chinese financial authorities. 
If there were no company income tax applying to firms in the zone, profits 
and losses of the foreign investors in the zone would be irrelevant. Only the profits 
of the Chinese partners constitute a benefit to the Chinese economy. A situation 
where no company income tax is paid is the norm in many export processing zones 
in East Asian countries (Warr 1990). However, since firms in China's special 
economic zones are subject to company income tax, any transfer pricing activities of 
these foreign firms will reduce China's net benefits from the zone. 
For example, in vertically integrated firms, the flow of goods and services 
between the zone and the rest of the world occur within the firm. To maximize total 
profits and minimize global tax burdens, the firm may engage in transfer pricing to 
relocate their profits internationally. If there were no company income tax, whether 
a firm's profits are realized in the zone or elsewhere would be essentially irrelevant. 
However, these profits are subject to 15 per cent of domestic taxation in China. 
Whether firms profits will be realized in China or not, affects the magnitude of the 
total tax revenue of the Chinese government. Because of the data difficulties, transfer 
pricing effects will be omitted in this study. The net benefit for the Chinese 
economy of taxes generated form foreign firms is: 
(8.2) 
where 
Bp T = total benefit of taxes for China; 
T F = total taxes paid of the foreign firms in the zone. 
151 
I .. ' 
·1 
:~ 1 
.; 
' ' J 
I { 
Table 8.2 Total taxes and profits of the Huli zone 1982-88 (million yuan) 
Items 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Total taxes 0.51 0.84 23.1 74.4 82.2 82.2 
Foreign firms 0.11 0.18 4.85 15.62 17.26 17.26 
Domestic firms 0.40 0.66 18.25 58.78 64.94 64.94 
Total profitsa 
Foreign firms 0.02 0.31 0.18 7.68 
Chinese firms 0.04 1.33 0.42 24.65 
Note: a net profits (after truces) 
Source: Fieldwork survey 1988, Xiamen. 
(iii) Domestic borrowing. One of the methods used to attract foreign 
investors has been by allowing access to local capital markets. In the Philippines 
such access was even combined with government guarantees for the repayment of 
foreign loans. This was one of the main causes of the large negative contribution 
made by the Bataan export processing zone to economic welfare in the Philippines 
(Warr 1985a). China, despite its acute shortage of capital, also allows foreign firms 
to borrow in the local capital market. 
If the local capital market were a competitive market open to international 
transactions, access to it by foreign investors would have little socio-economic 
effect. However, the Chinese financial system is 'repressed'. Interest rates are 
deliberately kept low. The marginal social productivity of capital in China exceeds 
commercial interest rates. This implies that the value of output foregone elsewhere 
within the Chinese economy as a result of foreign borrowing is likely to exceed the 
compensation received from foreign firms in the export processing zone in the form 
of interest payments. Hence, additional borrowing by foreign firms in the zone is 
costly to the Chinese economy. 
Total domestic borrowing of the Huli firms reached 39.19 million yuan in 
1988. However, only the borrowing by foreign firms and foreign partners in joint 
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ventures and cooperative enterprises is a net loss to the Chinese economy. 
Borrowing by domestic, firms at subsidized interest rates represe~ts a transfer 
payment from local lenders to local entrepreneurs. Th~ net welfare loss to the 
Chinese economy from domestic borrowing of the foreign firms in the Huli zone is 
calculated as the difference between total foreign firms' domestic loan interest and 
principal repayments and the social opportunity cost of this domestic borrowing: 
where 
Cpb 
Rpi 
Dpb 
sk 
= 
= 
= 
= 
(8.3) 
net welfare gain to the Chinese economy from domestic borrowing 
of foreign firms (loss if negative); 
total interest and principal repayments of domestic loans of foreign 
firms; 
total domestic borrowing of foreign firms; 
conversion factor for capital. 
(iv) Public utilities. If there are subsidies implicit in the rents at which land 
and factory sites are leased to foreign firms, and if me prices of utilities and other 
services purchased by them are set below their marginal production costs, this is 
clearly an economic cost to the Chinese economy. 
Tables 8.3 and 8.4 show the total electricity and water charges paid by firms 
in the zone from 1982 to 1988. In any particular year, the total loss to the Chinese 
economy will be equal to the difference between total electricity and water 
consumption of the foreign firms and foreign partners in joint ventures and co-
operative enterprises and the social marginal cost of generating the electricity and 
water consumed by them. Any subsidy of utilities used by local firms represents 
transfer payments from Chinese utility authorities to local entrepreneurs and are not 
a net loss to China. Hence, the net loss to the Chinese economy will be equal to: 
where 
= finet welfare loss to the Chinese economy from subsidizing the foreign 
rrms usage of public utilities; 
= amount of electricity used by the foreign finns; 
= market price of electricity in the zone; 
= shadow price for electricity; 
= amount of water used by the foreign firms; 
= market price of water in the zone· 
' 
= shadow price factor for water. 
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(v) Domestic raw material and capital goods inputs. The development of 
backward linkages with the local e'10nomy through the purchase of ra"'. materials and 
other production inputs of th'=: firms in Huli is another benefit expected by the 
Chinese government from the operation of the zone. The encouragement of using 
domestic raw materials and intermediate inputs in the zone implies that the prices 
paid by the foreign firms for these materials are believed (by the Chinese 
government) to exceed the social opportunity cost of producing them. However, 
only the purchase of raw materials and capital goods by the foreign firms and foreign 
partners in joint ventures and co-operative enterprises may generate net benefits for 
China. Purchases by local firms which exceed the opportunity cost simply represent 
transfers of these inputs between local entrepreneurs. Hence, the net benefit of the 
Chinese economy from the local purchase of raw materials and local capital goods 
by the foreign firms and foreign partners in joint ventures and cooperative 
enterprises is: 
where 
BpR 
(8.5) 
= net benefit of the Chinese economy from purchased of local raw 
materials and capital goods inputs by foreign firms in the zone; 
= local raw materials inputs by foreign firms in the zone; 
= market price of local raw materials; 
= shadow price for local raw materials; 
= local capital goods inputs by foreign firms in the zone; 
= market price of local capital goods inputs; 
= shadow price for local capital goods. 
The local raw material inputs are primarily the Chinese electronic parts 
purchased by the Xiamen Overseas Chinese Electronic Co.,Ltd and the raw materials 
purchased by the The South-East Aluminium Industry Co., Ltd. These two 
· t d for 92 per cent and 5 per cent respectively of the total local raw 
companies accoun e 
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materials purchased by the Huli zone during 1984-88 (fieldwork smvey 1988, 
Xiamen). 
Table 8.5 Additional local c ts f th fl . uan) os 0 e 1rim m the Huli zone 1984-87 (million 
Class 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Purchase of Local 
raw materials 0.10 83.34 38.61 72.44 
Foreign 0.03 23.34 10.81 20.28 
Domestic 0.07 60.00 27.80 52.16 
Purchase of 
local machinery 1.35 2.63 8.00 
Foreign 0.38 0.74 2.24 
Domestic 0.97 1.89 5.76 
Total imports 16.15 106.72 82.76 171.40 
Foreign 4.52 29.88 23.17 47.99 
Domestic 11.63 76.84 59.59 123.41 
Total local sales 9.00 132.00 178.60 258.00 
Foreign 2.52 36.96 50.01 72.24 
Domestic 6.48 95.04 128.59 185.73 
Total exports 1.48 0.68 16.59 31.15 
Foreign 0.41 0.19 4.65 8.72 
Domestic 1.07 0.49 11.94 22.43 
Source: Fieldwork Survey 1988, Xiamen. 
(vii) Local sales. All the above estimates of benefits to the Chinese economy 
from foreign firms operating in an export processing zone assume that the firms 
convert foreign exchange to pay for their local costs. This follows from the 
definition of conversion factor in chapter 3. If in fact they pay these costs out of the 
proceeds of local sales. this may reduce the net benefits to China from the zone. 
This is because the gains from forcing firms to convert fore~g~ exchange at an 
overvalued exchange rate may be lost 
Consider the case of foreign firms which has a wage bill of 1,000 yuan. If t'.1e 
actual exchange rate at which the firm converts foreign exchange is AER, the 
amount of foreign exchange it will have to convert is 1,000/AER yuan. If the actual 
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exchange rate (AER) is lower th th an e shadow exchange rate, China will receive a 
net benefit from this transaction equal to: 
NBFE = 1000 ( 1 - AER I SER) yuan (8.6) 
where 
NBFE = forehign exchange earnings from the over-valuation of the renminbi 
exc ange rate; 
SER = shadow exchange rate; 
AER = actual er.:change rate applied to foreign firms; 
If the actual exchange rate was equal to the official exchange rate, in 1989 the 
net benefits from this source would have been: 
NBFE = 1,000 ( 1 - 4.7 / 5.8)a yuan (8.7) 
= 190 yuan 
Sources: a Data for 1990, see Appendix Table A4.7 in chapter 4. 
Suppose now, that the firms receive 1 ,000 yuan from local sales and use this 
money to pay their wage bills, this 190 yuan of benefits to the Chinese economy may 
be lost. This will be the case if t.l-ie firms receive a tariff-inclusive price for their 
sales to the domestic market. In this situation the difference between domestic and 
border price of the goods sold will be a net loss to China. At present, firms in the 
Huli zone are officially permitted to sell up to 40 per cent of their products on the 
domestic market (Chen Deqiu 1989). However, these domestic sales are considered 
to be imports into China. They are subject to import tariffs which are collected by 
the Chinese government. Hence there may be no negative welfare effects on the 
Chinese economy from this source. 
However, when protection takes the form of quantitative restrictions, allowing 
firms to sell locally is equivalent to having an increase in the same amount of quotas. 
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If the foreign firms can th 11 1 en se ocally at an amount that includes the tariff 
equivalent of the quota this ·n ' WI represent a loss to the Chinese econo.my of some, if 
not all, of the benefits from th £ . e ore1gn exchange premium discussed in the above 
example. These issues are discussed in more detail and illustrated with simple 
examples in the following chapter. 
Appendix Table A8. l shows that earnings from the local sale of the foreign 
firms and foreign partners in joint ventures and co-operative enterprises (161.73 
million yuan) are greater than the total local currency that firms needed for their 
production (115.39 million yuan) during 1984-87. The foreign exchange earnings 
that were expected from the Huli zone has not occurred. 
Table 8.6 Total l!Ublic investment in the Huli zone 1981-88 (million }'.Uan) 
Year Xi amen Huli XPCC XREDC 
1981 2.5 
1982 234.8 20.5 10.9 
1983 186.7 35.3 30.7 
1984 320.6 93.0 86.7 
25.3 
1985 411.5 109.2 76.6 
31.7 
1986 420.0 25.~· 9.8 
14.6 
1987 420.0 32.0 21.7 
8.7 
1988 8.4 
2.0 
Total 199? .. 6 315.2 
247.3 82.3 
Sources: Fieldwork i. '!rvey, data provided by the Xiamen Municipality Statistics 
Bureau, 1988; Xiamen Project Construction Company(XPCC) and Xiamen Real 
Estate Development Company (XREDC), 1988. 
(vii) Public expenditures and administrative costs. Public expenditures 
required to set up the Huli zone are clearly an economic cost to.China. However, 
using the actual expenditures in the zone would overstate the net expenditure if some 
of these or similar expenditures would have been required even in the absence of the 
zone. Local roads are an example. The Huli zone, however, has largely been newly 
constructed and the major expenditures involved have been specific to the zone. The 
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differences between total ex e di p n tures and expenditures essential only for the zone 
therefore seem likely to be small. 
Table 8.6 indicates total g . ovemment mvestment in Huli zone since 1982. Up 
m astructure mvestment in Huli zone reached 315 to 1987, the amount of total · fr . 
r per cent of the total government investment in the million yuan and accounted fo 16 
Xiamen zone. 
Table 8.7 T~~: ~~~':~1;;f_t8~f the Xiamen Project Construction Company in the 
Total Standard Non-standard Roads Sewerage 
Year investment buildings buildings drainage 
(million yuan) (sq.m) (sq.m) (km.) (km.) 
1981 2.5 
1982 10.9 
1983 30.7 17,696 6,686 
1984 86.7 222,157 19,062 6.8 15.3 
1985 76.6 96,472 22,138 0 2.8 
1986 9.8 10,341 0 14.5 
1987 21.7 0.1 7.5 
1988 8.4 30,001 
4 
Total 247.2 336,325 88,228 6.9 
44.1 
Source: Fieldwork survey, The Xiamen Project Construction Company, 1988. 
The Huli zone consists of two parts. The northern part is an industrial area 
and the south is a residential area During the initial period of construction of the 
Huli zone, the main efforts were confined to the provision of transport, 
telecommunications, water and electricity. Two companies were set up to construct 
the Huli zone. The Xiamen Project Construction Company (XPCC) was established 
at the end of 1981 to build the industrial area~ and the Xiamen Real Estate 
Development Company (XREDC) was established at the end of 1984 to construct the 
residential cl.feas. The first phase of construction consisted of 1.1 square kilometres 
of standard factory buildings. The work started in October, 1981 and was completed 
in 1986. Work on the remaining 1.4 square kilometres began in 1984. A residential 
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area of 0.3 square kilometres is for foreign businessmen; 0.5 square l:ilometres is 
reserved for the harbour and 0.6 square kilometres for infrastructural facilities and 
factory buildings. 
Initial construction in Huli included: (1) local road links to the main road; (2) 
gas supply; (3) electricity suppl)'; (4) water supply; (5) a sewage system; (6) a 
communication link; (7) a storm drainage system and (8) land levelling. Table 8. 7 
indicates total investmenl of the Xiamen Project Construction Company in Huli 
infrastructure and in standard and non-standard factory buildings. 
Table 8.8 Total investment of the Xiamen Real Estate Development Company 
investment in the Huli zone 1984-88 (million yuan) 
Infrastructure 
land levelling 
road 
water,electricity 
sewerage disposal 
Buildings 
public facilities 
residential building 
other construction 
Other costs 
administrative 
design 
interest 
labour training 
Total Investment 
1984 1985 
6.1 7.6 
3.0 3.S 
1.5 1.9 
0.3 0.3 
1.3 1.6 
12.7 15.8 
5.1 6.3 
7.3 9.2 
0.3 0.3 
6.6 8.2 
0.5 0.6 
1.5 1.9 
2.5 3.2 
2.0 2.5 
25.3 31.7 
1986 
3.5 
1.8 
0.9 
0.1 
0.7 
7.3 
2.9 
4.2 
0.1 
3.8 
0.3 
0.9 
1.5 
1.2 
14.6 
1987 
2.1 
1.0 
0.5 
0.1 
0.4 
4.4 
1.7 
2.5 
0.1 
2.3 
0.2 
0.5 
(\9 
0.7 
8.7 
1988 
0.5 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
1.0 
0.4 
0.6 
0.0 
0.5 
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
2.0 
Total 
19.8 
9.8 
4.9 
0.9 
4.1 
41.2 
16.4 
23.8 
O.Z, 
21.4 
1.6 
4.9 
8.3 
6.6 
82.3 
Survey, The Xiamen Real Estate Development Company Source: Fieldwork 
(XREDC), 1988. 
Table 8.8 indicates the total investment of the Xiamen Real Estate 
"d "al At the end of 1983, traffic, 
Development Company in Huli res1 enn areas. 
. · water supply power supply and gas supply were available in 
telecommumcauons, ' 
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Hull zone. Twenty eight general factory buildings, 5 steel structure buildings and ;;\, 
comprehensive administration building were completed and some of. these were in 
use. A group of residential buildings for foreign business people, consisting of 22 
villas, were built. These are available on a rental or sale basis. In addition, 38 
apartment buildings were built for sale to factories, business people and residents. A 
second phase of construction began 1.n 1984. This is to include the remaining 1.4 
square kilometres in Huli. Additional infrastructural facilities and factories are under 
construction. 
By 1988, a total 336,325 square meters of standard factory building floor 
space; 88,228 square meters of non-standard factory building floor space; 25,899 
square meters uf public facilities floor space and 144,385 square meters of 
residential building floor space were completed in the Huli zone. 
The main components of the administrative costs of the Huli zone are the 
social opportunity costs of the wages of government employees and foregone rent of 
the administration buildings. The total wage bill of zone administrative employees 
adjusted by the conversion factor for skilled labour will be taken to be the social 
opportunity cost of their employment by the government. Hence, the net cost of 
construction and administration of the Huli zone for the foreign investment is: 
where 
(8.8) 
cFAK = total cost of construction and administration of foreign h:westment in 
the Huli zone; 
Kp 
SK 
Ap 
F s 
c 
= total rent paid by the foreign investment; 
= total payments for factory building purchased by foreign investment 
in local prices; 
:::: total construction cost for foreign investment; 
= conversion factor for capital; 
= total administration cost for foreign investment; 
= conversion factor for skilled labour. 
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(viii) Other benefits and costs. In appraising the successes or failures of the 
special economic zones in China, it is mor(': helpful to assess both $cir direct and 
indirect effects on promoting the national economy as a testing ground and the two 
radiation functions than to assess the regional developments by various economic 
indices in an isolated way. 
Special economic zones have taken the lead in the reform of the economk 
system in the past ten years. The most important contributions to Chinese economic 
reforms are the following. 
(1) After ten years reform, the special economic ronea have provided an 
experimental sample, method and way of introducing a market mechanism to a 
centrally planned economy. 
(2) In association with the t' ;quirements of the market economy, the special 
economic zones have necessitated changes in government economic management 
with traditional direct government control gradually being replaced by economic 
mechani!Jm, backe<l by proper legal regulations. 
(3) Great success has been achie·1ed in reforming enterprise management. 
The sped.al economic zones took the lead in instituting the system under which 
enterprises are responsible for its own profits and losses. The manager is responsible 
for fulfilling a fixed job target during his term of office. Enterprises have offered 
shares. Most of the successful practices have been popularized throughout the 
country. 
(4) Moreover, the special economic zones, though small in area, have a 
profound significance and far-reaching influence in the development of the Chinese 
Through the window of special economic zones, China learns 
economy. 
externalities in management and technology transfer, how to deal with foreign 
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investment, the importance of quality control "'"d · f · , .... a senes o economic concepts 
such as marketing, pricing, competition, efficiency and technological ir:nprovement. 
The establishment of the special economic zones have; also generated negative 
externalities such as pollution. Moreover rising materialism, speculations on the 
black market for foreign exchange, frauds and other economic crimes are also said to 
be inconsistent with the basic tenets of a socialist economy. 
Ideally, in economic analysis of the zone, both positive and negative 
externalities should be included in the assessment of net benefits. However, 
externalities such as the transfer of technology and managerial skills, and pollution 
are very difficult to quantify. Therefore, the effects of these externalities must be 
omitted from this study. Given data difficulties, this is unavoidable. Since there are 
both positive and negative externalities, it is possible that they may largely off-set 
each other. However, it seems likely that the positive externalities may exceed the 
negative ones in the long term, and this must be considered when the final· net 
economic benefits of the zone are estimated. 
8.4 Net benefit from foreign investment in the Huli 1;r de 
It is now possible to present an algebraic expression for the net economic benefit for 
China from the foreign firms operating in the Huli zone. In a given year, t, the net 
benefit of the Huli zone can be given by; 
NBpt = ( Lp"Wu - Lpuwu*) + ( Lpsws -Lpsws*) + ( Tp) + ( Rpi - Dpbsk) + 
where 
( U ep - U ep *) + ( UpwPw - Upwpw*) + ( Mif Pr- Mif P/) + (Mpkpk F e F e 
(8.9) 
b fit to Ch
ina from foreign investment in the zone at year t; 
NBpt = net ene i ' 
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Lpu = total employment of unskilled labour by foreign firms in year t; 
W Fu = wage paid to unskilled labour by foreign firms in year t; 
Lps = total employment of skilled labour by foreign firms in ye&r t; 
Wps = wage paid to skilled labour by foreign investment in year t; 
Mef = domestic raw material used by foreign firms in year t; 
Mp1c = domestic capital goods used by foreign firms in year t; 
Pr = the price of raw materials; 
Pk = the price of capital goods inputs; 
Upe = electricity used by foreign firms in year t; 
Up w = water used by foreign firms in year t; 
Pe = price of electricity; 
P w = price of water; 
Rpb = rent for the factory building paid by foreign firms in year t; 
RpP = factory buildings purchased by foreign firms in year t; 
Rpi = total interest and principal repayments by foreign firms in year t; 
T F = total taxes paid by foreign firms in year t; 
Wu* = shadow price for unskilled labour; 
W s * = shadow price for skilled labour; 
P / = shadow price for raw material; 
Pk* = shadow price for of capital goods; 
Pe* = shadow price for electricity; 
P w * = shadow price for water; 
Dpb = domestic borrowing in yeal' t; 
Kp = construction cost of the Huli zone for foreign investment in year t; 
Sk = conversion factor of capital; 
Ap =administrative costs of the Huli zone for foreign investment in year t; 
Fe s =conversion factor for skilled worker. 
Rearranging, this is equivalent to: 
The first bracketed term · · m equation 8.10 represents the payments made by 
foreign firms and foreign partne · · · rs m JOmt ventures and cooperative en~erprises in the 
zone to employ labour, purchase raw materials, capital goods, electricity and water, 
rent of the factory• interest and principal repayments of dcr "lestic loans, and various 
official taxes. 
The second bracketed term represents the social opportunity cost of providing 
labour, raw materials and capital goods inputs, and utilities for foreign investment in 
the zone. The third term and the fourth terms denote the costs of construction and 
administration of the Huli zone for foreign investment. 
However, to calculate the net benefits accruing to the Chinese economy from 
establishing the Huli zone, more detailed discussion of the effect of local sales and 
the foreign exchange rate applicable to the foreign firms in the zone is required. It is 
also necessary to clarify the common units to be used in measuring the cost and 
benefit components of the zone. This issue will now be examined in the next section. 
8.5 Simplified exposition of impact on the common unit of account of secondary 
exchange rate markets and local sales by foreign firms 
To calculate the net benefits received by China from the foreign firms operating in 
the Huli zone, all the components of costs and benefits must be measured in a 
common unit. In this study, border prices converted to local currency at the official 
exchange rate is employed as the numeraire. The conversion factors in the second 
bracket of equation 8.10 are used to convert the domestic prices of unskilled labour, 
skilled labour, local raw materials and capital goods inputs, utilities, construction and 
administrative costs into social opportunity costs in terms of border prices expressed 
in local currency. We must ensure that components in the first bracket of equation 
8.10 are also measured in border prices converted to local currency at the official 
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exchange rate. A simplified example is used to show how equation 8.10 meets this 
requirement. 
For simplicity, assume that foreign firms need 1,000 yuan to meet their 
domestic wage bill. There are two sources of funds that foreign firms can use to pay 
this bill. One is from export earnings and the other is from local sale earnings. 
(i) Payment of local costs from foreign firms' export earnings converted 
at official exchange rate. Suppose the local wage bill is paid out of earnings from 
exports. If foreign firms are required to use the official exchange rate to convert 
their export earnings to local currency in order to pay a wage bill of 1,000 yuan, this 
local expense of (1,000 yuan) can be directly included in the calculation of net 
benefits in equation 8.10. For example if the official exchange rate (US$1 = 4.7 
yuan) is applied, the foreign firm will need to convert export earnings of US$213 to 
pay their local wage bill. That is, 
1000 yuan I OER = US$213 (8.11) 
where 
OER =official exchange rate= 4.7 yuan 
In this case, the actual exchange rate applicable to foreign firms is the official 
ex~hange rate. What foreign firms actually pay in dollars for their wage bill is 
already correctly measured in border prices expressed in local currency. The value of 
local costs paid by the foreign firms export earnings converted at official exchange 
rate is: 
VBP = l,000 yuan* (OER I OER) = 1,000 yuan (8.12) 
where . 
V = value of local costs paid by the foreign firms export earnings converted 
BP at official exchange rate. 
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(ii) Payment of local costs from foreign firms' export earnings converted 
at secondary exchange rate. If the actual exchange rate which for~ign firms are 
allowed to access is the secondary exchange rate (SeER), the foreign firms will only 
need to convert US$ 172 to pay their wage bill (where the secondary exchange rate is 
US$1=5.8 yuan). That is, 
1000 yuan I SeER = US$172 (8.13) 
where 
SeER = secondary exchange rate = 5.8 yuan 
In this case, the local wage bill of 1,000 yuan is only worth 810 yuan 
measured in border prices and expressed in local currency (that is US$172 * OER = 
810 yuan). In this situation, the wage bill multiplied by the ratio of official exchange 
rate to the secondary exchange rate should be included in equation 8.10 to estimate 
the net benefits of foreign firms' operations to the Chinese economy. 
where 
V BP = 1,000 yuan (OER/SeER) = 810 yuan (8.14) 
= value of local costs paid by the foreign firms export earnings 
converted at secondary exchange rate. 
(iii) Payment of local costs from local sales at a tariff inclusive price. For 
this discussion, we should assume that the difference between domestic price of 
commodity i and its border price is tariff. If tariffs are the only protection measure 
that China employs on imports of commodity, i. The domestic price of commodity i 
is: 
DPi = BPi (AER)(l +t) 
(8.15) 
If foreign firms make 1,000 yuan from local sales at the tariff inclusive price, 
then 
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DPif = BPi (AER) (1 +t) (8.16) 
According to our numeraire the bo d . ' r er pnce of commodity i is1: 
(8.17) 
where 
BPi * = border price of commodity i. 
Therefore, 
CFif= BPi* /DPif = OER/ (AER) (l+t) (8.18) 
If foreign firms make 1,000 yuan from local sales of product i, and use this 
revenue to pay their 1,000 yuan wage bill. The wage bill of 1,000 yuan valued at 
border prices is: 
where 
(8.19) 
= 1,000 yuan (CFif) 
V BP = value of local costs paid by th~ foreign firms from local sales at a 
tariff inclusive price, at border price; 
BPi * = border price of commodity i; 
DPif = domestic price of commodity i, received by foreign firms, that is net 
of any tariff revenue or other taxes they pay for these local sales; 
= conversion factor for commodity i, confronting foreign firms 
(CFif=BPi*/DPif)· 
This case will then be comparable to case (ii) above, where foreign firms 
export and are allowed to convert their foreign exchange at a rate· close to the shadow 
exchange rate (in that case, China's secondary exchange rate). 
(iv) Payment of local costs fron~ local sales by the foreign firms at a tariff 
exclusive price. In the case that foreign finns sell their goods in the local market at 
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domestic price and pay over to the government the equivalent of actual import taxes 
levied on this commodity. The tariff paid by the foreign firms is siqiply a transfer 
payment from local consumer to the Chinese authority. Assume the firms use the 
proceeds of their local sales at this tariff exclusive price to pay their 1,000 yuan local 
wage bill. The value of the wage bill of 1,000 yuan to the Chinese economy 
measured at border prices expressed in local currency will then be only 790 yuan. 
That is: 
(8.20) 
Since, 
DPif = BPi* (AER) 
(8.21) 
Therefore, 
VBP = 1,000 (OER/AER) (8.22) 
where . 
V = value of local costs paid by foreign firms from local sales eammgs at a 
BP tariff inclusive price; 
If we assume that the average conversion factor for goods that foreign firms in 
1 1 k t is equal to the standard conversion factor which is the zone sell on the oca mar e 
d . hted average conversion factor as defined in chapter 3. Then the the aggregate we1g 
ed . ts when they are bought with th~ i:evenue from local value of locally purchas mpu ' 
sal~s made at domestic (tariff inclusive) prices is: 
VBP = 1,000 yuan* Fs = 690 yuan 
(8.23) 
where . (OER I SER= 0.69) estimated in chapter 3. 
Fs = standard conversion factor 
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(v) Excess revenue from local sales. If there is excess local sales revenue 
after payment of all local costs, firms must convert these funds at the secondary 
market exchange rate to obtain foreign exchange to pay imported raw materials and 
intermediate inputs. Suppose the firms receive a tariff inclusive price for these local 
sales, as in case (iv) above, to the extent that the ratio of the price received by foreign 
firms fr0m local sales to the border price, of commodity i, DPif I BPi is greater than 
the ratio of the secondary exchange rate to the official exchange rate, SeER I OER, 
then China will lose foreign exchange and tax revenue from such transactions, 
compared to simply importing such goods at the border price. That is: 
where 
* NC = (DPif I BPi ) - (SeER I OER) (8.24) 
= 1.27 - 1.23 = 0.04 
NC = net loss to China from foreign firms conversion of excess revenue fr?m 
local sales to obtain foreign exchange to pay imports; 
BPi * /DPif = 0.79 = consumption goods conversion factor as estimated in 
chapter 3; 
OER/SeER = 4.7 / 5.8 = 0.81 (Table A3.8, 1990 figures). 
It can be seen that this difference (equation 8.24) is likely to be small. The 
loss to China from this source will therefore be omitted. 
The calculation of net benefits to the Chinese economy generated from the 
by foreign firms can now be simp1ified. Figure 8.3 
purchase of local inputs 
. ' . factors' which will be applied to the local costs payment 
summanzes the conversion 
. . te their gross benefit to the Chinese economy, under the 
of the foreign firms to estima 
various scenarios examined. 
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Figure 8.3 Conversion factors 8 r d • China from foreign firms' tP ae m the '?'lculation of the gross benefit to 
expressed in local currency) pure ase of local mputs (measured at border prices 
Foreign firm export 
to pay local costs 
Foreign firm local sales 
to pay local costs 
OER SeER Tariff inclusive Tariff exclusive 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
OER BP·* BP·* 
1 1 
1 
SeER DP if DP if 
Notes: Offi?ial .exchange rate(<?ER~; Secondary exchange rate (SeER); Border price 
of coIIlID:odity, I (BPi); Domestic pnce of commodity i, received by foreign firms 
from their local sales. 
This discussion can now be illustrated by deriving th,~ net benefit to China 
from employment of local unskilled workers by foreign firms, considering each of 
the cases summarized in Figure 8.3. 
Cases (i) and (ii). In terms of the numeraire, the net benefits to the Chinese 
economy generated from the purchase of local inputs by foreign firms which convert 
foreign exchange earnings to pay these costs, are: 
where 
NBE =LuWu (OER/ AER)-W* (8.25) 
NBE = net benefits to China from local unskilled workers employed by 
foreign firms, with local currency earnings expressed at border price; 
Lu = total unskilled workers employed by the foreign firms; 
Wu = wage of unskilled worker at local prices; 
OER = official exchange rate 
AER = actual exchange rate at which foreign firms convert foreign exchange; 
W* = opportunity costs of unskilled worker measured at border price in local 
cum.mcy. 
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Cases (iii) and (iv) D di 
· epen ng on the prices actually received by foreign 
firms from their local sales 00 f . 0 any tariffs or other taxes paid, the net benefits to 
the Chinese economy gene ted fr ra om the employment of local unskilled workers by 
foreign firms which use local sales of com odity . h m 1, to pay t esc costs are: 
where 
(8.26) 
NBE = net benefits to China from employment of local unskilled workers by 
foreign firms, with local currency earnings expressed at border price; 
BPi = domestic price of commodity i; 
DP if= domestic price of commodity i, received by the foreign firms' local 
sales; 
CF if= conversion factor for commodity i, for foreign firms. 
DPif denotes the domestic price that the foreign firm received from local 
sales. If the firms pay no duty of good i, DPif > BPi. If they pay all the relevant 
duty, DPif = BPi. 
Assuming that conversion factor for commodity i is about the average of the 
import and export goods, then, 
CF if= Fs = OER I SER 
(8.27) 
The actual situation in the Huli zone is that in some cases, firms convert 
foreign exchange earnings at the secondary exchange rate to p_ay local costs. The 
conversion factor applied to obtain the gross benefits to China is 0.81 (OER/SeER = 
4.7 / 5.8 = 0.81). For firms which sell locally, domestic prices invariably include a 
tariff and non-tariff barrier component. According to the investment guide, foreign 
firms selling locally do not receive the tariff component. This is paid to the Chinese 
172 
government. However they will all . 
' usu y receive some of the non-tariff barrier 
component. The proportion th . . ey receive is negotiatt:d case by case. 
If firms generally are selling consumer goods, which have a value of 
conversion factor equal to 0.79 {that is BP· /DP· = 0 79) . i if · . then. 
XS OER LS BP· i 
CF if = * + * (8.28) 
LC SeER LC DP if 
where 
CF if= total weighted average conversion factor for local sales of commodity 
i, for foreign firms· ~ ' 
XS = total domestic currency obtained by foreign firms from conversion of 
export revenue; 
LC = total local costs paid by the foreign firms; 
LS = total local sales by the foreign firms; 
BPi = border price of commodity i; 
DP if= domestic price of commodity i, received by the foreign firms from 
their local sales. 
A weighted average conversion factor for local sales of commodities by the 
foreign firms is calculated by using equation 8.28. In the case study, this weighted 
average conversion factor for foreign firms will be employed as the base case. The 
effects on the gross benefits to China of applying the official exchange rate or the 
shadow exchange rate to foreign firrns will be treated 'ln sensitivity analysis. 
8.6 Net benefits from local firms: the domestic investment model 
Besides the net benefits generated from the foreign firms, Ch\na also benefits from 
the operations of locally owned firms in the Huli zone. Unlike the case for foreign 
firms all the economic transactions of the domestic firms operating in the zone are 
' 
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releva11t in a cos·l'.-benefit analysis of the zone H th d b fi 
. owever, e cost an ene t 
components of domestic investment are very different from the foreign investment 
model. 
It is important to point out that part of benefits and costs generated from 
domestic investment are simply transfer payments among local entrepreneurs, local 
workers and various local authorities. For example, taxes paid by the domestic firms 
in the zone is a transfer payment from local entrepreneurs to the local financial 
authority. Similarly, government subsidies for the use of utilities in the Huli zone is 
a transfer payment from government to local entrepreneurs, and the difference 
between the market wage rate of unskilled labour and the opportunity cost of this 
labour is a transfer payment from local entrepreneurs to local workers. None of 
these considered as costs or benefits for China. 
Total benefits from domestic investment are simply the total economic value 
of the output of the domestic partners in joint ventures and co-operative enterprises 
in the zone. On the other hand, the total costs to China from the operation of local 
firms are the opportunity cost of production inputs and the costs of construction and 
administration of the Huli zone for domestic investment. Thus, the net benefits from 
domestic investment in the Huli zone are: 
* e * w * M rp* 
Q * ( L uw * + LnsWs + Un Pe + Un Pw + D r + NBnt = n - n u 
where 
(8.29) 
b 
+- f China from domestic investment in the Huli zone at 
NBnt = net eneJJt o 
year t; d · 
. t f output of local firms in the zone measure m Qo * = opportumty cos o 
border prices in year t; 
174 
Lo uw u * • opportunity cost of unskilled labour of local finns measured in 
border prices in year t; 
Losw s * = oppilrtunity cost of skilled labour of local finns measured in 
border prices in year t; 
Un ep e * = opportunity cost of electricity of local firms measured in border 
prices in year t; 
Un wp w * = opportunity cost of water Qf local finns measured in border prices 
in year t; 
MorPr * ==opportunity cost of raw materials inputs of local finns measured in 
border prices in year t; 
Mokpk * • opportunity cost of capital goods foputs of local firms measured in 
border prices in year t; 
KnSk = opportunity cost of government investment in construction for the 
local firms measured in border prices in year t; 
AoFc s =opportunity cost of administration of local firms measured in border 
prices in year t. 
8.7 Net bentfit for China from establishing the Huli zone 
The net benefit for China from establishing the Huli zone is the sum of net benefit 
from foreign investment and the domestic investment. That is: 
NBt s: net benefits for China from establishing the Huli zone in year t; 
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Luw u * =opportunity cost of tot.:11 unskilled labour input measured in border 
prices in the Huli zone; 
Lsw * s ::;:; opportunity cost of total skilled 1abour input measured in border 
prices in the Huli zone; 
uep e * = opportunity cost of total electricity used in the Huli zone, measured 
in border prices; 
uwpw * = opportunity cost of total: water used in the Huli zone, measured in 
border prices; 
MrPr * == opportunity cost of total raw materials input in 'the Huli zone, 
measured in border prices; 
Mkpk * = opportunity cost of total capital goods input in the Hull zone, 
measured in border prices; 
KSk = opportunity cost of total constru.ction investment of the Huli zone, 
measured in border prices; 
AF cs = opportunity cost of total administration of the Huli .zone, measured in 
border prices. 
"The present value of the net benefits to China from the zone is then calculated 
by discounting these net benefits over the life of the zone. Appendix tables A8.1 and 
A8.2 summarized the finatlcial data for foreign firms and local firms in the Huli zone 
during 1981-88. 
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Appendix Table AB.1 Summany financial data for foreign owned firmsa in the Hull zone (1980 constant prices, million yuan) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Revenue: 
Total exports 0.38 0.16 3.69 6.46 
Local sale 2.33 31.19 39.82 53.59 
Reported profits of firms 0.02 0.26 0.14 5.70 
Costs: 
Total imports 4.18 25.22 18.45 35.60 
Local purchases of: 
Raw materials 0.03 19.69 8.61 15.05 
Capital goods 0.32 0.59 1.66 
..... Electricity 0.11 0.26 0.33 0.39 0.50 0.87 
-J Water 0.04 0.05 0.'.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.12 
0.12 
-J 
Rent 0:,17 0.63 
1.20 1.45 
Building purchased 3.56 2.51 0.15 1.17 2.95 
Total official truces 0.11 0.17 4.49 13.18 13.74 13~74 
Total wage bills: 
Unskilled 0.21 0.60 1.14 1.51 
Skilled 0.11 0.31 0.59 0.66 
Domestic borrowing 6.87 
" 
Note: Includes foreign partners in joint ventures and co-operative enterprlses. 
Source: Fieldwork survey, 1988. 
Appendix Table AS.2 Summany of financial data for domestic flrmsa in the Hull zone (1980 constant prices, million yuan) 
1981 . 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Revenue: 
Total exports 0.92 0.38 9.55 16.61 
Lccal sale 6.00 80.20 102.38 137.80 
Reported profits of the firms 0.04 1.12 0.33 18.29 
Costs: 
Total imports 10.84 74.02 47.36 91.50 
Local purchased: 
Raw materials 0.06 50.64 22.13 38.69 
Capital goods 0.82 1.50 4.27 
Electricity 0.30 0.66 0.84 1.01 1.28 2.23 2.23 
I-' Water 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.27 0.25 0.32 0.27 
-.] 
co Rent 0.45 1.61 3.10 
3.74 
Building purchased 9.15 6.44 0.37 3.02 7.59 
Total official truces 0.39 0.62 16.88 49.60 51.71 28.42, 
Domestic borrowing 17.67 
Total wage bills: 
Unskilled 0.61 1.72 3.26 4.29 
Skilled 0.32 0.89 1.68 1.88 
Government: 
construction costsb 2.44 10.62 28.99 103.61 91.39 19.43 22.55 6.51 
Notes: a Includes domestic partners in joint ventures and co-operative enterprises; b Total government construction costs of the Hull zone. 
Source: Fieldwork survey, 1988. 
Chapter 9 
Economic Evaluation of the Huli Zone 
Hull zone was obviously established at considerable cost. Large investments in 
public infrastructure and the extent to which the government has subsidised utility 
prices, must raise the question of whether this investment has been worthwhile. 
9.1 Simplifying assumptions and data about the case study 
Some simplifying assumptions are made to undertake the evaluation of the Huli 
zone. Some of these are later relaxed in the sensitivity analysis. It is assumed that 
construction costs ceased in 1989 and that 10 per cent of the total construction costs 
of 1989 will continue as on-going maintenance costs. Administrative costs and the 
firms' operation costs are assumed to remain at the level of 1987. 
The share of port construction costs and benefits for the Huii zone are 
estimated from economic analysis of the Xiamen port project in the Appendix Table 
A9:I (World Bank Project Report No.7296, 1988). The percentage of 6.75 per cent, 
as Huli's contribution to total port construction costs, is derived from the ratio of 
total imports and exports of Huli zone to those of the Xiamen special economic zone 
from 1984-87. The share of airport construction costs and benefits which could be 
attributed to the Huli zone are omitted because of data difficulties~ But this omission 
will bias downwards the infrastructure costs of the zone. 
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Total foreign borrowing from domestic banks of 6.87 million yuan up to 1988 
are assumed to be equally distributed over the years 1984-88. Interest and principal 
repayments are calculated on a 10 year term at an interest rate of 6 per cent per year. 1 
The conversion factors of skilled and unskilled labour, capital, electricity, 
water and the standard conversion factor are those calculated in chapter 3 to chapter 
7. based on the first part of this study. They are summarized in Table 9 .1. 
Table 9.1 Conversion factors applied in the case study 
Conversion factors 
Standard conversion factor 
Raw materials 
Capital goods inputs 
Electricity 
Water 
Unskilled labour 
Skilled labour 
Capital investment 
Official exchange rate 
Secondary exchange rate 
Socitl discount rate 
CF if 
Notes: 
a data for 1990; 
b calculated from Table A8.1 by using equation 8.28 
0.69 
0.70 
0.59 
l.44 
1.36 
0.83 
3.70 
4.00 
4.73 
5.83 
9.00 
0.79 
The time horizon for project life will alter the rate of return. A project life of 
25 is used in the 'base case' by assuming that assets in the zone such as factory 
buildings, infrastructure etc will cease operation at the end of year 2005. However, 
. l'c f 30 to 50 years is chosen for sensitivity analysis. the project 11e o . 
d. t the 'Report on the adjustment of interest on deposits and loans 1. Accor mg o 
k' D mber 1982 the interest rate on loans to foreign joint of the People's Ban , ece , 
the interest rates for domestic industrial enterprises. 
ventures are the same as 
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9.2 Results of the Cost-Benefit analysis 
Appendix Table A9 2 pr · d th 
· ovi es I! aggregated economic analysis of t~e Huli project. 
The negative net present val ( 290 2 ue - · 1) at 9 per cent social discount rate and a low 
economic rate of return f 3 77 . . o · per cent, mdicate that the Huli project is not 
economically viable Eve ·th 50 . · _, n WI a year operatmg horizon, the net present value is 
still negative and the economic rate of return (6.73 per cent) is still lower than the 9 
per cent social discount rate estimated to be appropriate for China (Chapter 5). 
Table 9.2 Cbomposition of net present value of costs and benefits of the Huli zone· 
ase case (1980 constant prices, million yuan) · 
Total 
PY benefits 945.39 
PV costs -1235.60 
NPV -290.21 
ERR(%) 
25 years 3.77 
30 years 5.11 
40 years 6.28 
50 years 6.73 
Foreign 
investment 
196.45 
-358.58 
-162.13 
0 
0 
1.17 
2.06 
Domestic 
investment 
748.94 
-882.28 
, 
-133.34 
5.78 
6.92 
7.89 
8.24 
Notes: Present value (PV); Net present value (NPV); Economic rate of return (ERR). 
Sources: See Appendix Tables A9.2, A9.3 and A9.4 
However, the economic performance of the domestic investment is better than 
the performance of the foreign investment. Appendix Tables A9.3 and A9.4 show 
the economic analysis of foreign firms and domestic firms in the Huli zone 
respectively. The economic rate of return of the foreign firms as summarized in 
Table 9 .2 is lower than that of the domestic firms. The poor performance of foreign 
firms in the zone is caused by the opportunit~; costs of labour particularly scarce 
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skilled labour and inte edi . 
rm ate mputs, local capital, and factory buildings used by 
the foreign investment outweighing their market prices. 
Table 9.3 shows the c · · f ompos1uon o net present value of costs and benefits of 
the foreign investment in th H 1. e u t zone. Some unusual features must be stressed. 
An unusually high (8.82) local raw material input contributes to total net present 
value. These are primarily the result of the low opportunity costs of local 
intermediate inputs. 
Table 9.3 Composition of net present value of costs and benefits of the foreign 
. firms: base case (1980 constant prices, million yuan at border prices) 
PY 
benefits 
Capital goods 7.44 
Port charges 7.17 
Raw materials 77.63 
Unskilled 7.33 
Water 0.76 
Electricity 4.52 
Skilled 3.28 
Domestic borrowing 3.05 
Building purchased 5.03 
Rents 6.39 
Official taxes 73.86 
Total 196.45 
PY 
costs 
-5.56 
-3.54 
-68.81 
-7.68 
-1.30 
-6.02 
-15.36 
-16.46 
-233.853 
-358.58 
NPY 
1.88 
3.63 
8.82 
-0.35 
-0.54 
-1.50 
-12.08 
-13.41 
-148.57b 
-162.13 
Notes: Present valub (PY); Net present value (NPY); 3 construction and 
administrative costs; benefits including building purchased, rents and official 
taxes. 
Benefits generated from total unskilled labour employed by the foreign firms 
are offset by the loss of China on the employment of skilled labour by the foreign 
firms. Because of under pricing of skilled labour, employment of skilled labour by 
the foreign investors generates a net social cost (-15.36) for China. These costs 
outweigh the social benefits (3.28) generated from the employment of unskilled 
labour in the zone. 
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The negative net present value of electricity and water supplies imply that a 
social t · cos is generated from government subsidization of electricity 3.1}.d water usage 
of the foreign firms in the Huli zone. 
Social costs generated fro d . · bo . 
· m omestic rrowmg are large enough to outweigh 
the sum of benefits derived from local raw materials and local capital goods 
purchased by the foreign firms in the Huli zone. 
9.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Appendix Table A9.5 summarizes the sensitivity analysis of economic rates of return 
and net present values of the Huli zone with various assumptions being implicit in 
six case scenarios viz: 
Case 1, it is assumed that foreign firms operating in the zone are all getting 
tariff inclusive prices from their local sales. In this case the economic rate of return 
of the Huli zone drops to only 3.27 per cent in the 25 years of project life time·and 
has a negative net present value of 315.08 million yuan at border prices. 
Case 2, the net economic benefits from the zone were calculated as if there 
was a 20 per cent increase in local raw materials and capital goods inputs usage by 
the.foreign firms in the zone. This raised me economic rate of return to 4.10 per cent. 
Case 3. Inefficient utilization of capital such as factory buildings was evident 
in the early operating years. In Case 3, the net benefits from the Huli zone are 
calculated as if total infrastructural costs were reduced by 20 per cent in the first 7 
years, but in the 8th year, full infrastructural costs were assumed. -This will increase 
the net benefits for the Huli zone. The economic rate of return rises to 4.3 per cent. 
Since capital is very costly, allowing export processing zone firms to borrow 
from local markets, generates substantial social costs for China. In the sensitivity 
analysis case 4, the net benefits from the Huli zone are calculated as if foreign finns 
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are prohibited from borrowing in the domestic market with no subsidies from 
utilities. The economic rate of return would rise to 4.43 per ce~t in this case. 
However, the economic rate of return of the Huli zone is still significantly lower than 
the social discount rate of 9 per cent. Even after 50 years of operation without 
domestic borrowing, and government subsidies in utilities, the net present value of 
the zone is still as high as negative 147.12 million yuan at border prices, and the 
,economic rate of return is only 7 .22 per cent. 
In case 5, all the foreign firms operating in the Huli zce are assumed to 
receive tariff exclusive prices from their local sales. This improves the economic 
rates of return to 4.78 per cent, if the zone is assumed to operate for 25 years. 
However, the economic rate of the zone is still well below the 9 per cent social 
discount rate in China even after 50 years of operation. Hence, none of these 
scenarios significantly improve the economic performance of the Huli zone. 
A better design for the Huli zone under the present trade and economic regime 
would undoubtedly be less capital intensive. If total government construction costs 
could be reduced by 10 per cent (case 6), the economic efficiency of the Huli project 
would be slightly better than the previous cases, with the economic rate of return 
risi.ng to 4.89 per cent over a 25 year project 
However, even in case 7, if the total costs of the zone could be reduced 20 per 
cent, while the total benefits are kept at the same level, the Huli project would still 
not be economically viable. Only after 30 years of operation would the Huli project 
have 9.05 per cent of the economic rate ofretum which is closet~ _the social discount 
rate in China. 
To improve the economic viability of the Huli project, case 8 shows that the 
Id ed to reduce 20 per cent total construction cost and at the same government wou ne 
time, prohibit domestic borrowing and utilities subsidies. The Huli project will then 
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be economically viable after 25 years of operation with an economic rate of return of 
8.74 rising to 9.64 at 30 years. 
The above sensitivity studies overlook the fact that benefits generated from 
infrastructural costs will persist in the future. Case 9 took this into consideration. 
The net benefits from the Huli zone are calculated as if total output will increase at a 
rate of 5 per cent per year from 1989, while the total costs are kept at the same level. 
The Huli project will be economically viable after 25 years of operation with an 
economic rate of return of 8.8 per cent. 
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Appendix Table A9 1 Costs d b ti • ( ·ir · an _ene .•ts of the X1amen port project 1989-2011 
nu mn yuan at econonuc pnce) 
Total costs Total benefits 
Year Huli Foreign Domestic Huli Foreign Domestic 
1989 3.38 0.95 2.43 1990 5.30 1.48 3.82 1991 10.02 2.81 7.21 1992 5.30 1.48 3.82 3.70 1.04 2.66 1993 0.91 0.25 0.66 9.34 2.62 6.72 1994 0.91 0.25 0.66 10.34 2.90 7.44 1995 2.26 0.63 1.63 11.41 3.19 8.22 1996 0.98 0.27 0.71 11.67 3.27 8.40 1997 0.98 0.27 0.71 11.94 3.34 8.60 
1998 0.98 0.27 0.71 12.20 3.42 8.78 
1999 0.98 0.27 0.71 12.46 3.49 8.97 
2000 0.98 0.27 0.71 12.72 3.56 9.16 
2001 0.98 0.27 0.71 12.72 3.56 9.16 
2002 1.10 0.31 0.79 12.72 3.56 9.16 
2003 1.43 0.40 1.03 12.72 3.56 9.16 
2004 1.43 0.40 1.03 12.72 3.56 9.16 
2005 1.43 0.40 1.03 12.72 3.56 6.16 
2006 1.43 0.40 1.03 12.72 3.56 6.16 
2007 1.43 0.40 1.03 12.72 3.56 6.16 
2008 1.43 0.40 1.03 12.72 3.56 6.16 
2009 1.43 0.40 1:03 12.72 3.56 6.16 
2010 1.43 0.40 1.03 12.72 3.56 6.16 
2011 1.43 0.40 1.03 12.72 3.56 6.16 
NPV 
Notes: Total port costs and benefits components of Huli is calculated from 6.75 per 
cent of the Xiamen port project. 
So~rce: World Bank Staff Appraisal Report 1988, N0.7296-CHA, World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
Appendix Table A9.2 Economic analysis of the Huli zone: base case (1980 constant prices, million yuan at border price) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ... 2015 
Total benefits 0.03 0.21 0.40 12.43 93.26 109.32 150.88 152.64 150.47 150.47 
Output (D) 5.47 63.66 88.42 121.98 121.98 121.98 121.98 
Unskilled (F) 0.17 0.47 0.90 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 
Skilled (F) 0.09 0.24 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Raw materials (F) 0.02 15.56 6.80 11.89 11.89 11.89 11.89 
Machinery (F) 0.25 0.47 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.31 
Electricity (F) 0.09 0.21 0.26 0.31 0.40 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Water (F) 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Rents (F) 0.13 0.50 0.95 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Building purchased (F) 2.81 1.98 0.12 0.92 2.33 
....... Interest and principal (F) 0.16 0.32 0.47 0.63 0.79 0.79 
00 Taxes (F) 0.09 0.13 3.55 10.41 10.85 10.85 10.85 10.85 10.85 
""1 
Port charges (F)a 
Total costs -10.40 -45.29 -123.02 -443.49 -446.74 -124.63 -160.25 -91.40 -65.86 -67.78 
Opportunity cost of: 
unskilled (T) -0.68 -1.93 -3.65 -4.81 -4.81 -4.81 -4.81 
skilled (T) -1.59 -4.44 -8.40 ~9.40 -9.40 -9.40 -9.40 
raw materials (T) -0.06 -49.23 -21.52 -37.62 -37.62 -37.62 37.62 
machinery (T) -0.67 -1.23 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 
electricity (T) -0.59 -1.32 -1.68 -2.02 -2.56 -4.46 -2.81 -2.81 -2.81 
water (T) -0.20 -0.26 -0.37 -0.39 -0.50 -0.48 -0.60 -0.52 -0.52 -0.52 
construction (T) -9.76 -42.48 -115.96 -414.44 -365.56 -77.72 -90.20 -26.04 -2.60 -2.60 
administration (T) -0.44 -1.96 -5.37 -19.17 -16.91 -3.59 -4.18 -1.22 -1.22 
port (T)a -3.38 
Net cash flow -10.37 -45.08 -122.62 -431.06 -353.48 -15.31 -9.37 61.24 84.61 82.69 
Continued 
Project life 25 years 30 years 40 years 50years 
Discount rate 9 9 9 9 
PV benefits 945.39 1014.17 1086.77 1117.35 
PV costs -1235.60 -1264.43 -1294.75 -1307.51 
NPV net cash flow -290.21 -250.25 -207.98 -190.16 
IRR 3.77 5.11 6.28 6.73 
Notes: Domestic investment (D); Foreign investment (F); total of Huli zone (S); Present value (PV); Net present value (NPV); Internal 
rate ofreturn (IRR); a See Table 9.1. 
Table A9.3 Economic analysis of foreign investment in the Huli zone (1980 constant prices, million yuan at border price) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 •.• 2015 
Total benefits 0.03 0.21 0.40 6.96 29.60 20.90 28.90 30.66 28.49 28.49 
Unskilled 0.17 0.47 0.90 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 
Skilled 0.09 0.24 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Raw materials 0.02 15.56 6.80 11.89 11.89 11.89 11.89 
Machinery 0.25 0.47 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.31 
Electricity 0.09 0.21 0.26 0.31 0.40 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Water 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Rents 0.13 0.50 0.95 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Building purchased 2.81 1.98 0.12 0.92 2.33 
-
Interest and principal 0.16 0.32 0.47 0.63 0.79 0.79 
(X) Taxes 0.09 0.13 3.55 10.41 10.85 10.85 10.85 10.85 10.85 co 
Port chargesa 
Total costs -2.90 -12.67 -34.45 -133.45 -128.89 -38.61 -48.53 -29.27 -17.87 -18.40 
Opportunity cost of: 
unskilled -0.17 -0.50 -0.95 -1.25 -1.25 -1.25 -1.25 
skilled -0.41 -1.15 -2.18 -2.44 -2.44 -2.44 -2.44 
raw materials -0.02 -13.78 -6.03 -10.54 -10.54 -10.54 -10.54 
machinery -0.19 -0.35 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98 -0.9& 
electricity -0.16 -0.37 -0.48 -0.56 -0.72 -1.25 -0.79 -0.79 -0.79 
water -0.05 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 
construction -2.73 -11.89 -32.47 -116.04 -102.36 -21.76 -25.26 -7.29 -0.73 -0.73 
administration -0.12 -0.55 -0.15 -10.74 -4.73 -1.00 -1.17 -0.34 -0.03 -0.03 
po~ -0.95 
Net cash flow -2.87 -12.46 -34.05 -126.49 -99.29 -17.71 -19.63 1.39 10.62 10.09 
.....,.. ___________________ ~ ~------------~-"------------~--
Continue 
Project life 25 years 30 years 40years 50years 
Discount rate 9 
PV benefits 196.45 228.84210.21 223.80 229.46 
PV costs -358.58 -366.39 -374.61 -378.06 
NPV net cash flow -162.13 -156.18 -150.80 -148.60 
IRR 0 0 1.17 2.06 
Notes: Present value (PV); Net present value (NPV); Internal rate of return (IRR); a See Table 9.1. 
...--~-~---------------~-~------------ ------~-------··-·-- --- ---~---
Appendix Table A9.4 Economic analysis of domestic investment in the Huli zone (1980 constant prices, million yuan at border price) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 ... 2015 
Total output 5.47 63.66 88.42 121.98 121.98 121.98 121.98 
Unskilled labour -0.51 -1.43 -2.71 -3.56 -3.56 -3.56 -3.56 
Skilled labour -1.18 -3.29 -6.22 -6.96 -6.96 -6.96 -6.96 
Electricity -0.43 -0.95 -1.21 -1.45 -1.84 -3.21 -3.21 -3.21 -3.21 
Water -0.15 -0.19 -0.26 -0.29 -0.37 -0.34 -0.44 -0.44 -0.44 -0.44 
Raw materials -0.04 -35.45 -15.49 -27.08 -27.08 -27.08 -27.08 
Machinary -0.48 -0.89 -2.52 -2.52 -2.52 -2.52 
Construction -7.03 -30.59 -83.49 -298.40 -263.20 -55.96 -64.94 -18.75 -1.88 -1.88 
,..... Adminstrative -0.33 -1.41 -3.86 -13.80 -12.17 -2.59 -3.00 -0.87 -0.09 -0.09 
CD Port chargesa -2.43 -3.82 ,..... 
Total costs -7.51 -32.62 -88.56 -315.43 -317.84 -86.04 -111.71 -63.39 -48.17 -49.56 
Net cash flow -7.51 -32.62 -88.56 -309.96 -254.18 2.38 10.27 58.59 73.81 72.42 
Project life 25 years 30 years 40 years 50 years 
Discount rate 9 
PV benefits 748.94 803.96 862.96 887.89 
PV costs -882.28 -903.37 -925.57 -934.91 
NPV -133.34 -99.41 -62.61 -47.03 
IRR 5.78 6.92 7.89 8.24 
Notes: Present value (PV); Net present value (NPV); Internal rate of return (IRR); a See Table 9.1. 
,_. 
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Appendix Table A9.5 Summary of sensitivity analysis (1980 constant prices, million yuan at border price) 
Case (1) Case (2) Case! (3) Case (4) Case (5) Case (6) Case (7) Case (8) Case (9) 
PV benefit 920.52 962.40 945.39 942.34 997.61 945.39 945.39 942.34 1219.10 
PV costs -1235.60 -1235.60 -1166.40 -1193.30 -1235.60 -1157.06 -988.48 -954.64 -1235.60 
NPV -315.08 -273.20 -221.01 -250.96 -237.99 -211.68 -43.09 -12.30 -16.50 
ERR(%) 
25 years 3.27 4.10 4.30 4.43 4.78 4.89 8.10 8.74 8.78 
30 years 4.66 5.41 5.72 5.71 6.02 6.12 9.05 9.64 10.29 
40 years 5.90 6.55 6.91 6.81 7.08 7.17 9.79 10.33 11.63 
50 years 6.38 6.98 7.34 7.22 7.47 7.55 10.03 10.54 12.14 
Notes: 
Case (1) =tariff inclusive prices of local sales; 
Case (2) = 20% increased in local raw materials and capital goods inputs; 
Case (3) = 20% infrastructural cost reduced in the first 7 years, but in the 8th year, full infrastructural costs were assumed; 
Case (4) =without domestic borrowing and subsidies in utilities; 
Case (5) = tariff exclusive prices of local sales; 
Case (6) = 10% reduced in government total construction costs; 
Case (7) = 20% reduced in total costs including administrative cost; 
Case (8) = 20% reduced in total costs including administrative cost and without domestic borrowing and subsidies in utilities prices. 
Case (9) =total output in~eased at 5% from 1989, while kept total costs at the same level. 
Chapter 10 
Summary and Conclusions 
Special economic zones are an important element of China's open-door policy. They 
constitute both a physical and policy enclave which permits outward orientation and 
export-promotion policies to be explored without changing the trade regime and 
structure of protection applicable to the industrial sector as a whole. 
The Chinese government expected that by granting preferences to foreign 
investors, the special economic zones would develop economic and technological co-
operation with other countries, make the best use of their geographical advantages, 
attract large amounts of foreign investment, import advanced technology, develop 
modern industrial and agricultural production, expand exports, and increase foreign 
exchange earnings. 
The nature of the special economic zones made it inevitable that some of the 
objectives set by the Chinese government could not be achieved. In fact, the only 
real economic logic justifying the establishment of the special economic zones is to 
offset some of the domestic policies which impede foreign direct investment, hamper 
export development and prevent China from turning its comparative advantage into a 
competitive advantage. The special economic zones can not create comparative 
advantage. They can only help remove obstacles to its exploitati<:>n_ (Wall 1988). 
The expected advance technology transfer from foreign firms entering special 
economic zones is in conflict with China's factor endowment. Like most of the 
export processing zones in other Asian countries, many of the firms operating in the 
Huli zone are involved in labour intensive production and have very little 
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technological knowledge. Those firms which do have unique technological 
advantages protect their knowledge carefully. The expected techn.ology transfer 
from foreign firms entering zones is not realistic. It has not occurred to a significant 
extent. 
Development of special economic zones also cannot be expected to cause a 
gradual liberalization of the entire economy. In a restrictive and controlled regime, 
the enclave nature of the export processing zone policies are likely to become more 
entrenched rather than diffused (Wall, 1988). China can utilise the full potential of 
the special economic zones and benefit from the externalities that they generate only 
when the overall economic environment is also being liberalised. In the case where 
the present domestic policy framework is to be maintained, the special economic 
zones might be expected to yield only marginal gains for the Chinese economy. 
10.1 Shadow prices of capital and labour and their policy implications for China 
The literature on shadow price and cost-benefit analysis in China is limited. Interest 
has largely been confined to the theory of planning techniques and investment 
choice, such as the law of value, least-cost methods, linear programming, cost of 
foreign exchange earnings and other concerns of socialist economies. Thus, efforts 
at economic reform have not led to new investment criteria in the 1980s. 
The concept of shadow prices and the application of cost-benefit analysis to 
public investment projects was introduced into China soon after the adoption of the 
d 1. The State Planning Commission (1987) published guide-lines to open oor po icy. . . 
the application of cost-benefit analysis in China. However, there has been little or no 
application of shadow prices in planning. 
Through its project funding, the World Bank has been the principal 
contributor to cost-benefit evaluation in China. Ichishima and Wood (1982) reported 
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the earliest example of cost-benefit analysis in China. Since then, World Bank Staff 
Appraisal Reports have contributed ~o project analysis and hence the. estimation of 
ranges of commodity conversion fact~rs. Appendices A, B, C, D and E contain some 
of the commodity conversion factors and shadow prices of labour applied in the. 
evaluation of World Banlc projects. However, only a few studies have been directly 
concerned with the estimation of shadow prices in China. 
Calculating shadow prices for China is challenging. The country's large size 
results in great differences between regions. Quantity rationing in domestic markets 
and in international trade (imports and exports) makes it difficult to estimate 
conversion factors. A multi-price system (including quotas, planned, negotiated and 
free market prices) and the lack of information of their relative importance make the 
choice of domestic prices difficult. Recognizing these difficulties and encouraged by 
an increasing demand for project appraisal for China, the World Bank developed a 
simple computer model for the estimation of socio-economic conversion factors. for 
project evaluation in China in June 1988. The model provides a framework within 
which a user can adjust data and assumptions and take project-specific information 
into account (World Bank 1988). 
Table 10.1 summarizes the conversion factors derived from the World Bank 
model and compares them with those estimated in the present. study. 
(a} Conversion factors for traded and non-traded commodities. Standard 
conversion factor used by the World Bank are simply derived from the official 
exchange rate and the internal settlement rate. By using the trade data approach in 
addition to deriving the ratio from the official exchange rate and the secondary 
market exchange rates from October 1988 to September 1990, the value of the 
standard conversion factors derived in this study are very close to the estimation 
from the World Bank. They are 0.69 and 0.67 respectively (chapter 3). 
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Table 10.1 Summary of the . mam results of the conversion factors for China 
Subsector World Present 
conversion factor 
Bank Pr·~sent study 
study study range 
General CF 
Standard CF 0.67 0.69 
Consumption goods 0.64-0.88 
Intermediate goods 
0.79 0.74-0.89 
Capital goods 
0.70 0.65-0.89 
0.59 0.53-0.84 
Non-traded goods 
Construction 1.30 1.45 1.02-1.45 
Electricity 3.40 1.44 0.91-1.44 
Freight transport 1.50 1.09 0.81-1.09 
Passenger transport 0.90 1.17 0.78-1.17 
Commerce 1.30 1.20-1.30 
Services 0.75 0.71-0.75 
Water 1.36 
Capital 4.0 
Social discount 
rate (Ri) 10-12% 9% 8.6-9.4% 
Labour 
Unskilled 0.5-0.6 0.83 
Skilled 2.0-4.0 3.7 
Sources: World Bank 1988, 'Economic prices for project evaluation in China', China 
Department, Report No.7365-CHA, Country Operations Division China 
Department, Washington D.C. ' 
For non-traded goods conversion factors, tb World Bank model mainly used 
component inputs in ronstruction (steel, timber, cement, wages, 
management/design), electricity (marginal productivity and actual industrial price 
per kilowatt hour), and railway transportation (wages, materials, diesel, coal, 
electricity, depreciation and other) to derive conversion factors. . -
In the present study, non-traded goods conversion factors are derived from 
input-output tables by using traded goods conversion factors which are derived by 
trade data and price comparison methods. By using the input-output table, non-
traded goods are broken down into traded inputs and primary factor inputs. The 
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conversion factors for non-traded goods derived in this way are more accurate than 
existing figures derived from the World Bank model. 
(b) Conversion factors of labour. In the World Bank model, the conversion 
factor of 0.57 for unskilled labour is derived from the estimated marginal 
productivity of labour in the agricultural sector and adjusted urban non-enterprise 
overheads. A conversion factor of 2.0 for skilled labour is derived from the cash 
wage of engineers and the estimated marginal productivity of engineers. 
The formulae for the shadow price of unskilled and skilled labour were 
derived in equations 6.13 and 6.16 and have several advantages compared to the 
traditional formula and World Bank practice. This includes the excess migration 
effect in the unskilled labour equation which is a common phenomenon in 
developing countries. The sub-optimum saving argument and the income 
distribution effects are both incorporated in equations 6.13 and 6.16. The equations 
reflect both growth and equity objectives. 
Equations 6.13 and 6.16 distinguish between changes in private savings and 
consumption, so that the effect of government valuation of consumption versus 
investment has been taken into account. 
The conversion factors for skilled and unskilled labour in the present study are 
mainly based on data from the Xiamen zone. The conversion factor for skilled 
labour of 3.7 is a weighted average conversion factor which takes into consideration 
the different sources of skilled labour in the Xiamen zone. Project specification 
conversion factors for skilled and unskilled labour are more ·appropriate than a 
national average for this study· 
Shadow price of Capital. The World Bank did not estimate the shadow price 
of capital for China. The ten to twelve per cent social discount rate used in most of 
· al · ·mply a value J"udgement. No detailed analysis is available. the apprats papers ts st 
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In this study efforts have b ad . . 
• een m e to estimate the margmal productivity of capital 
for independent accounting units within state industri~s. A social discount rate has 
also been estimated, and both have been incorpo~ated into the calculation of 
conversion factors for China. 
The study of the shadow prices of traded and non-traded commodities 
suggests that the failure of the market mechanism results in a serious divergence of 
market prices from shadow prices of commodities. The over-valuation of the 
Chinese currency and distorted domestic prices cast doubt on the comparative 
advantage of China "revealed" by present patterns of trade and production. 
The study of the shadow prices of capital and labour in Chapters 5 and 6 
shows that capital is too cheap and unskilled labour is too costly in China. Given its 
factor endowment, China needs to encourage the use of more labour intensive 
techniques by pricing its labour and capital at its opportunity cost. In practice, 
distortions in capital and labour markets encourage a strong tendency to favour the 
most advanced, capital intensive technologies. These distortions have created high 
costs for the Chinese economy. In the establishment of special economic zones, 
over-pricing of unskilled labour is a disincentive to foreign investment and hinders 
the .exploitation of China's other comparative advantages. 
10.2 Summary of the case study 
The case study shows that the Huli project is not economic viable, unless the 
externalities generated from technology transfer and managerial skill transfer are 
significant. The limited benefits generated by the Huli zone have been extremely 
costly to achieve. The infrastructural costs of establishing special enclaves is very 
high. Moreover, to attract foreign firms into the zone, the Chinese government has 
allowed zone firms access to the local (distorted) capital market and subsidized the 
use of public utilities, adding to the social costs for the Chinese economy. 
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Intuitively, the Huli zone has contributed to the employment of skilled and 
unskilled labour. But economic analysis suggests that the real effects of these 
employments c11 the gross benefits of China are negative. Because of under pricing 
of skilled workers, employment of skilled workers by foreign investors generates a 
net social cost to China. The social benefits of China generated from employment of 
unskilled workers by the foreign firms in the zone are off set by the social costs 
generated from foreign currency conversion by the firms to pay wage bills. 
The use of local raw materials and capital goods inputs builds up commercial 
contacts between export processing zone firms and domestic firms. However, the 
expected technology transfer and the backward linkage effects, initially sought by 
China, do not appear to have occurred. The substantial gains from the use of 
domestic raw materials and C8.pital goods inputs mainly arise from the over-valuation 
of the Chinese currency and distortions of domestic prices. 
In the Huli zovc, China permits duty-free imports of raw materials ·and 
intermediate goods inputs and gives some other preferential customs treatment. 
However, these alone, though necessary to exporting, do not attract foreign investors. 
Stable policy towards foreign investment, minimal bureaucratic red tape including 
simplified customs procedures, flexible labour administration policies and lower 
labour costs are also very important, for they are also necessary to profitable 
exporting. 
Most of the instruments applied in the export processing zone to attract 
foreign investment could also be applied outside the zones. Sui:;h investment could 
achieve much the same benefits, but it would avoid the huge construction costs of the 
· e It is the policy treatment of firms which is crucial to attract export processmg zon . 
c 1·1 is not necessary for the firms to be physically foreign investors. There1ore, 
collected together in a zone. 
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Lower capital intensity would improve the present design of the Huli zone. 
The Huli zone could only be economically efficient if its total construction costs and 
subsidies given to utilities could be reduced, if domestic borrowing could be ended 
and local raw materials and capital goods inputs could be increased. 
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Appendix A 
World Bank conversion factors for industrial projec~ 
Table Al. Shanghai machine tool project: conversion factors 
Cost component 
Wages and salaries 
Unskilled labour 
Skilled labour 
Technical and engineering staff 
Managerial and administrative staff 
Capital costs 
Construction work 
Local machinery - for foundries 
Local machinery - for other plants 
Production materials 
Foundry raw materials 
Foundry binders 
Steel castings, plate, 
shapes & forgings 
Iron castings 
Electric equipment & motors 
Electronics 
Pumps and bearings 
Other components 
Consumables 
Energy 
Electricity 
Fuel oil 
Gas 
Coke 
Overheads 
Maintenance 
Other overheads 
Conversion factors 
0.56 
1.11 
4.00 
1.11 
1.08 
1.15 
1.34 
1.12 
0.76 
1.17 
1.14 
1.10 
1.00 
1.27 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.80 
1.00 
1.56 
1.20 
1.00 
W Id Bank Staff Appraisal Paper Report No. 5994-cHA: 1987. Source: or 
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Tabl.e A2. Changcun (Luan) coal mining project: conversion factors 
Cost component 
Unskilled labour 
Skilled labour 
Managerial/administrative labour 
Electricity 
Transport 
Lubricants 
Timber 
Steel 
Local machinery 
Construction works 
Conversion factors 
0.50 
4.00 
1.00 
1.50 
2.20 
0.54 
2.15 
1.13 
1.34 
1.08 
Source: World Bank Staff Appraisal Paper Report No. 5127-CHA. 1985. 
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AppendixB 
World Bank conversion factors for port projects 
Table B 1. Huangpu port project: conversion factors for wharf construction 
Cost component 
Unskilled labOur 
Technical labor 
Steel 
Civil works: 
Main wharf construction 
Barge quay construction 
Djke 
Dredging and reclamation, quay 
Roaclways and yards in port 
Railway in port 
Power supply in port 
Water supply and d1~inage 
Sewage treatment plant 
Automatic control and tower 
Auxiliary building~. 
Ventilation, oil station, other 
Temporary work . 
Preparation and lantl compensation 
Tests, survey and exploration 
Design 
Channel dredging 
Railway and highway 1utside port 
Railway and highway bridges 
Water and power outside port 
Farmland reform 
Equipment .. 
Technical assistance and trammg 
Total 
Conversion 
o.sa 
4.oa 
1.0 
i.osb 
1.02 
1.02 
0.98 
1.02~ 
0.97 
t.21e 
i.ose 
i.ose 
1.ose 
1.02 
1.02 
1.00 
l.OOf 
1.34 
4.00 
0.98 
0.97 
1.02 
1.15 
1.00 
1.34 
1.00 
1.05 
Source: World Band Staff Appraisal Report No.6230-CHA. 1987. 
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Table B2. Tianjin port project: conversion factors for major components 
Cost component 
Unskilled labour 
Transport 
Diesel 
Gas<..,line 
Other fuel 
Electricity 
Project conversion factor 
Conversion factors 
0.50 
0.90 
0.90 
1.00 
2.40 
1.50 
0.99 
Source: World Band Staff Appraisal Report No.5856-CHA. 1986. 
Table B3 Ningbo and Shanghai port: Shanghai port conversion factors 
Cost components 
Civil worksh 
Baoshan (6): 
Timber (1) 
Container (1) 
General cargo ( 4) 
Guangang - general cargo(8) 
Zhujiament - coal (2) 
Minsheng - grain (2) 
Equipment 
Baoshan (6) 
Guangang - general cargo(8) 
Zhujiament - coal (2) 
Minsheng - grain (2) 
d .• Tech. assistance an tramm~ 
Total (18): 
Timber (1) 
Container (1) 
General cargo (12) 
Coal (2) 
Grain (2) 
Total 
Conversion factorsa 
1.09 
1.09 
1.09 
1.09 
1.09 
1.09 
1.18 
1.18 
1.18 
1.18 
3.93 
1.04 
1.03 
1.04 
1.05 
1.03 
1.04 
Notes: . factors are based on detailed estimates of conversion 
a These aggregate conver~1on 
factors made at nearby Chmese pi~~· of berths. 
Jj Number in parentheses are num 1988 
W Id Bank Staff Appraisal Report No.7257-CHA. Source: or 
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Table B4 Xiarnen port project: conversion factors for major components 1988 
Cost component 
U nskillCd labOur 
Skilled labour 
Temporary worker 
Electricity 
Water 
Fuel 
Conversion factors 
0.50 
4.00 
1.06 
1.50 
1.21 
1.00 
Source: World Bank Staff Appraisal Report No. 7296-CHA. 1988 
Table BS. Xiamen port project: conversion factors for all berths 1988 
Cost component 
Container and general cargo berth 
Revetment 
Dredging 
Sheds, yard and road pavement 
Stacking yard 
Road (others) 
Cable trench 
Auxilliary buildings 
Earth works/backfilling 
Water supply and sewerage 
Power supply 
Communications 
Environmental protection 
Railway inside port 
Road, rails and infrastructure 
outside port 
Others 
Equipment 
Loading/unloading equipment 
Control Systems 
Tech. assistance and training 
Master plan 
Action plan . 
Financial informatlo!1.system 
Construction superv.lSl~n 
Environmental momtonng 
Training 
Total 
Conversion factors 
1.07 
1.08 
0.99 
1.02 
1.02 
1.21 
1.08 
1.08 
1.07 
1.21 
1.21 
1.21 
1.00 
0.97 
0.99 
1.00 
1.40 
1.40 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
1.40 
4.00 
1.08 
Source: World Bank Staff Appraisal Report No.7296-CHA. 1988 
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AppendixC 
World Bank Convers· ...., aon .. actors For Transportation Projects 
Table Cl. Railway project: conversion factors 
Component cpa cpb CfC cpd CfC 
Land 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Labour 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Services 4.00 
Materials 1.00 
Steel 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Timber 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Cement 1.00 1.00 LOO 
Others 1.00 
Civil work 1.08 
Sub grade 0.92 
Track laying 0.92 
Bridges and culverts 1.08 
Buildings 1.08 
Others 1.34 1.15 
Mechanical Equipment: 
Imported 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Local 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 
Mechanical & electrical 
system on expressway 1.30 
Sources: 
: World Bank Staff Appraisal Report No. 4560-CHA. 1984. 
World Bank Staff Appraisal Report No. 5512-CHA. 1985. 
c World Bank Staff Appraisal Report No. 6002-CHA. 1986. 
d World Bank Staff Appraisal Report No. 7148-CHA. 1988. 
e World Bank Staff Appraisal Report No. 6344-CHA. 1987. 
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Table C2. Second railway project: conversion factors for different locomotives 1982-88 
Component Dongfeng Shaoshan. G.E. Steam diesel : electric diesel 
Fuel 1.47 1.63 1.42 1.63 Wages 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Locomotive repairs 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Loco. depreciation 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Wagon repairs 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Wagon depreciation 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
maintenance 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 depreciation 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Loco. preparation 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Lubricants 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63 
Source: World Bank Staff Appraisal Report No. 5512-CHA. 1985. 
Table C3. Highway projects: conversion factors for major components 
Conversion Convers~on 
Components factorR factor 
Land 1.00 
Construction 0.90 
Unskilled labour 0.50 
Skilled labour 
Materials: 
Cement 1.00 
Timber 1.00 
Steel 1.00 
Bitumen 
Fuel 
Equipment: 
1.34 Domestic 
Foreign 1.00 
1.00 Overhead 
Miscellaneous 1.00 
V•ihicle Operation 
depreciation 
maintenance 
Overheads 
Sources: . R N 5408 CHA· 
a w Id Band Staff Apprru.sal eport 0 · - ~ 
b' W~~ld Band Staff Appraisal Report No.7167-CHA, 
c.' World Band Staff Appraisal Report No.7168-CHA. 
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.. 
0.70 
3.00 
1.00 
1.3~ 
1.3 
1.30 
1.00 
1.00 
1.30 
.. 
1.00 
1.30 
1.70 
1.00 
Conversion 
factorc 
.. 
0.70 
3.00 
1.00 
1.30 
1.30 
1.30 
1.00 
1.00 
1.30 
.. 
1.00 
1.30 
1.70 
1.00 
AppendixD 
World Bank conversion factors for power projects 
Table Dl. Power projects: conversion factors 
Component Conversion 
Unskilled labour 
Skilled labour 
Material 
facto~ 
Cement 1.41 
Steel 1.10 
Gasoline 0.81 
Diesel 1.04 
Explosives 1.16 
Timber 1.32 
Standard conversion factor 
Sources: 
Conver%on 
factor 
0.5 
.. 
0.80 
a World Bank Staff Appraisal Report No.4334-CHA. 1984. 
b World Bank Staff Appraisal Report No. 5147-CHA. 1985. 
c World Bank Staff Appraisal Report No.6720-CHA. 1987. 
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Conversion 
factorC 
0.75 
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